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Abstract
The purpose of this Dissertation is to analyze the current ills of the international tax system with
a special focus on developing countries, and to structure and present a Unitary Taxation System
(“UT”) as a solution to the legitimate and multifaceted complaints about current international
taxation of multinational companies (“MNEs”). The research aims at presenting a UT that would
restore credibility in the international tax arena by providing fiscal predictability and certainty to
MNEs, and ensuring appropriate taxation by all countries (specifically developing nations) of all
“real” economic activity within their borders. Although this issue has been previously explored,
there is currently a vacuum to be filled concerning a coherent and complete UT as an alternative
to the current taxation of MNEs from a developing countries’ perspective. Specifically, there is a
need for a major research and elaboration of a specific UT that would satisfy the legitimate
concerns of developing countries while not alienating the developed world and MNEs. That is
the goal of this Dissertation.
The international tax regime was created in an effort to avoid situations where the same income
was subject to double taxation due to the exclusive fact that it had a cross border character.
However, sovereign tax laws and tax regimes have grown so different, and international
economic activity has grown so large that the debate ought to shift from the exclusive legitimate
need to avoid double taxation to the urgent imperative to prevent double non-taxation and other
undue tax arbitrage schemes1 that are threatening the very existence and credibility of the
international tax regime. The current debate2 in the international tax world about the

1

David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax System, 53 Tax L. Rev. 137 (1999).
Avi-Yonah, Kimberly Clausing, and Michael Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt
a Formulary Profit Split. Michigan Law School: Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers (2008).
2
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inappropriateness of arm’s length standards and its disservice to tax authorities across the globe
is opening a tremendous opportunity to reflect and design an international tax system that is fair
to MNEs by providing them with fiscal certainty, and fair to all countries, particularly
developing countries, by allowing them adequate taxation of economic activity through
independent and sovereign tax policies.
This research is a response to the current global outcry about the misfortunes of the international
tax treatment of MNEs, largely based on the separate accounting arm’s length standard (“ALS”).
Currently MNEs that operate in different countries have very complex and burdensome tax rules
applicable to them. The economic realities of MNEs’ operations have shown completely
irrelevant in the design of the applicable tax rules. MNEs have therefore proven extreme
creativity in using tax rules to their advantage since these rules are not inspired and usually have
no real impact on the economics of their transactions. The need to conduct a business in a foreign
country in the form of a Permanent Establishment (“PE”) for example is very comparable, on a
strict economic standpoint, to the regime of conducting the same business in the form of a
Controlled Foreign Corporation (“CFC”). However, in the view of tax law, the not so
economically relevant fact of choosing a PE or a CFC has tremendous fiscal consequences. The
debate over “check the box” regime in the U.S. and its use abroad by U.S. MNEs is a telling
example.3

The main focus of this research is twofold: on the one hand I intend to analyze the current ills of
taxation of MNEs, their negative impact on tax authorities in developing countries specifically,

3

Steven Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check the Box Election, and the Future of Tax
Simplification, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 405 (2005).
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and the urgent need for a different approach. On the other hand, I intend to design and structure a
proposal for a better way of taxing MNEs. Through this structure, I intend to align international
tax rules to economic realities. The UT proposed in this research would provide for equitable
taxation of MNEs in every jurisdiction they operate in, specifically, in the developing world. The
research therefore aims at providing an in-depth study and explanation of the current
unsustainable international tax regime, its weaknesses and unfairness in taxing MNEs; then the
construction of a new and better structure to approaching and taxing MNEs: the UT. First, the
discussion of the ills of the current system, focusing specifically on the developing countries,
would require empirical research of current specific international tax policies in selected sample
countries. Also, the design of a new structure would require answering several questions
including: what is a UT (an agreement on definitions of Unitary Business, Combined Reporting
and Formulary Apportionment)? What can be learned from previous experiences of application
of various forms of UT (a look at UT within U.S. States, as well as the European experience with
the Common Consolidated Tax Base “CCTB”)? How does UT compare with the present system,
in terms of ease of operation and outcomes, for MNEs and for tax authorities? What would be
the administrative implications for tax assessments? What changes (ideally the least disruptive)
to the legal framework would be necessary for a transition to UT? What would be the
administrative cost of such transition, specifically for developing countries?

The answers to the questions raised in this research are utterly important and relevant because
they will fill the vacuum by providing a concrete proposal on how to tax MNEs in a way that is
fair to developing countries and would address the current shouts and cries of MNEs and
governmental authorities about the global fiscal uncertainty.

7

Introduction
The International tax regime is at a crossroads and the path to be chosen is yet to be determined.
Many solutions have been attempted none of which has totally satisfied the needs of the different
actors in the international arena. The current system, largely based on a solid network of bilateral
tax treaties and other Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”), has been designed in order to
assure that the same income earned should not be subject to multiple instances of taxation due to
the simple fact that it has a cross border character. In fact, early tax treaties were denominated
“convention for prevention of double taxation”.4 The international community and the
international tax regime have more successfully than not achieved this goal. In fact, the burden
of preventing double taxation has been taken on by national tax authorities directly and
unilaterally to the point where some have argued that bilateral tax treaties are no longer
necessary to avoid double taxation.5 This sentiment is echoed in the current environment of tax
treaty negotiation and drafting to the point where most modern tax treaties do not enunciate the
need to avoid double taxation in their titles.6 The need to avoid double taxation was made
necessary as economic activity grew beyond single nations. Today, economic activity has grown
so large and the world has become so interconnected that if concerns about double taxation seem
diminished, the emerging trend is the legitimate concerns about tax arbitrage and double non
taxation.7 The internationalization of economic activity is demonstrated by a large and very
powerful conglomerate of MNEs.8 The biggest and most impactful companies today operate in
4

See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income between the U.S. and Japan, Mar. 8, 1971.
5
Tsilly Dagan, Tax Treaties Myth, The, 32 NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 939 (1999).
6
See for example, U.S. Canada tax treaty of 1980, as revised in 2007.
7
See Jane Gravelle, Tax havens: International tax avoidance and evasion, National Tax Journal 727 (2009).
8
See for example, Richard Barnet and Ronald Muller, Global Reach: the Power of the Multinational Corporations,
26 Catholic University Law Review 2 (1977); See also, Brian Roach, Corporate Power in a Global Economy, Tufts
University (2007).
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several sovereign countries and their taxation has animated many debates. Today, even though
these MNEs are very connected and coordinate their global activities very closely, international
tax laws, accentuated by the tax treaties network, have chosen to ignore the economic reality and
rather to treat those companies as separate entities dealing independently with each other.9 This
has created an opportunity for MNEs to basically choose where to pay taxes, if at all. There is a
growing perception that governments lose substantial corporate tax revenue because of corporate
designs solely aimed at shifting profits in ways that erode the taxable base from alleged high tax
jurisdictions to the so called tax havens10 notwithstanding the fact that economic activity is
located in the former jurisdictions.11 There currently is a growing realization by some that taxes
are only paid by the naïve.12 Tax revenues are particularly critical in developing countries and
such countries have been feeling the full weight of tax evasion by MNEs.13 There is
overwhelming admission today that the system of taxation of MNEs is broken.14 However,
nothing is as far from a consensus on how to solve it. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) in an attempt to solve the problem in the mid-2000s
regrettably doubled down and made matters worse by bringing more transactions under the failed
ALS of transfer pricing.15 The OECD is back at it again by issuing a report calling for major
research on how to solve the problems related to taxation of MNEs and specifically base erosion

9

See Article 9 of the U.S., OECD, and U.N. Model Tax Conventions, providing for the separate accounting and arm’s
length standard.
10
A tax haven generally refers to a country or an independent territory where taxes are levied at a low to zero
rates. Traditional examples include Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Luxembourg or Switzerland.
11
See, for example, Bloomberg: “the great corporate tax dodge”; the New York Times: “but nobody pays that”; the
Times: “secrets of tax avoiders”; the Guardian: “tax gaps”
12
OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting , January 2013, available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/bepsreports.htm (last retrieved 12/13/2015).
13
See Clemens Fuest and Nadine Riedel, Tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax expenditures in developing countries:
A review of the literature, Report prepared for the UK Department for International Development (DFID) (2009).
14
See Shome Parthasarathi, A primer on tax evasion, IMF Working Paper No. 93/21 (1993).
15
See Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, OECD Report, July 17, 2008.
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and profit shifting (“BEPS”).16 This begs the central question of this research: can we design a
better way of taxing MNEs? Is there a better way of meeting MNEs’ needs for fiscal certainty
and the need for countries all across the globe to legitimately exercise their sovereign power to
tax economic activities within their borders? And if such a system exists (and I argue it exist and
intend to craft it), what is it all about? How is it different from the current system? How is it
advantageous for both MNEs and tax authorities globally (specifically in developing countries)?
And what would be necessary to implement that new and arguably better system, departing from
the current rules?
Although there have been writings on this issue, there is currently a vacuum to be filled
concerning a coherent and complete alternative to the current taxation of MNEs based on a UT.
Specifically, there is a need for a major research and elaboration of a specific UT that would
satisfy the legitimate concerns of developing countries while not alienating the developed world
and MNEs. That is the task that this research purports to take on. To achieve this goal, this
research is divided into two main parts, comprised of four chapters each. The first part of this
paper is a diagnostic on how, and an explanation of why the international tax system is currently
broken. In this part, we start with a voyage in the history of taxation in general and international
tax specifically because the knowledge of such history is quintessential to understanding the
current system. Then we discuss major trends driving international tax rulemaking in the
developing world, looking at specific countries as case studies in three different continents.
Finally in this part of the research, we present an analysis of the current shortcomings of the
systems, specifically for developing counties. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the
advocacy of the UT as a viable alternative to the current failed system. In this part, we start by

16

See Supra, Note 12.
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presenting a UT through its common tenets. Then we elaborate the reasons why UT would be the
panacea for the current international tax ills. Finally, we design and structure an international tax
reform proposal based on the UT, and present the current international tax treaty network as a
potential accelerator of a transition to UT, with which it is compatible.

11

Part 1
Past and Present of the International Tax System:
an Evaluation

12

Chapter I
Historical Background

13

Taxation for every country is more than just an expression of a country’s sovereignty; it is a
condition of each country’s existence and ability to meet its most basic responsibilities to its
people.17 To take up a serious discussion around taxation, it is necessary to review its historical
perspective. It is important to not fall into the tempting and rather common habit of a generation
to easily forget the experiences of its predecessors. The history of taxation, even though with
parallels globally, is different between the north and the south. This part of the assay analyses, on
the one hand, the history of taxation in general (A) through discussion of taxation in Colonial
America (1), in Medieval Europe (2), and in colonial and post-colonial Africa (3); and on the
other hand, the discussion of the history of international taxation specifically (B).

17

Ring, Diane, What's at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate: International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 Va. J. Int'l
L. 155 (2008).
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A. The History of Taxation in General
Dating as far back as the biblical tithing18 and even before that, a form of taxation has always
existed throughout times and has shown to be necessary.19 The struggles and evolutions, mainly
from property to personal taxation have marked the history of taxation in America, Europe and
Africa.
1. Taxation and Colonial America
Marks of taxation and contributions to the activities of the collectivity existed throughout
colonial America.20 However, the first general tax law in the American colonies was enacted in
Massachusetts Bay in 1634.21 The early tax laws relied heavily on property taxation, taxation of
things. In fact, the Massachusetts Bay tax law of 1634 was interpreted to mean that the taxes
where to be levied only on the property (specifically land) notwithstanding the curious notion of
“abilityes” used in the law.22
In the colony of New Plymouth, a revision to the Massachusetts Bay tax law of 1634 was passed
in 1643 to define the notion of “ability”. The New Plymouth tax law indicated that assessment
for each person would be “according to their estate and faculties, that is, according to the goods,
lands, improved faculties and small abilities”.23 This New Plymouth tax law is the first in the
history of colonial America to use the term “Faculty”. Tax systems and tax laws throughout
colonial America relied on property and tangible things for assessment of taxation. The

18

Chodorow Adam, Agricultural Tithing and (Flat Tax) Complexity. University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 68
(2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014967
19
Brauner, Yariv, International Tax Regime in Crystallization, An, 56 Tax L. Rev. 259 (2002).
20
See Delos Kinsman, The Income Tax In the Commonwealth of the United States, Publications of the American
Economic Association, 3rd Series, IV, 4 (1903). See also Ripley, Financial History of Virginia, Columbia University
Studies in History, Economics and Public Law Vol. iv, No 1, Pp 17-24.
21
See Colonial Research of Massachusetts Bay, shurtleff’s Ed., No1 Pp 120 (1853).
22
The 1634 tax law stated that each man was to be assessed “according to his estate and with consideration all
other his abilityes whatsoever”.
23
See Records of the Colony of New Plymouth: Laws 1623-1682, Pulsifer’s Ed., No XI, Pp 42.
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innovative tax law of the colony of New Plymouth did not, however, detail the notion of faculty,
nor outline methods through which assessment of taxation of a person’s faculties, would be
accomplished. Nevertheless, the idea of a tax detached from the tangible property was introduced
and the embryo of “faculty taxation” was planted.24 The notion of faculty tax will thereafter
make its way in the Massachusetts Bay later tax legislations and enjoy a wide expansion to other
American colonies.
The colony of New Heaven relied on land taxation until 1640 at which time it expanded the tax
base to include estates by introducing a tax on estates. In 1648, in an effort to increase their
revenues, the colony of New Heaven appointed a committee to inquire as to whether the
Massachusetts Bay style of taxation would be admissible in New Heaven. As a result of the
Committee’s work and recommendations, the colony of New Heaven introduced, in 1649, a law
that imposed tax on the profits of laborers, tradespeople and others.25
In Connecticut, the tax law closely followed the Massachusetts Bay model. The Connecticut tax
law of 1650 stated that “every inhabitant who doth not voluntarily contribute proportionably to
his ability … shall be compelled thereunto by assessment and distress”.26 The law provided for
an assessment based on the situs of the land and the dwelling of the person.27 In Connecticut,
non-compliance with tax laws was strongly sanctioned.
Rhode Island introduced the ‘faculty tax’ a little later, in the tax law passed by the Assembly in
1673. The particularity in Rhode Island however was the fact that the colony entrusted
enforcement of the faculty tax to its peoples. In fact, each inhabitant was task to assess its

24

See Edwin Seligman, The Income Tax: a Study of the History, Theory and Practice of Income Taxation at Home
and Abroad, Political Science Quarterly, Vol X, No 2 (1895).
25
See Records of the colony and Plantation of New Heaven, Pp40.
26
See Colonial Records of Connecticut, Pp548.
27
Id.
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neighbor, and recommend the tax that the neighbor should be liable for based on the person’s
assessment of the properties of its neighbor. The final decision on assessment was however
reserved to a committee of three locally chosen honest and able men.28
In New Jersey, the tax law of 1684 ended the system of taxation solely on property, and
stipulated that tax would be assessed on profits. In fact, the 1684 law in New Jersey brought into
the tax net, in addition to property owners, “all other persons … who are freemen and are
artificers or follow any trade or merchandizing, and also all inholders, ordinary keepers and other
persons in places of profits”.29 The law granted the assessor wide discretion in administering the
new tax provisions.
In Pennsylvania, the faculty tax was not introduced until after the revolution had started. The law
of 1782 imposed a poll tax on all freemen.30 Under this law and similar to the Massachusetts Bay
model, taxes were assessed on profits, not only property. The law afforded the assessor ample
discretion in the assessment of such taxes. In 1785, a revision to the 1782 law was adopted. The
revised version of the law diminished the power and discretion of the tax assessor by providing
for floors and ceilings in the tax assessments and payments. Unlike Massachusetts Bay, the
Pennsylvania tax was a poll tax because it assigned the taxes to be paid based on categories of
persons and classes of professions.31
The Delaware tax law of 1752 which indicated that all persons should be assessed on their
estates, clarified that the estate was not merely the visible and tangible property, but it rather also

28

See Supra at 24 (Seligman).
See Laws of New Jersey, 1664-1701, leaming and Spicer Pp494.
30
See the Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dallas ii, Pp 8.
31
For example, freemen of no profession might be assessed fifty cents to ten dollars, mechanics thirty cents to ten
dollars, retailers fifty cents to five dollars, lawyers and physicians one to ten dollars etc.
29
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included “no visible estate”,32 adopting thereby, the faculty tax model that existed in other
colonies and had gained continuous popularity.
The southern state of Maryland had a very primitive tax system. Taxes were levied evenly and
equally, without regard to notions of ability to pay, or property worth.33 In 1777 the primitive tax
system and its poll tax were abolished and the state instituted a property tax along with a faculty
tax.34 Maryland raised its taxes in 1779, very soon after their introduction in 1777.35 Shortly
thereafter, in 1780, the whole system was abolished.
The state of South Carolina introduced the faculty tax earlier. The faculty tax model was existent
there from the outset and South Carolina did not abolish such system but rather thrived to
improve it over time. The tax law of 1701 clearly imposed tax on citizens according to their
“estate… and abilities”. The later tax law, after the state constitution was adopted, indicated that
tax should be assessed on “the profits of all faculties and professions…”36
As seen above, in the colonial America, the question has seldom been whether to tax; the debate
and evolution instead has always been about how to tax. The distinction between real and
personal property marked the evolution of taxation in the colonial America. Most colonies
started their tax systems with exclusive taxation of real property. Due to the palpable nature of
real property, it made more sense to assess taxes on the tangible objects and any taxation
detached from the tangible was hard to imagine. Authors have usually referred to the property
taxation, predominant during that period, as the ‘real tax’.37 In a quest to expand their tax base
32

See the Laws of the Government of New-Castle, Kent and Sussex upon Delaware, Philadelphia, 1752 Pp234.
See Sketch of tax Legislation in Maryland, Report of the Maryland Tax Commission, Appendix Pp cxxix, Baltimore
(1888).
34
See Maryland Laws of 1777, c. 22 Sections 5, 6.
35
See Maryland Laws of 1779, c. 35 Section 48 (which raised the tax to two and a half percent).
36
See Cooper, Statutes at Large of South Carolina, Pp36, 183.
37
The Notion of real tax to describe taxation of real property remains in some fiscal systems to date. In France and
Cameroon for example, the term “Fiscalite reelle” (translated as real tax) is still used today to describe taxation of
real property as to distinguish it with the taxation of personal property. See also, supra at 24.
33
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and increase their revenues, many colonies adopted the tax on faculties and abilities to capture
that portion of the population with income not necessarily in the form of tangible property. The
then known as “faculty tax” imposed a tax on the revenue without being a pure income tax of the
modern era. The distinctive trait of this tax, compare to the current income tax is that the faculty
tax was not levied on an individual’s total income excluding his expenses or liabilities. The tax
was assessed on presumed income on certain classes and categories of people. The system
resembled a sort of class tax in which different classes within each employment were rated at
fixed amounts and assessed accordingly.
After the constitution of the United States and the formation of the Federation, acts of war and
threats of totalitarian powers raised the importance yet again, of taxation.38 The founding fathers
clearly understood the importance of taxation in order to achieve important goals such as shaping
the national economy, bringing other nations to fair commercial terms, regulating morals or
abolishing slavery.39 The founding document empowered Congress to “lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States”.40 The US Constitution however, provided many limitations to such
otherwise broad taxing powers of Congress. The Constitution clearly indicated that “No… direct
tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census…”41 Any direct tax therefore was prohibited
unless apportioned to the states populations. Many attempts to impose an income tax or other
direct taxes during that period failed on constitutional grounds. In addition, any tax legislation
was subject Alexander Hamilton’s “necessary and proper” requirements for its validity.42 The

38

See Sidney Ratner, American Taxation: Its History as a Social Force in Democracy, the Vail-Ballou Press (1942).
See Walton H. Hamilton and Douglas Adair, The Power to Govern, New York 121-44 (1937).
40
See U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 1.
41
See U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 9, Cl. 4.
42
See Federalist Papers, essay by Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No 33.
39
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corporate tax was sometimes upheld as an excise tax imposed on the privilege of doing business
in corporate form. The first attempt at imposing an income tax was in 1815. In fact in 1815,
Secretary Dallas after proposing a tax on inheritance, a tax on wheat and flour, and a tax on bank
dividends, suggested that an income tax would be easier in order to raise revenues necessary to
pay for the Civil War.43 However, the conclusion of peace made the tax unnecessary and the
whole system of internal revenue was abolished. Many attempts to impose an income tax
thereafter fail through as arguments continued to be raised as to the constitutionality of the
income tax. In fact, the Supreme Court, in 1895, held that a non-apportioned income tax on
interest, dividends, and rents was unconstitutional as a direct tax.44 The necessity of a
constitutional amendment was established in order to sustain an income tax and an Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”). In response, the US Treasury proposed the Sixteenth Amendment to
do away with the apportionment requirement of direct taxes, and specifically of income taxes.45
Notwithstanding many attempts to block the Sixteenth Amendment on the grounds that it was a
dangerous setback in the development of the Union, and many campaigns after its ratification
questioning the legitimacy of the ratification process, the Amendment was passed by Congress
and ratified by the requisite number of States in 1913.46 Tax laws and statutes passed after
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment are often referred to as modern tax statutes, and there
have been several tax statutes since that period; most commonly in the form of the Internal
Revenue Code (“IRC”) and amendments thereon. Similar, the IRS was created and has been the

43

See Special Report on the State of the Finances, American State Papers, Vol VI, Pp885-887 (1832).
See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)
45
See U.S. Const. Amend. XVI stating in part: “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration.”
46
See generally Boris Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power of the Federal Government, 41 The Tax
Lawyer 1 Pp3 (1987).
44
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institution in charge of the administration and interpretation of tax laws. The courts have also
consistently upheld Congress’ broad power to tax.47
2. Taxation and Medieval Europe
In Medieval Europe, states and empires survived if they possessed sufficient and continuous
command over the financial mean necessary to defend their territory and citizens against external
aggressions, and to meet internal challenges to their authority.48 The regularity of wars and
aggressions of this period required ever-increasing amounts of revenues. A successful state was
distinguished by its capacity to mobilize the resources required to maintain its success.49 England
is often presented as the prime example, in early Europe, of strong, centralized state with a
powerful monarchy, a sophisticated system of government, and a single representative institution
claiming to act on behalf of the people.50 The process started with the Kings of Wessex who, in
late ninth century, started the process of centralization by establishing themselves as rulers of the
whole of England and creating local administrations to institutionalize their authority.51 Under
King Edward I,52 the costs of war increased enormously and much of the crown’s expenditures
needed financing. Public taxation was the response. In England however, there was a long
standing principle that any extraordinary taxes, say to pay for wars, had to be authorized. From
1920s therefore, it became normal practice for the Crown to request approval from the

47

See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Co., 384 U.S. 426 (1955) where the court upheld the IRS’s decision to tax punitive
damages awards received by the taxpayer. See also, Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21
(1978) where the court confirmed that wages, along with other gains are taxable income. See also, Murphy v. IRS
as well as Penn Mutual Indemnification Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16 (1960) where the court agreed that the
IRS could properly impose the federal income tax on receipts of money regardless of what the receipt of money is
called.
48
Richard Bonney, The rise of the fiscal state in Europe c. 1200-1815, Oxford University Press (1999).
49
Id.
50
Lynn Thorndike, The history of medieval Europe, Houghton Mifflin (1917).
51
For example, King Alfred the Great who died in 899AD.
52
King Edward I reigned from 1272 to 1307.
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Parliament for any new taxes. Parliament was entrusted with the power to authorize extra
ordinary taxes, granting the Parliament powers and strengthened bargaining position in its
dealings with the Crown. War taxation gave influence to the Parliament and profoundly altered
the basis of English politics thereby planting the early seeds of the balance of powers system.
The change and empowerment of the parliament in England distinguished it from its neighbor
and greatest rival of the time, France. In the French society at the time, there was no
authorization needed from the Parliament to collect taxes, even extraordinary taxes. In 1470s,
John Fortescue drew the distinction of fiscal powers calling the French system the “dominium
regale” while referring to the English system as the “dominium politicum et regale”. The
distinction pointed the fact that in France, the Monarchy was free to impose tax anytime of their
choosing while in England, Parliamentary consent was needed.53 The English system relied on
land taxation in its early days. The highly sophisticated and remarkably productive land tax
known then as the “danegeld”54 provided great resources to the Crown.55 However, this tax
showed ineffective because the Crown, not a taxable subject, was the largest landholder by far in
the territory by 1086. Even attempts at largess to its most remarkable citizens by granting them
land and thereby reducing the percentage ownership of land by the Crown, did not solve the
problem. Another way of raising revenues in late twelfth century was through arbitrary
‘tallages’56 on royal estates and towns and on the Jews.57 For example, King John imposed a very
successful ‘tallage’ for the expansion to Ireland in 1219. In the thirteenth century however, the
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British Empire instituted a tax on the profits, from land and other activities. The main forms of
raising revenues in England were land taxes, custom duties, and later taxes on personal property
and income. The English Empire adhered to a procedure for imposing new taxes, unlike the
French empire of the time.
In France, there were many attempts to attack localities compared to the attempted attacks to the
country as a whole. Taxation in Medieval France, like in England, was driven by the need to
protect the territory against attacks and to provide minimum social services. Defense needs in
France were mostly local and France relied heavily on local taxation. France, unlike England, did
not adopt the “tallage” and instead, various local communities instituted local taxes to respond to
the various local attacks. For example, Charles VI allowed a 5% tax in 1383 in Perigueux in
order to build and repair town defenses.58 In general however, the most important tax in France,
before 1380 (year of its termination) was the hearth tax.59 This tax was relatively consensual as it
was authorized by the central authorities and voted on by local authorities. Nevertheless, the
main point of distinction in early France is the predominance of arbitrary taxation. Taxes in
Medieval France were mostly imposed unilaterally by rulers who then spent the revenues as they
choose. The predominance of arbitrary taxation in Medieval France is justified by the increase in
the powers of rulers, and the prevailing insecurity. In the free deliberations, the King was free to
exempt or lessen the tax burdens of individuals or groups. Specifically, in attempt to secure their
support and perpetuate its reign, the King exempted the nobility from taxation in 1384, right after
the internal revolts of 1380-82. Taxation in Medieval Europe ultimately spurred the major
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revolutions and civil unrest that led not to the abolition of taxation, but rather to a more
democratization of taxation and arguably, more overall levels of taxation in cities and states
across Europe.

3. Taxation and Colonial Africa
In Africa, similar to other societies, a form of taxation has always existed as a way of meeting
common challenges and satisfying the needs of the greater group. The history of taxation in
Africa can be analyzed through the lenses of three main periods, before the colonization (precolonial era), during colonization (colonial era) and after the decolonization (post-colonial era).
First, the pre-colonial era in Africa is marked by unique models of societal organization and a
form of centralized powers through notions of ‘chiefhood’. The early traits of taxation in precolonial Africa can be traced to Ancient Egypt. Under the reign of Pharaoh,60 the Scribes61 were
responsible for raising funds for the dynasty. The Pharaoh afforded the Scribes large powers and
ample discretion in their revenue raising (tax collection) activities. For example and even though
the most important tax of that period was the grain tax, the Scribes instituted a tax on cooking oil
for every household. The cooking oil tax was very hard to enforce and many in Ancient Egypt
attempted to avoid and/or minimize the tax by recycling their oil, and using the same portion of
the cooking oil several times. In response, the Scribes instituted an audit procedure whereby they
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inspected households to make sure that cooking oil was not being recycled.62 In their discretion,
the Scribal tax collectors often used coercion to raise revenues for the Pharaohs. Like most of
precolonial Africa, the Ancient Egyptian society had a predominantly barter economy. As a
consequence, the simplest way to exact the taxes was the ceasing of the actual produces, the
merchandise or property involved in the exchanges. Farmers and the agricultural sector in
general were the highest and most consistently taxed: their fields could be measured, their
produces observable, and their yield calculated regularly by the Scribal tax collectors. Scribal tax
collectors had more difficulties taxing other peoples’ means of livelihood. The ease with which
taxation was assessed to farmers was not possible for other professions and ways of earning
livelihoods. Nevertheless, the risk of not paying or reducing one’s tax liability was highly
punishable and very discouraged. In fact, the law of the Amasis established that anyone who did
not honestly declare the source of his livelihood was punishable by death.63 The large powers
afforded to tax collectors created massive corruption and to protect taxpayers, the Pharaoh
instituted a system of tax receipts and strong punishment to corrupt tax collectors.64 Ancient
Egypt also adopted tax breaks and exemptions. When a farmer was struggling with his
production and was not able to meet his tax obligations, the practice was to offer the farmer a tax
break, and when such farmer returned to prosperity, he was immediately reinstated in the tax net.
Also, some Egyptians were not subject to tax either because the positions they held in society
were too influential for tax collection, or because the state needed their services.65 The pre-

62

See, Barry Kemp, Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilization, Routledge, ISBN 0-415-23549-9 (2006); See also,
Michael Rice, Who's Who in Ancient Egypt, Routledge, ISBN 0-415-15448-0 (2001).
63
Amasis (Ahmose II) was the Pharaoh from 569 to 526 B.C. Amasis was known as a strong leader as is credited as
the last great King of Egypt as the kingdom is reported to have enjoyed great prosperity under his reign. Amasis
established the voluntary declaration system whereby each Egyptian was required to honestly report the source of
his livelihood for tax assessment purposes. Failure to do so accurately, under Amasis law, was punished by death.
64
The condemned tax collectors would usually be tied to polls and publicly beaten by servants of the Pharaoh.
65
See Cyril Aldred, The Egyptians, London, Thames & Hudson (1961).

25

colonial era in Egypt is not unlike other African early societies. Early Sub Saharan African towns
began as fortified villages which grew into larger communities that served several purposes.
People who lived in the same villages generally claimed lineage to the same ancestor. The
extended family, made out parents, grandparents, children and other family members even living
in separate homes or separate villages, comprised a lineage group. The lineage groups were the
basic building blocks of early Sub Saharan African societies. Members of the same lineage group
claimed relation to the common ancestor and the leading members of the group had powers over
others. The lineage group provided support to its members, each member taking care of the
other. The villages and towns in early Sub Saharan African societies were centers of government,
entertained markets with goods for trade, artist who made pottery tools and other crafts, and
farmers trading their crops for goods. In these early societies, the king was the ruler of the
community. The king held audiences to settle disputes, granted favors to distinguished members
of the group, allowed merchants to practice their trade, maintained law and order, and levied
taxes. Similar to Egypt, merchants and other craftsmen used their produces and goods to pay
their taxes to the King and contribute to the larger community. In most of early African societies,
the taxes collected by the King were used to provide for the community and to some extent for
the King’s comfort and prestige. As colonization started and foreign powers started entering the
African territory, the nature and purpose of taxes changed.
Second, during colonization, taxes collected by the Kings in early African societies were
destined to the colonial powers, until the colonial powers started directly exercising their powers
to directly tax their subjects and territories. Colonial officers were instructed to make Africans
pay something in tax, “however poor they may appear to be.”66 Colonial taxation was not simply
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a fiscal measure ensuring revenue and balanced books; it was conceptualized as a moralizing
force, transforming the primitive and barbaric into good, industrious and governable colonial
subjects.67 Many colonial powers started relying on duties to raise revenues in their territories;
however, direct taxes quickly became the main instrument. Frederick Lugard,68 showed his
preference for direct taxes and was one of the early pioneers of direct taxation in the colonies.69
The two main colonial powers that were active in Africa are France and England.70 Across
colonial Africa, taxation was usually imposed by requiring payment of cash. African economies
and peoples at the time, however, relied on barter economy and did not possess the cash.
Colonial powers often imposed tax settlement in cash as a way to compel Africans to sell their
goods, or as a way to create a labor force whereby African would be compelled to work for the
colonial power to obtain the cash needed to pay their taxes.71 The review of taxation in colonial
Africa ought therefore to be seen from the lens of Colonial English Africa and Colonial French
Africa as the two systems presented noticeable differences. Colonial powers in Colonial English
Africa applied generally a colonial system through indirect administration advocated by
Lugard.72 The colonial government chose local representatives and built upon the local tribal
structure to administer their territories. Under these systems, local chiefs and kings were in
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charge of collecting revenues that they thereafter, remitted to the colonial power representatives.
Taxes were collected in the form of goods like Ivory, copper, slaves, salt and labor. It was well
established in these societies that a portion of each inhabitant’s possessions should go to the king
and the king was in charge of remitting most if not all, to the colonial power.73 As indicated by
Leigh Garber, the revenues raised by England in its colonies contributed tremendously to fund
the British Empire costs.74 The British government required each colony to be self-sufficient and
any excess was reverse to England.75 Nevertheless, empirical data shows that taxes collected in
English colonial Africa were much lower than the taxes in French colonial Africa. In addition the
English colonial Africa was unique in that they admitted the principle of “no taxation without
representation” early on. In its 1920, the first meeting of the newly formed National Congress of
British West Africa76 adopted a resolution establishing the principle of “no taxation without
representation” and advocated a more pronounced African control over public revenues of the
colonies.77 French colonies used a direct system of administration of their colonies. The central
French government sent a representative in the colonies and such representatives were in charge
of directly administering the colonies and levying taxes. Taxes collected in French colonies were
comparatively higher and the coercive means used to collect the taxes were reported more brutal.
People in French colonial Africa paid their taxes with the goods they produced and their labor.
The resistance to taxation started in the early days of colonial Africa. Many movements were
formed to protest the imposition of taxes by a foreign power, but such movements were quickly
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silenced with the brutality and coercion of the conquering power. Notions of Kings and
‘Chiefhood’ were diminished and their prestige among the population tarnished. In some
instances, the Kings and Chiefs were used by the colonial powers to raise the revenues and
enforce punishment against the people attempting any protest of the exercise of the taxing power
of the colonial authorities. The taxes collected were generally brought to the central
governmental power and many accounts indicate the necessity of the revenues to fund the central
powers’ governmental obligations to their citizens in the west. Many authors have argued that
tax systems imposed in colonial Africa have many consequences in the view of taxation today.78
African early population were introduced to taxation as a means of funding an oppressor, and
such image, some argue, has shaped the view of taxation by many African population today and
their rebellion to tax compliance.79 The compliance rebellion, however, is not the only trait of
taxation of in post-colonial Africa.
Finally, taxation in post-colonial Africa is a constant struggle of how to tax the unwilling and
how to access the hard to tax. As indicated by Fjeldstad et al,80 taxation in sub Saharan Africa
faces a “trilema”: first, an urgent need for increased revenues and ensuing pressure on taxation to
provide it; then, the strong resistance of the very few with capacity to actually pay the taxes; and
finally, the majority of the people with nearly nothing to tax, show similar strong feelings against
taxation.81 To this list, it is Important to add, following Tadesse and Gunther,82 the impotence of
African post-colonial tax administrations as well as the ever growing underground economy, the
hard to tax. After the independence era, many African countries faced the reality of providing for
their people, the very basics in terms of social services and defense. The weak social structures
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that had emerged from the colonization needed special attention and many areas required
considerable investments. The new independent countries faced a high need for revenues and the
obvious form of obtaining those was through taxation. Governments must be able to ensure
sustainable funding for social programs and public investments for development. The struggles
to raise revenues internally have sometimes been compensated by outside aid and assistance.
However, as aid became more and more questionable or insufficient, African governments were
faced with a choice to either reduce/eliminate expenditures, and/or raise revenues in order to
avoid unsustainable balances in their economies. Many governments reduced their expenditures
to the simplest minimum and still fail to provide a sense of balance to their economies. The
taxation became quickly the royal means of solving the economic and budgetary threat. 83 The
need for revenue and many attempts at raising states intakes have collided with the refusal and
rebellion of the peoples subject to taxation. Taxation is not a popular idea in many places but
African reluctance is unique in many regards and many tax administrations have resolved to
accessing the accessible and taxing the easily available while acknowledging their inability to
reach the hard to tax.84 Many specialists have attributed Africans deep feeling against taxation
and their reluctance to tax compliance to the colonial era.85 During that period and as seen above,
African were required to pay something in tax, however poor they were, and at the same time
they were not allowed to “spend a penny” without express authorization of the colonial power.
Taxes were seen as a reward to their oppressor, and many African have continued to view
taxation through those lenses and would do whatever necessary to escape the tax net.86 Many
newly independent African countries continued to rely heavily on direct taxes and duties postindependence. The tax systems grew to rely primarily on the big industries and big companies
that existed. Corporate taxation of the bigger companies, even though challenging, yielded more
revenues as those businesses were regulated and could not easily hide their existence. As a
consequence of concentration on main big businesses, the major part of the economy fell out of
the tax net. Many attempts to regulate the so called under-ground economy have proven
ineffective.87 Personal income taxes are difficult to collect either because of phenomenon of
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under reporting or because many people are poor and have close to nothing to be taxed on.88
Business taxes, primarily on big business, have been unable to reach small business and lose
tremendously on income from small operations. Collection from large businesses, usually
subsidiaries of multinational companies (“MNEs”) became more difficult as these businesses
started using more sophisticated tax planning techniques beyond the expertise of the newly
formed African countries and their tax administrations.89 After colonization and to date, African
countries have remained at the cross roads of their people despising tax and political price to be
paid for any pressure otherwise, and large established businesses using complex tax planning
strategies that African tax administration have neither the physical capacities nor the intellectual
expertise to respond to and levy the appropriate taxes. Many governments, including in the
developed world, have been outsmarted and outpaced by big MNEs in the development of
creative ways to minimize if not evade taxation. Tax administrations have usually played “catch
up” in these circumstances and have reacted to counter MNEs strategies. The reaction has always
required seasoned expertise to match the creativity in the private sector. The reaction of tax
administrations in Africa, if at all, has come late and has shown very slow to curve the patterns
and, more often than not, ineffective. The ineffective taxation in post-colonial Africa, and the
various barriers to expanding the tax base have led government to focus on getting their revenues
mostly from specific industry sectors, such as natural resources industry sectors. Some authors
have argued that the incompetence to tax citizens has also been a major impediment to the
establishment and expansion of democracy. Governments, because they get their revenues
mostly from a restricted sector of industry, do not feel accountable to the nations as a whole,
instead deal with the stakeholders in the specific industries and feel accountable to them.90 A
more aggressive tax collection and tax participation from the regular citizens could participate in
more involvement in the affairs of the nation. Additionally, the collection of the revenues from
their inhabitants could lead the leaders to feel and express more political accountability toward
their people.91
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4. Common Denominator in Global Tax History: Tax Disdain
The existence and collection of taxes has grown hand in hand with the revolts against taxes and
tax payment. Because taxation has often been onerous, and sometimes excessive and cruel,
reaction to its enforcement has been consistent, heated and usually violent.92 Tax revolts date at
least as far back as the Later Han Dynasty in Asia,93 the Hammurabi era in Babylon,94 and the
Roman Empire in Europe.95 Many major events in world history, including the Magna Carta, the
American Revolution, and the French Revolution, had their roots as tax protests. Taxation simply
provides an ostensible cause for protest and insurrection because they represent an easily
identifiable and detested target.96 Most people understand and deal with taxes at the very
personal level. Taxes are tangible and almost everyone pays them, whether in moneys or goods;
therefore, the objections to taxes are easily popularized and the disgruntlement comes
immediately. As seen above, there has always been a form of taxation. The ancient states of
Persia, Greece, Egypt, and Rome all relied heavily on a form of taxation to meet their revenue
needs. Early forms of taxation included real property, sales and inheritance taxes, as well as
various custom duties. The introduction of these taxes as well as their maintenance sparked
various revolts and protest throughout history. Nevertheless, and as stated by Benjamin Franklin,
only taxes and death are certain this world; indeed, many people share the opinion that of the
certitudes throughout history, it has become easier to avoid death than taxes. Rebellions and riots
protesting imposition of taxes and the activities of tax collectors exist across centuries. Below,
we will analyze some major historical events, in diverse geographical areas to underscore the
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point that the common global trend in the history of taxation is its permanent coexistence with
revolt and protest.
In the Roman Empire, in year 6, Augustus Caesar introduced a 5% tax levy on inheritance. The
tax sparked general protest and was widely unpopular. The furious revolt, known as the Senate
Tax Opposition forced Caesar to consider alternative levies. However, the alternatives
considered were less attractive and Caesar used oppression to successfully implement his
inheritance tax proposal.
In addition, in year 400, the Roman Empire experienced the so called Garlic Trader’s Tax
Avoidance movement in Gaul. Badly affected by the tax, many traders in Gaul fled to avoid
taxation. The legislation of year 400 revealed that the City of Gaul was losing members who fled
to anonymity of the countryside, preferring to live under the shelter of a wealthy rural patron
rather than paying the proper taxes.
In the Byzantine Empire, in year 722, taxes brought to light a deep dislike between the emperor
and the clergy. After suffering a defeat against the Arab forces in Armenia in 720, the forces of
the Empire regained momentum by defeating the Arab forces in Isauria in 721. The ongoing
Arab assault and the response increased the military expenditures of the Empire and the Emperor
needed further revenues. In an effort to raise the needed revenues to fund the Arab war, Emperor
Leo III97 levied greatly increased taxes on Rome and Italy in 721 and 722. However, Pope
Gregory II98 publicly and forcefully rejected the increased taxes. The Pope specifically
denounced the poll tax. Leo III in fact ordered that the Pope be assassinated and replaced in order
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to do away with the opposition to his taxes.99 The Pope sent out communications to the people of
Rome and Italians, instructing them to oppose Leo III’s decrees. The Italian took up arms to
defend the Pope against the Emperor, and to protect their own liberties. Italians also endeavored
to choose their own Emperor instead and in replacement of Leo III. Unable to control Rome, Leo
III was obligated to back down, abolishing the increased taxes. Many commentators attribute the
independence of the church from governmental power as well as the tax free status of churches
to this early fight and resistance by Pope Gregory II which remained known as the Papal Tax
Rejection of 722.100
The struggles between the papacy and the kingdom continued late in the 13th Century. In 1297,
Monarch Edward I101 of England, declared war to King Philip IV102 of France. Both kingdoms
were already engaged in war, and this new military adventure stretched their military budgets. In
a search for new revenues to cover the war, Edward I and Philip IV instituted a tax on the Clergy
and the church. However, these measures were put in place at the time where Cannon Law
explicitly prohibited taxation of the church by the state. In fact, Pope Boniface VIII103 had
declared the Prohibition of taxation of Clergy. The Pope saw taxation as an assault to clerical
right and took a hard stand against it. In 1296 the Pope denounced Edward and Philip’s levies in
a Bull titled Clericis Laicos104 whereby he indicated the prohibition of any taxation without prior
and express papal approval. The Pope instructed excommunication of anyone who levies the
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taxes or pays them without the required papal approval. In the bull, Boniface stated "they exact
and demand from the same the half, tithe, or twentieth, or any other portion or proportion of their
revenues or goods; and in many ways, they try to bring them into slavery, and subject them to
their authority. And also whatsoever emperors, kings, or princes, dukes, earls or
barons...presume to take possession of things anywhere deposited in holy buildings...should
incur sentence of excommunication."105 Nevertheless, the emperors of both France and England
had a very strong response to the Papal tax opposition. In France, Philip IV prohibited the
expatriation of property outside of France thereby preventing the transfer of the church’s
revenues from France to Rome. In England, Edward I denied all judicial protections to the
church; the church and its members could not bring cases to the royal courts, but every case
brought against the church and its members was to be heard.106 With these restrictions, Pope
Boniface had his hands tied and was obliged to agree to the taxation of the church and the clergy.
France and England therefore instituted clergy taxation. Pope Boniface’s initial opposition to
taxation in fact led to the diminution of the papacy and the expansion of the monarchal power.107
In fact, Pope Boniface was ultimately removed and succeeded by Pope Clement V,108 who
moved the papacy to France and basically subordinated himself to the monarchical power by
repealing the acts posed by Pope Boniface to establish Church’s supremacy. Further, Pope
Clement V basically endorsed most policies and demands of the French Monarchy whether as
regards to tax increases or supremacy of the state over the church.109
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In England in June 1215, King John signed the Magna Carta, the Great Chart, in Runnymede, as
a symbol of the victory of the English nobility against the King’s tax proposal. King John
attempted an unsuccessful military campaign to regain control of Normandy, creating an
increased need for revenues for the Kingdom. To raise the revenues, the unpopular King John
imposed, in May 1214, a new Scutage, a tax paid in place of military service, on his baronial
tenants. The barons were already subject to a Scutage, already set at 2 marks, which they
considered too high. The new Scutage was set at 3 marks, an unacceptable increase for the
baronial tenants. Most barons refused to pay the new tax. In an effort to compel them, the King
met with a group of nobles; however, the nobles vehemently rejected the tax and failed to reach
any agreement with the King. Instead, the barons swore to withdraw their allegiance to the King
unless he restored their rightful laws and liberties (including the old Scutage tax). The barons
gathered an armed force to pressure the king and enforce their demands, if needed. The barons
marched and presented their demands to the King, which the king rejected, forcing the barons to
officially withdraw their allegiance to the King and march to London. Under growing pressure,
the King agreed to meet with the insurgents near Windsor. After about a week of discussions and
negotiations, the conclave produced a document that became the basis of the Magna Carta.
Although intended to secure a variety of liberties, the Great Chart was largely an outgrowth of
the barons’ resistance to taxes. Two chapters in the Great Chart were dedicated to taxation.
Chapter twelve posed the requirement that any new Scutage tax or aid or tallages in the city of
London be approved by the Common Council of the Kingdom.110 Chapter fourteen on the other
hand required the assembling of the Common Council of the Kingdom whenever its approval is
necessary for new taxes, and indicated procedures for notifying the nobles of the assembling of
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the Council.111 The Magna Carta therefore posed the basis of the principle of ‘no taxation
without representation’. However, the representation prescribed therein was that of the nobility,
the most influential and powerful, not the people as a whole.
The power of representation in taxation, even when afforded to the people in later English years,
would not go unchallenged. In 1736, a general protest known as the Gin Act Protest of 1736
would demonstrate the power of the people to protest against an assembly attempting to restrict
consumption of spirit (specifically Gin) through taxation. In 1727, the annual consumption of
spirits was 3.5 million gallons; by 1735, the annual consumption had increased to about 5.5
million gallons. In 1735, the London area alone accounted for more than 7,000 Gin shops
offering quick and easy access to drinks. By 1736, the plethora of spirits and Gin shops
presented a concern of drunkenness especially amongst apprentices and servants. The Parliament
responded with the Gin Act of 1736. The Act aimed at making the consumption of spirits more
expensive by levying taxes on them. Under the Act, a duty of 20 shillings per gallon had to be
imposed on spirits and all spirit retailers had to pay a yearly license fee.112 The Act, along with
other frustrations sparked massive riots starting in July 1736 displaying over 2000 protesters.
Also, reports emerged of plans to assassinate the drafters of the Gin Act in the Parliament; and
many others protested by massive distribution of free Gin to the people. Nevertheless, the revolt
was not successful at repealing the Gin Act, and its revisions, first in 1743 and then in 1751
continued the taxation of the spirits and eventually slowed and controlled Gin consumption
within the kingdom.
In France, in 1548, the King imposed a tax on salt known as the “Gabelle” and a direct tax on
land known as the “Taille”. The introduction of these taxes provided the catalyst for revolt.
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People opposing the taxes formed a rebellion, known as the Guyenne Revolt, in Guyenne and its
neighboring provinces. The rebellion was one of the biggest agrarian rebellions of that century.
The taxes were widely unpopular and parishes and the church joined in to organize protests
against the taxes. In August of 1548, protesters slaughtered the King’s Lieutenant General and
seven supposed tax officials. Many local representatives of the King refrained from taking action
against the revolt, and some shared the non-fiscal purpose of the protests. King Henry II, in
1549, rescinded the salt tax forever in Guyenne and its neighboring provinces by pledging that
neither him, nor his successor in perpetuity would again impose that tax.
Yet, in 1643, the Taille (the direct tax) is one of attempted tax proposals that met strong protests
known as the Tax Risings of 1643, a yearlong series of tax revolts across France. In May 1643, a
five-year-old, Louis XIV succeeded to power, after his father’s death. At that time, France was at
war with the Habsburgs and more revenues were needed to finance the war. As always, the
kingdom imposed new taxes which in turn, provoked several revolts. During the year 1643,
rebellions were recorded against the Taille across France including in Guyenne, Rouergue,
Tours, Alencon, Gascony, and Clermont. There were regular attacks against tax collectors
including protest in Valence where the resident rose up and drove the tax collectors out of town.
Tax collectors were killed in Toulouse, and a mob of several thousands in Ile-de-France attacked
a troop of soldiers dispatched to enforce the collection of taxes.
Even the second great revolution in Western civilization during the 18th Century, the French
Revolution,113 originated to a large extent, in discontent against taxes. Even though the
Revolution tackled many issues, taxes ranked high on the agenda. In fact, tax troubles were
palpable. No laws, including tax laws of the national government applied uniformly throughout

113

The French Revolution lasted from 1789 to 1802.

38

France. Taxes in the northern and central districts were notoriously more burdensome than taxes
in the south of France. Taxpayers in Paris paid more taxes per head than any other person in
Europe; similarly, French people as a whole, in proportion to their wealth, were more heavily
taxed than the people of any other nation in Europe. Further, the inequity of the national
mishmash and the regional comparative burden were worsened by the various tax exemptions
granted to nobilities including exemptions to Taille,114 Gabelle115 and Corvee.116 As a
consequence, the ensuing multi-year and generalized revolution drew its inspiration and passions
from the crucial inequities in the taxation system. The social inequalities were seen as
encouraged by the tax system, and the drive to abolish classes was fueled by the need to establish
a tax system uniformly and non-discriminatorily applicable to all throughout France. Following
the 1789 uprising, marking the beginning of the French Revolution, citizens stopped paying
taxes and threatened officials who tried to collect them. In years 1790 and 1791, local taxes on
commerce and consumption including tax on tobacco and salt, were abolished. The Deputies of
the revolution naively proposed a tax system with direct taxes, no exemptions, no enforcement
mechanisms with an expectation that citizens would voluntarily pay the taxes since the proposed
systems met the egalitarian requirements voiced in the 1789 uprising. The policy quickly showed
to be a mistake.
In Guatemala in 1659, Guatemalan indigo producers and merchants, the richest and most
powerful section of that society, designed a system allowing them to evade taxes when they lost
control of the tax system. Until 1667, indigo merchants controlled the tax system and as a
consequence no taxes were collected from them. However, when they lost control of the tax
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system, and to respond to the state’s efforts to collect taxes on the merchants, taxpayers designed
a strategy with the then tax exempt church, strategy known as the Indigo Tax Evasion. In fact,
the merchants sold the indigo to church officials who thereafter, and free of any taxation, sold the
indigo to the Mexican and the Spanish purchasers.
Later, in 1763, a series of reforms including increase in taxes initiated by the Spanish crown led
to generalized protests in Guatemala. The protest was known as the Bourbon Fiscal Reform
Resistance. In an attempt to reform the Guatemalan tax system which was dominated by the
indigo merchants and derived most of its revenues from the tributes paid by the Indians, the
Spanish Crown delegated The Visitador from Mexico into Guatemala. The Visitador abolished
the Indian Tributes by ending the farming tax system, took control of the tax system from the
merchants, instituted a sales tax, and doubled the existing Barlovento, a tax originally intended to
support the Caribbean fleet. The Visitador also levied tax on goods that had never been taxed,
and added new import and export duties. Under mounting pressure and continuous complaint
sent to the Crown in Spain, and various threats of massive popular uprising, the Spanish Crown
agreed to reinstitute pre-existing taxes to their previous levels. Additionally, and to diffuse the
threat, the Guatemalan president suspended the collection of the tax on resale and distributed
grains to the poor areas of the city.
In the 1880s in Egypt, many revolts and resistances were recorded specifically against the salt
tax. In 1883 for example, as the epidemic of cholera ravaged the people of Cairo, officials in
charge of tax collection were given absolute powers. Tax collectors had the ‘right to use violence
in order to enforce respect of the law,’ here, the tax law. The salt tax was widely unpopular and
many tax collectors suffered fatal experience with the protesters. In 1886 in Faiyum, peasants
rose up and murdered a salt tax collector. Similarly, a tax collector was assassinated by the
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people of Wadi Natrum. There were widespread hostilities against tax collectors, which resulted
in significant loss of revenues in Egypt in the 1880s.
In the neighboring Ethiopia, taxation and failure to pay taxes led to the so called Bale Rebellion
starting in 1963. The Ethiopian central government and its corrupt local tax officials used land
expropriations to sanction any non-payment of taxes. The residents of Bale, a southern province
of Ethiopia and bordering Somalia took refuge into Somalia when expropriated from their lands
for non-payment of taxes. With Somalian expansion plans, the anger in Bale presented an
opportunity. The residents of Bale organized a rebellion against corrupt tax systems and
protested against their expropriation. Somalia encouraged and supported the rebellion.
Ultimately, the Ethiopian central government intervened, quelled the rebellion, and offered a
cancellation of all tax liability and arrears for land owners. Additionally, the government allowed
a reclaiming of the land by the formerly expropriated owner with no previous tax liability
attached.
Tax protests were just as common, albeit non-violent, in India. In 1921, the Guntur district
organized a tax resistance movement forcing many government officers to resign their posts
succumbing to intimidation. Rejecting advice from Mahatman Ganghi, resisters initiated their
non-cooperative campaign centered on the refusal to pay taxes. The campaign continued
throughout January 1921, causing a big drop in government revenues. The tax resistance
movement in India along with other contemporaneous revolts had wider political ambitions of
doing away with the British rule.
In Japan in 1770, the Fukuyama rising marked the third in a series of tax rebellions in the
Fukuyama during the eighteenth century. After his accession to power in 1769, Lord Mosatomo
was presented with a series of nineteen demands. The peasants, authors of the demands,
specifically requested their Lord reduced the enterprise taxes on cotton. Mosatomo resisted the
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demands and the peasants organized a movement to protest against Mosatomo. In 1772,
Mosatomo responded forcefully by ordering the execution of the Leaders of the rising.
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B. History of International Taxation Specifically
As seen above, taxation has been throughout history, the omnipresent tool to raise revenues to
provide for the community. Throughout history, taxation was justified by the need to provide for
the defense of the territories and sometimes for the basic social services or a way of honoring
royalties.117 At national levels therefore, the need to tax was established and taxation was
commonly applied for transactions within the state. In the United State for example, the passage
of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 legitimized Congress’s constitutional power to tax residents
of the U.S. in very broad terms.118 The consensus to tax at national level raised questions when
cross border activities became involved. With growing need for bilateral and multilateral
cooperation, taxation of cross border and international transactions became a concern. Very early
on, as economic activity grew and evolved beyond the frontiers of one country, there were
questions regarding the application of sovereign taxing powers of several countries on the same
income. Each state, aiming at taxing economic activity within its borders and/or income of its
citizens, targeted all kinds of income. It therefore became obvious that double taxation would
exist and would interfere with cross border transactions and transnational economic activities.119
This concern was very important in the early twentieth century, specifically after World War I,
when most countries engaged in behaviors of protectionism and retrieval from global
cooperation.120 Possible double taxation was seen as added threat for countries growing further
apart from each other. When income is earned in one country by a citizen or resident of another
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country, both the country where income is earned (the source country) and the country where the
investor or earner resides (the residence country) have legitimate claims to tax the income. The
basic task of international tax rules was to resolve the competing claims of residence and source
nations in order to avoid the double taxation that results when both fully exercise their taxing
powers.
Facing this situation, the League of Nations, newly created after World War I and aiming at
promoting international cooperation between countries looked to find a solution to double
taxation as a way of promoting international economic cooperation. In early 1920s, the League of
Nations appointed a Commission121 and charged it with the task of finding a solution to the threat
of international double taxation. The Commission composed of four prominent economists
representing both capital importing and capital exporting countries had to design a solution that
would allow cross border cash flow to be subject to a single instance of taxation. Members of the
commission had different perspectives on the issue. View from the side of capital exporting
countries and led by Professor Seligman122 of the United States on the Commission, the argument
was that all taxation has to be by the country of residence. Professor Seligman used arguments of
ability to pay to declare that any source based taxation was “illegitimate” in that view.123 Under
his view, the residence country has an exclusive right to levy tax and the source country has the
obligation to assure that there is no double taxation. On the other end of the spectrum, capital
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importing countries represented on the Commission by Professor Luigi Einaudi124 of Italy argued
that taxation shall be exclusive to the country of source. Under this view, the connection to the
source country and the ability of the country to levy the tax gives exclusive taxing power to the
source country and the residence country has the obligation to assure that there is no double
taxation. The debate was framed in terms of rich versus poor countries. In fact, rich countries
exporting capitals needed to ensure that their investment was not subject to taxation locally and
that taxation should only occur where the investors reside, thereby giving such rich countries, the
exclusive power to tax. Poor countries on the other hand maintained that economic activity was
within their borders, and income earned within their borders; consequently they were sole qualify
to exercise taxing power.125
After intensive debate, the Commission came out with a solution, labeled the “great compromise
of the 20s.”126 The Commission submitted its report in 1923 representing the compromise
reached by the four economists in eliminating double taxation. The League of Nations adopted
the report and it was publicized in 1923. Under the Compromise, income was divided into two
main categories: active income,127 and passive income.128 The solution was to allow source
countries the privilege of taxing active income, and residence countries, passive income. This
translated into capital export countries taxing income from return of capital and other passive
income, while capital import countries tax income from business activities and other active
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income within their borders. This Compromise shaped the international tax regime for a century
and has its marks on all tax legislations throughout the globe to this day.129 In fact, in late 1920s,
the League of Nations published the Model International Tax Treaty founded on the Great
Compromise which continues to serve as the basis for countries international tax policy to date.
Even before the Great Compromise, many countries endeavored unilaterally to solve the threat of
double taxation. In the US for example, the Foreign Tax Credit (“FTC”) legislation was passed
in 1918 to allow for tax credit to US persons for any taxes paid outside of the US.130 The FTC
system created in the US quickly enjoyed popularity globally as many countries quickly adopted
it. The need to avoid double taxation of the same income was therefore reduced and serious plans
and strategies were designed globally to eliminate it. The ensuing national laws and international
tax treaties followed the same basic compromise in allocating the power to tax. To the question
of whether the same income should be taxed multiple times only due to the fact that it has a cross
border character, the answer was unanimously, no. To the question of what country had the
power to tax, the Compromise divided this power according to the nature of the income. The risk
of double taxation was therefore, at the very least, mitigated.
However, the four economists at the negotiating table in the 1920s could not have foreseen the
intensity in which international economic activity and international taxation would expand. They
could not imagine that the world would mainly function through cross border transactions and
that transnational economic activity would dominate the landscape. The compromise which has
continued to shape the international tax policy a century later shows inadaptable to the current
realities. The advent of multinational companies has changed the entire landscape and the global
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fiscal response has been, at the very least, disappointing. The solutions designed are
inappropriate, and have proven suicidal to developing countries which often do possess neither
the material nor the human resources necessary to implement mind-boggling complex
mechanisms designed by the developed world to avoid, or at least, reduce illegitimate erosion of
tax base.
In the US, specifically, the development of international tax has aligned, and to some extent has
shaped the development of international taxation globally. As presented by Professor Reuven
Avi Yonah, the evolution of international taxation in the US can be analyzed under four major
periods representing each the major policies that drove reform.131
The first period was dominated by the right to tax and largely resulted in an emphasis on sourcebased taxation. The legislative act consecrating this period was the FTC Act of 1918.132 Under
this period which lasted until about 1960, the dominant argument was that taxing jurisdiction
should be based on the benefits conferred by the taxing state.133 Most US international taxation
architects of the time recognized source taxation as the convenient and more efficient way of
addressing issues of double taxation.134 The enactment of the FTC act of 1918 legitimized
Professor Thomas Adam’s argument of a predominance of source based taxation while not
allowing for opportunities for double non taxation.135 The Great Compromise of 1923 gave
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credibility to Professor Seligman’s view of the idealistic nature of pure residence taxation.136 The
Permanent Establishment (“PE”) limitations on source based taxation are in recognition of the
incidence of PE on taxation, developed by Mitchell Carroll.
The second period saw an increased attention to the notion of residence based taxation based on
the dominant concept of capital export neutrality at the time.137 This period which lasted from
about 1961 to 1980 is referred to as the “Age of Neutrality.”138 Under the Kennedy
administration there was a profound shift in the principles underlying US international tax
policy. The long standing principle of benefits afforded by the state as well as fairness were
abandoned and gave way to the notion of efficiency which in taxation, translated to neutrality. 139
The main architect of this switch was Stanley Surrey who advocated for neutrality and whose
marks on US international tax policy remain apparent today.140 Surrey was the main driver of the
Subpart F rules in the 1960s allowing the US to currently tax some incomes earned outside of the
US.141 The debate centered on neutrality and the choice, highlighted by then Secretary Dillon in
his 1961 address to the House Ways and Means Committee, was between Capital Export
Neutrality (“CEN”) and Capital Import Neutrality (“CIN”).142 As a matter of fact, Stanley Surrey
who prepared the remarks for Secretary Dillon indicated the choice was about designing an
international tax policy that either encourages investments in the US or investments abroad.143
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The US treasury at the time which expressed its preference for CEN ushered an era of
prioritization of residence based taxation over source based taxation.144 Surrey went on to
influence tax policy enactments such as the 1966 Foreign Investors Tax Act that invented the
notion of “effectively connected” income;145 and the 1968 transfer pricing regulations.146 The
concept of neutrality was at the heart of any tax policy discussions during this period and any tax
policy enactment was viewed from the lenses of their impact on tax neutrality, whether import or
export neutrality.
The third period which lasted from about 1981 to 1997 focused the attention of US tax policy
making on competitiveness and competition. 147 Professor Avi-Yonah refers to this period as the
“Age of Competition”.148 The new emphasis on competitiveness encouraged unilateralism in tax
enactments. Many legislative and regulatory actions taken during this period endeavored,
unilaterally, to level the playing field for MNEs. Legislative action of this era included the
Foreign Investment Real Property Act (“FIRPTA”),149 the Branch Profits Tax rules of 1986,150
the earning stripping limitations and interest deductibility rules of 1989,151 the portfolio interest
exemptions of 1984,152 or the reduction in the scope of the Subpart F rules between 1994 and
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1997.153 As a result, this period saw a reduced emphasis on US residence based taxation and
growing criticism of the CEN as well as growing unilateral action for the sake competition.
The fourth period started in the late 1990s and is still prevalent today. Under this period, US tax
policy makers understand the need for coordinated action to achieve both competitiveness and
avoid double taxation and ideally double non-taxation. Professor Avi-Yonah refers to this period
as the Age of Cooperation.154 Long urged to cooperate by their European counterparts, it is only
under this period that US tax policy actors engage in cooperation and accept to meet
international tax challenges in cooperation with at least the US major trading partners. The US
took the lead in international organizations such as the OECD to define a coordinated tax policy
with and for the member states. The OECD’s initiative on harmful tax competition155 was mostly
driven by Professor Hugh Ault, and main figure in US international tax policy. The US
negotiated/renegotiated and concluded many tax treaties during this period all of which
contained measure of cooperation including the exchange of information with major partners.
Most recently, the US has led in the OECD’s effort to combat Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(“BEPS”).156 With US cooperation, the BEPS project has developed a number of Action Items
understood as needed to combat the phenomenon.157 Even though the US has not signed on to
and does not agree with some of the action items proposed, the US has been involved in the
process throughout as a testament of its activism in the international tax arena in this era of
cooperation.158
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The salient point in the review of the history of the US international taxation
historical shifting from source to residence taxation and back, as well as motive of
competitiveness or cooperation have still not answered the question of how to prevent both
double taxation and double non taxation at the same time. Adams struggled with the question in
1918 and the US and International Tax policy actors and spectators continue to struggle with it
today.
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Chapter 2
Overview of the Major International Tax Policy
Philosophies Driving International Tax
Rule-Making in the Developing World
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The formation of international taxation rules in the developing world has to contend with various
philosophies and structures of the respective nations. The design and adoption of rules, including
international tax rules is motivated by various underlying economic positions and philosophies.
Ideas, interests, and institutions play a central role in shaping tax policy. As indicated by Vito
and Zee in their 2001 piece entitled Tax Policy for Developing Countries: “In developing
countries, tax policy is often the art of the possible rather than the pursuit of the optimal.”159
Even though, as will be shown, the specificities of each system may differ, there are general
philosophies that underlie the design, adoption and implementation of international tax rules in
developing countries. Most developing countries aim to (A) attract investments, (B) encourage
exports, (C) deal with the hard to tax, (D) provide simplicity, and (E) set special rules for their
vital industries, usually extractive industries.
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A. Attracting Investments: the Phenomenon of Tax Incentives
Many countries in the developing world have sought to attract investments and ignite more
business activities within their borders. Attempt to convince investors to intervene have touched
many areas of the local laws. However, not many areas have been used as often as tax law design
and implementation for purposes of attracting business investments. The decisions to adopt a tax
rule and incorporate it into the country’s legislation, as well as the decision to implement those
rules that were already incorporated in the local laws have had to contend with the idea of
whether those decisions contribute to attract investments. The concern is even more vividly
expressed in recent years as global completion grew and many countries battle to be home of the
major multinational companies. In this context, developing countries which are already
shorthanded by their very many other impediments to business investments have had recourse to
heavy and ever controversial tax incentive constructs.160
A tax incentive is defined as any measure that provides for a more favorable tax treatment of
certain activities or sectors compared to what is available to general industry. The very existence
of tax incentives was largely sparked by tax completion. Many countries, both in developing and
the developed world, endeavored to attract capital by reducing taxes on capital and other creative
fiscal strategies. Typical tax incentives include tax holidays, special zones, investment tax credits
and other investment tax allowances, accelerated depreciation, targeted reduced tax rates,
targeted tax exemptions, exemptions or deferrals of customs taxes on imports, and tax incentives
on financing.
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Tax holidays are very popular in developing and developed countries alike. A tax holiday is a
temporary reduction or elimination of a tax. Examples of tax holidays have included all areas of
taxation including income taxes, indirect taxes, or property taxes. Tax holidays may be granted
to particular activities or to particular taxpayers. In developing countries specifically, tax
holidays are used to attract Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”), to stimulate growth in selected
industries, or to develop specific business sectors. Tax holidays can however be particularly
harmful. The fact that tax holidays are temporary in nature make them most attractive to short
term footloose and rapidly profitable investment. The absence of a long term view and structure
leads to opportunistic investor behavior, establishing a short term investment to benefit from the
tax holiday and planning on winding the investment down when the holiday ends. Nevertheless,
most economic data indicate that tax holidays, more often than not, serve their purpose by
boosting a business sector, albeit short term.
Special zone, originally with labor and trade undertone, are now frequently used in the tax debate
as a tax incentives. Special zones traditionally have many objectives including increased trade,
optimal taxation, increased investment, or lenient labor requirements. In developing countries,
special zones are used to allow fiscal benefits. The zones can be determined geographically or
based on the business sectors. Special zones are still used as tax incentives even though many
commentators doubt their ability to attract investments.161
Investment allowances which have the same effects as investment tax credits are another
common form of tax incentives. Under the investment allowance, the investor can deduct a
percentage of its capital cost, including depreciation, from its taxable income. Whereas, under
the investment credits, the investor is allowed to deduct the investment cost directly from their
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tax liability. Many developed countries experimented both investment allowances and
investment credits before generally abolishing those systems.162 The investment incentives are
directly related to the investment. In fact, investment incentives are contingent on the investment.
Many commentators argue that investment incentives are only useful to profitable businesses and
as such may not be as valuable to those already highly profitable corporate entities.163 Investment
incentives remain largely used however, specifically in the developing world.
A tax incentive seen as much in the developing and developed world alike is the accelerated
depreciation. Accelerated depreciations are mechanisms through which a tax system allows for a
business to depreciate some assets faster disregarding their regular useful life. The particularity
of this incentive is that it is simply a timing advantage afforded to the investor. Investors are
allowed to frontload their depreciation deductions, reducing their taxable income in the early
years of acquisition of the depreciable asset.164 The accelerated depreciation incentive is
effective as it allows the investors to enjoy the time value of money and pay tax later. On the
other hand, the government does not indefinitely forgo the revenue; it simply delays the time the
revenue is collected. This incentive has particularly shown effective and helpful for cashconstrained, but highly profitable businesses.
Even though tax incentives have expanded globally, the question remains as to whether they are
fit for purpose. Are tax incentives effective in attracting investment or boosting growth? The
general answer to that question seems to be that tax incentives are ineffective. In fact, many
commentators have argued that there is no link between tax incentives and business development
generally; and in the case of developing countries, that there is no evidence that tax incentives
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lead to increased FDI.165 There is however broad understanding and acceptance that tax
incentives are used for tax competition. Many countries have adopted some tax incentives in
order to mimic behavior seen elsewhere, to compete for mobile tax base, or to align their tax
policies with other jurisdictions. Within developing countries, tax incentives continue to be
adopted despite overwhelming evidence of their infectivity. Many commentators have
endeavored to demonstrate how and why tax incentives are ineffective; however, there has been
no concrete proposal of what they should be replace with. In the developing would the need to
attract investments is so profound that it leads to countries being pushed to do something, and in
the absence of a viable alternative, tax incentives continue to be introduced in tax legislation.
The debate therefore is not whether tax incentives should be adopted, but rather which types of
tax incentives are less harmful and can be put in place in situations where they are most likely to
work. Understandably the trend in many countries has been to replace tax holidays with for
example accelerated depreciation.166 The need to attract investment continues therefore, through
tax incentives or otherwise, to dictate international tax policy design and debate in most
developing countries. Another philosophy that influences international tax rule making is the
developing countries exports encouragement philosophies.
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B. Encouraging Exports and Markets Openness
Major policy design in the developing world has to contend with the need to encourage exports
from those countries as a way to grow local economies. Dating as far back as in the writings of
Adam Smith, it has been generally accepted that international trade is the engine of growth.
Many protectionists policies experienced with, specifically in the twentieth century, were short
lived and the general consensus today remains that international trade and countries openness
lead to major economic benefits and growth.167 In fact, major international organizations such as
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) have made market openness and
reduction in trade barriers, a condition for financial assistance in developing countries.168 The
success of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in increasing international trade including in
developing countries is another proof of the general belief that more trade is good for the
economy.169 In the current era of globalization, many developing countries are encouraged and
expected to ‘bring something’ to the international market. International trade has opened global
markets and presents an opportunity for developing countries to access major trading centers and
sell their goods and services. The design of the rule of law in general and of taxation law
particularly including international taxation, must therefore satisfy the need to promote exports
as many developing countries measure their economic success by how many goods and services
they are able to offer in the international markets.
In the tax arena, the promotion of exports and the openness of markets generally translate into
national tax rules that allow for incentives and sometimes international tax rules that struggle to
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balance source based versus residency based taxation. As will be shown in the case studies
below, sometimes, there are contradictory tax policy goals and design of contradictory tax rules
that aim to attract investment into the local jurisdiction while promoting local exports from that
jurisdiction. Many countries have adopted tax holidays for companies investing into products
exclusively destined for exports. Encouragement of exports is not a concern for developing
countries alone. In fact, many developed countries continue to design rules that would boost their
capacity to export goods to foreign markets. In the US for example, it was a central promise of
then presidential candidate Barack Obama to double US exports by the end of his first term in
office, a promise that he argued he was on his way to achieving and even doubled down on it
during his second run for president in 2012.170 The goal to promote exports, while noble from a
local country perspective, is not always in line with the rules of some international organizations.
The design of rules, including taxation rules that promote local countries exports have usually
faced obstacles regarding their compliance with rules of international organization such as the
WTO. As an example, the US as well as China, in their endeavor to promote local exports, have
been engaged in litigation regarding violation of WTO rules.171 Any design of tax rules, and
international tax rules specifically should satisfy the need of developing countries to encourage
exports but at the same time should not put compliance with international tax provisions of
international organizations in jeopardy.
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C. Inability to Reach the Hard to Tax and Heavy Reliance on Corporate Taxation
Exercising the taxing power is one of the most daunting tasks that countries face globally. In
fact, one of the quintessential issues facing tax administrations around the world is how to deal
with tax evasion, both on the large and most publicized scale, and on the smaller, less headline
grabbing scale.172 The issues varying from the “hard to levy”173 to the “hard to tax”174 pose
specific challenges to developing countries. The proliferation of small businesses, the engine of
any economy, has created a quasi fiscal nightmare for developing countries tax administrations.
The question remains how to deal with the hard to tax, how to reach the underground economy.
In the developed world, tax administrations are relatively well resourced and have the expertise
to track the otherwise hard to tax. In the developed world, government allocate necessary
resources to form robust and ever increasingly skillful tax administration with the time and the
man power to go after tax evasion, on a large as well as small scale. In these systems, tax
administrations are organized around voluntary assessment by taxpayers, with regular and robust
audits by the tax administrations to correct any irregularities or sanction fraud. In developing
countries, challenges are different and more fatal. In developing countries, skillful personnel are
scarce and the necessary manpower is unsustainable.175 In these countries, most of the economy
is underground and out of the tax authorities reach and the infrastructure needed to reach such
underground economy is inexistent. As a consequence, many tax authorities in developing
countries have focused on relatively bigger businesses that are within the tax net, slamming them

172

Tax Justice Network and Mike Lewis, Global tax evasion, (2006).
The expression hard to levy has generally been used to describe a pool of income the base of which is not
determinable for assessment for tax purposes.
174
The expression hard to tax has generally been used to describe a pool of income difficult to locate and account
for, for tax purposes.
175
Bird Richard, Tax challenges facing developing countries, Institute for International Business Working Paper 9
(2008).
173

60

with high taxes and relentless audits. The phenomenon, described as that of ‘milking the cow
already in the barn’ has led any effort to develop tax rules laser focused on big companies as the
only source of the ever-increasing need for government revenues. The reality of the developing
countries is that self-assessment of tax is not trusted and tax administrations have neither the
resources nor the time to enforce notoriously complex tax structures. The design of tax rules, and
international tax rules specifically in developing countries have to face the reality of weak tax
administration infrastructures and the resulting heavy reliance on relatively big companies
already in the tax net, for most of the tax revenues.
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D. Need for Simplicity and Simplification Concerns
Legal simplicity in general and tax simplicity specifically have always been a goal of legislators
globally.176 In the developing world in fact, tax simplicity is not only an ideal, it is a necessity for
optimal tax administration.177 The definition of simplicity itself has animated many debates.178
Many commentators have defined simplicity solely from its economic perspective while others
have looked at simplicity solely from a legal standpoint. Even though the debates have merits,
we will limit ourselves to the notion of legal simplicity in our discussion of tax simplicity in
developing countries because we believe legal simplicity is not totally separate from economic
simplicity and a well-rounded legal simplicity will lead to the economic simplicity in tax. The
commonly accepted definition of legal simplicity of taxation is the ease by which a body of a tax
law can be read and correctly understood and applied to practical situations.179 Legal simplicity
of taxation therefore requires clarity, consistency and certainty.180
Clarity in tax simplicity refers not only to the linguistic expression of the legislation, but also to
the organizational scheme by the drafters. The notion of consistency refers to both internal and
external consistency. Internal consistency requires coordination, harmonization and linkage
between all the parts of the legislation. External consistency requires the laws at large181 to not
contradict with any other adopted tax legislations in the jurisdiction.182 The requirement of
certainty is arguably the most important in the concept of simplicity. Certainty means that the
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taxpayers ‘true’ tax liability can be uniquely determined from a minimal supply of relevant data
with reasonable efforts.183 Tax simplicity can therefore be measure by answering a number of
questions including: how simply is the tax legislation written? How simple is the content of the
tax legislation? How taxpayers respond to the tax law? How tax administrations respond to the
tax law? How expensive is it to operate the tax? This last question factors in the economic
simplicity as the economic simplicity looks at the interaction between the tax law and the
economy. The economic simplicity shifts the focus from comprehensibility to applicability, but a
well-rounded legal simplicity takes applicability into account.
Changes in tax legislations in general and international tax rules specifically in developing
countries have been preoccupied with the need to achieve simplicity. Any proposal to change
international tax rules in developing countries needs to be simple, in both the legal and economic
sense in order to achieve optimum tax administration. The need for simple tax rules is very
pronounced in developing countries because, as indicated, those countries usually lack the
expertise and resources to apply complex rules. The current rejection of the transfer pricing
regulations adopted by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”)
by developing countries is rooted in the fact that the regulations are too complex and resources
available to developing countries tax administrations do not allow them to apply those
regulations.184 Developing countries need simple rules, easily applicable, easy for taxpayer to
comply with and for tax administration to enforce, and able to be coordinated with rules of
external jurisdictions.
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E. Special Regimes for Extractive Sectors
In many developing countries, the extractive sector, specifically the oil and gas industry account
for the major part of the economy and taxes therefrom constitute the major source of revenues
for those governments.185 In Nigeria for example, the largest oil producer in the African
continent, statistics show that the country produces approximately 2 million barrels of oil per
day, 1.9 million of which were exported.186 The oil industry is the main sector of the economy
representing approximately 95% of the country’s total exports. Oil revenues in Nigeria represent
approximately 80% of the government’s total revenues, and the oil and gas sector accounts for
approximately 35% of the Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”).187 Similar to Nigeria, many
developing countries have the oil and gas industry at the center of their economies and any tax
policy discussion or proposal is bound to give special consideration to the sector.188 The dilemma
in designing tax policy for these countries is to raise enough revenues from the oil and gas sector
while not consecrating a tax system that would discourage investments in the sector. The
concerns in this area are taken more seriously today as research overwhelmingly shows that
countries with high reliance on oil have performed poorly comparatively to their counterparts
who are less reliant on oil. The so called “resource curse” obliges any tax policy to aim carefully
at solving/mitigating the curse, at least from a fiscal policy perspective.189 The dependence of
revenues on oil proceeds, which are volatile, unpredictable and exhaustible, significantly
complicates fiscal design and fiscal management specifically from a short as well as long term
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perspectives.190 From a short term point of view, taxation of the central extractive industries must
raise enough funds to provide for government expenditures while providing enough incentives
for continued investments in the sector. From a long-term perspective, taxation of this central
sector must be done in a way that designs non-reliance of governments to those industries alone.
As a consequence, and on a long-term basis, governments must utilize tax policy that encourages
and boost other forms of investments in other sectors in order to proactively deal with the
unpredictability of the extractive sector and its exhaustiveness. It is accepted that fiscal policy is
not the only way to deal with the “resource curse” but it is also widely accepted that fiscal policy
is a central way to deal with it. The taxation policy and its redistributive underpinning can lay the
ground for enhanced government services and enticement to develop alternative industries
making the system sustainable for the long run. Also the design of tax policy takes into account
the way in which the natural resources sector is operated. In most developing countries,
resources are operated through private companies which then pay taxes to the government on
their profits.191 Taxes are usually high in this industry but often accompanied by many incentives
and loopholes that major natural resource companies willingly take advantage of. Most high oil
producing companies have grown creative as to how to raise funds through taxation of the
industry. It is therefore common to encounter special taxes on the industry for education, or
wellbeing of the localities.192 On the other hand, in some other countries, the governments
directly operate the natural resources, and in that setting tax policy might be less impactful.193
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Chapter III
Current international Tax Positions in the Developing
World, Case Studies
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The tax policy philosophies discussed in Chapter II are discernable in the international tax rules
and systems that exist currently on the developing world. As details below demonstrate, the
struggles to satisfy the major fiscal policy philosophies discussed above are noticeable from
Africa to South America and Asia. The analysis below focuses on a few countries, in a sampling
manner, to characterize the systems as a whole. As any sampling exercise, the choice of the
countries below did not meet an exact and wholly objective standard. Instead, the below case
studies were decided based on a number of criteria including whether the countries meet the
definition of a developing countries and the pertinence of the potential link between its tax
policies and its overall development. Also, the choice of the below countries as case studies was
informed by the aspiration of this thesis to bring a novel contribution to the discussion; as a
consequence, we intentionally avoided the large yet classified as developing countries but for
which ample writing on their tax systems is readily available. Our intention was therefore
twofold: first, to study those countries judged, a priori, ‘interesting’ because their tax structures
are either strong or weak, and the impact is readily ascertainable on the overall economy. And
second, to bring into light in an academic setting, the policies existent in those fiscal
jurisdictions194 that are not abundantly explored in academic tax research.
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A. Current International Tax Positions in Africa
Developing countries in general and African countries specifically face many hurtles when it
comes to taxation. The need to raise revenues is urgent in these countries. However, authorities
have struggled to use taxation as a means to provide for the optimum operation of the state. In
the sub Saharan Africa context for example, tax authorities have little to no powers and are
unable to collect tax from ‘the very few’ who are wealthy and powerful; at the same time the
enforcement powers they possess toward ‘the many’ are ineffective because ‘the many’ have
next to nothing to be taxed on.195 Countries are diverse and tax systems vary profoundly from
one country to another. For instance Mauritius has adopted the worldwide system of taxation,
Congo the territorial system of taxation, and Liberia applies a blend of both systems.
Nevertheless, there are common concerns across the continent including those related to
enforcement of the international tax rules that have been incorporated into most of these systems.
The task of choosing two countries in the continent that might provide a relatively acceptable
representation of the situation as a whole is bound to be imperfect. The choice of Cameroon and
Nigeria for the cases study below was necessary in order to portray the situation as a whole by
showing both ends of the spectrum. On the one hand, Cameroon, a smaller country196 which
inherited most of its fiscal policies from its former colonial power, France, is an example of a tax
system in a smaller African economy.197 On the other hand, Nigeria, a larger country198 whose
fiscal policies early influences came from England,199 shows a tax system in a larger economy.200
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It should be noted that most African countries rely on indirect taxes, specifically Value Added
Tax (“VAT”) which since its introduction throughout the nineteen nineties, has had it percentage
increased many a time.201 The case studies below disregard the study of VAT and it specific
impact in the selected jurisdictions.
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1) Cameroon Fiscal Environment: a Case Study
Cameroon is a developing country in the Central Region of Africa. Like most countries including
industrialized countries, the Cameroonian tax system is separated into individual taxation and
entity taxation. Further, taxation should be viewed from an internal as well as an international tax
perspective. The focus of this case study is to present, in a topical manner, the international tax
aspects of the Cameroonian tax system. The impact of the fiscal policy and tax structure in the
overall economy is widely acknowledged by both the government and the private sector. In fact,
in 2007, the government initiated an effort to reform the fiscal structure in Cameroon in order to
produce a simple yet competitive tax system capable of meeting the then current and ever
changing national and international fiscal challenges. The commission for fiscal reform was
therefore created to carry that mission through consultation with the various stakeholders and
policy recommendations.202
Cameroon adopted the territorial tax system whereby Cameroonian companies that carry out
trade outside of Cameroon are not taxed on their foreign sourced profits. Likewise, foreign
companies with activities in Cameroon are subject to Cameroonian corporate tax only on their
income sourced in Cameroon.203 Further, Cameroon adopted residency requirements similar to
those applicable in the US. Thus, a company is classified as a Cameroonian company only if it is
registered in Cameroon, and regardless of whether or not it is managed and/or controlled in
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Cameroon.204 In the event of an entity managed and/or controlled from Cameroon, there is a
likelihood of the entity having a permanent establishment in Cameroon thereby subjecting its
income sourced in Cameroon to Cameroonian taxation.
The individual income tax system in Cameroon relies on a progressive tax rate. Depending on
the income of the individual, the tax rate ranges from 0% to approximately 40%.205 The
Cameroonian tax legislation establishes a number of conditions in order for one to be liable for
tax in Cameroon. The conditions include the requirement to have a home or principal place of
residence in Cameroon, or to maintain a ‘center of business’ in Cameroon, or be a civil servant.
The requirement of one’s principal place of residence is satisfied if one spends 183 days per year
in the country.206 The individual tax allows for both personal and business deduction of expenses
where applicable. However, in 2012, the law was amended to preclude deductions where
payments are deemed made to a recipient in a ‘tax heaven’. Nevertheless, the tax authorities are
unable to clearly construe the notion of tax heaven, and are unable to track and trace those
payments that are destined to recipients in the designated tax heavens. This situation is similar to
struggles in the corporate international environment.
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Taxes on Income and gain of Corporations
As indicated above, Cameroon applies the territorial tax system whereby Cameroonian
corporations are not taxed on their foreign sourced income, and foreign companies are only taxed
in Cameroon on their income sourced in Cameroon.207 The regular corporate income tax rate is
38.5% (35% plus a 10% council surtax).208 Cameroon also adopted a turn over tax to serve as an
alternative minimum taxation. Cameroonian companies are tax on the higher of either
corresponding corporate tax rate or 1.1% of their turn over, meaning, their gross annual sales. It
should be noted the turn over tax is presumed from the previous year turn over, it varies
depending on the kind of industries or sectors of activities, and it should be remitted throughout
the current financial year with a credit being allowed at the end of the year.209
Profits realized by branches of foreign companies in Cameroon are presumed distributed to the
parent companies and are consequently subject to the branch profits withholding tax currently at
16.5% of the after-tax income.

Capital Gains and Dividends
In Cameroon, capital gains, specifically return on investments, are subject to the regular
corporate tax rate of 38.5%.210 Capital gains include gains on the sale of real estate, corporate
shares and business assets.211 Cameroon has not adopted the preferential tax treatment of capital
gains as applied by most other jurisdictions. It should be noted however that the tax can be
deferred or eliminated in the event of a merger. Additionally, if a business is wholly or partially
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transferred or discontinued, only one half of the capital gains would be taxed if the transfer or
termination occurred less than five years after the business started or was acquired, or only one
third of the capital gains would be taxed if the business started or was acquired more than five
years before the transfer or discontinuation.
A unique characteristic of the Cameroonian system of capital gains taxation derived from its
need to promote and encourage investments in the local stock exchange. In fact, any capital gains
realized on the Cameroonian (and planned to be regional) stock exchange are exempt from
corporate income tax and taxation on movable capital.212 The exception to that generous
treatment is however related to capital gains derived from the disposition of the oil and gas
related interest when the exploitation of the Cameroonian subsoil is involved. In fact for all oil
and gas related capital gains, whether realized inside or outside of Cameroon, the corporate tax
rules would apply provided the interest is related to the exploitation of the Cameroonian
subsoil.213
Dividends paid to residents in Cameroon are subject to a 16.5% withholding tax (15% plus the
10% council surtax).214 Resident recipients must include the gross dividend in their taxable
income, but they receive a corresponding 16.5% tax credit to prevent double taxation.215
Dividends paid to nonresidents are subject to a 16.5% withholding tax, which is a final tax.216 A
parent corporation may exclude up to 90% of the dividends received from a 25%-owned
subsidiary if the parent company and the subsidiary have their registered office in a Central
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African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) country.217 In this case, however, no
withholding tax credit is allowed. Instead, the tax can be offset against any withholding tax due
on its own dividend distributions.

Tax and Other Investment Incentives
Cameroon, like many other developing countries has always maintained various incentives to
encourage investment and spur economic growth. Tax incentives have usually served as the
primary vessel for attracting investments. The recent provisions in Cameroon were laid in the
2013 law to provide for various preferential tax treatments to attract investment. The law of April
18, 2013 establishes two main kinds of incentives. On the one hand, incentives that affect the
installation phase of the enterprise. The April 18, 2013 law defines the installation phase of the
enterprise as the period of five years from the date of issuance of the approval of the enterprise as
pertaining to the special regime.218 During the installation period, the April 18, 2013 law offers
exemptions from registration duties, transfer duties, custom duties and Value-Added-Tax on
certain items.219 On the other hand, the April 18, 2014 law establishes incentives that affect the
operational phase of the enterprise. The April 18, 2014 law defines the operational phase as the
period of ten years from the time the company qualified for the incentive.220 Incentives during
the operational phase are many and very impactful for the approved enterprises. As a matter of
fact, and under the April 18, 2014 law, operational phase incentives include exemption or
reduction with respect to the minimum tax, exemption or reduction of the corporate tax, custom
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duties, and other specified taxes and duties. Also, even though the general rule on loss carry
forwards in Cameroon is four years, a company under operational phase of the incentives would
be allowed to carry losses forward into the fifth year.

Tax Treaty Network
Even though Cameroon has various investment tax treaties, the country only has a few executed
tax treaties. Currently, Cameroon has eight executed tax treaties, only two of which are with nonAfrican countries.221 Each of the tax treaties contains specific provisions and some of the
provisions are now outdated as they provide for a worse fiscal treatment than no treaty. For
example, in the Financial Law of 2014, Cameroon established a 0% withholding tax on interest
payments to non-resident lenders. However, all tax treaties executed by Cameroon provide for at
least 15% tax on interest payments.222 Some provisions in the treaties reveal the balance of
power when the treaties were negotiated and ought to be revised. The tax treaty between
Cameroon and Canada for example provides for different tax rates for the same income
depending on source of such income. The tax treaty provides that if the dividend, interest or
royalty is paid from sources in the Cameroon, there shall be a 15% withholding tax; however, if
the dividend, interest or royalty is paid from sources in Canada, there shall be a 20% withholding
tax.223
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It should be noted however that all the rules discussed above apply only when there is no double
tax treaty otherwise applicable. The existence of the tax treaty supplements the above rules and
rules under the executed treaty are dispositive.

Transfer Pricing
In 2012, Article M19 bis in Book II of the General Tax Code on Manual of Tax Procedures was
introduced to increase the regulation and control of transfer pricing.224 Under the new rules, if in
the course of an audit, the administration has evidence that a company indirectly transferred
profits, the administration may request that the company provide information and documents
regarding relationship between the company and other companies or groups outside of
Cameroon, the pricing method utilized and the justification, the tax treatment for the other
company or related party in the foreign jurisdiction, and a description of the activities of the
other party located outside of Cameroon. The 2012 law allows for a request, in addition to the
regular disclosure requirements, of a detailed statement of transactions with the companies which
control or are controlled by 25% or more. Specifically, 25% companies must provide a statement
of their shareholding in other companies, and a detailed statement of intercompany
transactions.225
The 2012 amendment was introduced in order for the Cameroonian tax authorities to respond to
undue base erosion and profit shifting schemes that are on the rise across the continent.
Cameroon, like many other tax administrations across Africa is reacting through an increase in
requested information. The issue however is whether the tax authorities in Cameroon possess the
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necessary human capital to digest the ever-growing list of information requested from MNEs.
The Director of the tax collection sub-division at the ministry of revenues indicated that transfer
pricing is by far their major challenge around tax administration and tax collection in the
country.226 The Director specified that the information they are given is abundant and overly
confusing; the information does not easily trace the movement funds and the rational. Base
erosion and profits shifting seems therefore easily achievable and the potential for redress
pursuant to an audit is slim to none. The Cameroonian tax authorities, heavily reliant on
corporate taxation, have been outspoken about the need to curve issues of base erosion and profit
shifting within Cameroon, regionally, and globally.
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2) Nigerian Fiscal Environment: a Case Study
Nigeria is a developing country in West Africa, and one of the largest economies in Africa.
Nigeria operates under a fiscal federalism composed of three layers, federal, state and local
taxing authorities. Taxation has existed from the pre-colonial era of the Nigerian society but its
modern state can be assessed from the post-independence period.227 Since Nigeria became
independent, major political and social needs have dictated tax policy orientations.
Right after independence, the most urgent need of the system was to provide revenues to finance
public sector programs.228 As a consequence, early post-independence tax policy making was
driven by the need to provide as much revenues to the government and possible. As Nigeria
evolved after independence, the tax policy began to be influenced by the need to develop an
internal economy and an internal business sector. Tax policy making therefore shifted from
exclusive revenue raising mission to a mission to encourage business venture and national
economic development. Tax legislation during this period was evidenced by several measures to
encourage national production and slow imports. Government revenues during this period
originated primarily from import duties levies. Also, the Nigerian tax policy relied heavily on
revenues from the oil and gas industry as major reserves were found in the country.
Later into its independence and more recently, the Nigerian tax policy has been focusing on
diversifying tax revenues sources, reducing the dependence in oil revenues, and producing a
globally competitive tax system.229

227

See Ariyo Ademola, Productivity of the Nigerian tax system, 1970-1990, 67 African Economic Research
Consortium (1997).
228
See onireke Ibadan, A Comprehensive Tax History of Nigeria, Federal Inland Revenue Service, ISBN: 978-97848776-4-0 (2012).
229
Id.

78

Nigeria applies the worldwide system of taxation whereby Nigerian persons are taxed on their
worldwide income.230 On an individual income tax perspective, Nigerian tax legislation specifies
condition for tax liability as well as the taxable amount.
The main condition for individual tax liability in Nigeria is the requirement of Nigerian
residency. Under Nigerian law, individuals are considered Nigerian residents if they reside in
Nigeria, expatriate employees present in Nigeria for employment purposes, or anyone present in
Nigeria for more than 183 days during any 12 months’ period. These rules regarding individual
tax liability are preempted in the presence of a tax treaty.
The Nigerian tax legislation subjects various kinds of individual income to taxation in. The
individual income tax rate, depending on the income, varies from 0 to approximately 40%.
First individual taxable income includes employment income. Employment income has a wide
definition which includes salaries, wages, fees, allowances, pensions, non-cash benefits, bonuses
and other premiums or gratuities. Individual partners are taxed on their share of the partnership
profits whether the profits are distributed or not. Income from self-employment is subject to
individual taxation. Individuals are also subject to taxation on their investment income.
Nigeria imposes a 10% tax rate on payments of interest, dividends or royalties. Further, the
Nigerian tax legislation subject individuals to a 10% tax rate on their capital gains including the
sale of land and/or buildings located in Nigeria. Finally, the Nigerian tax legislation imposes
various taxes on individuals including the inheritance tax, the gift tax, the social security tax, or
the national housing find tax.
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Contrary to individual taxation that is relatively easy to grasp, corporate taxation in Nigeria and
international taxation specifically have a more complex structure.

Taxes on Income and gain of Corporations
As indicated above, Nigeria operates a system of worldwide taxation whereby companies
resident in Nigeria are subject to tax on their worldwide profits. Similarly, non-resident Nigerian
companies are only subject to tax on their Nigerian sourced profits. A company is resident of
Nigeria if it is incorporated in the country. Any foreign company that intends to carry on a trade
or business in Nigeria is required to incorporate a company in the Country.231
The general corporate tax rate in Nigeria is 30%, and the rate can be reduced in various
circumstances. However, all companies are subject to a minimum tax representing the greater of
either 0.25% of turnover, 0.25% of paid in capital, 0.5% of net assets, or 0.5% of gross profits.
Companies are subject to a 10% withholding tax on payments of interest, dividends and royalty
to all recipients in non-treaty jurisdictions.
Nigeria has no specific thin capitalization rules. Thus, generally speaking, there are no ratios
which may limit the amount of debt that may be applied to fund a company. However,
companies that intend to engage in banking or insurance business are required to have specified
minimum paid-up capital, capital adequacy ratios and/or solvency margins.

Capital Gains and Dividends
In Nigeria capital gains arising from the disposal of capital assets are taxable at a 10% rate.
Generally, capital gains arise from disposal of assets such as land and buildings, options and
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other property rights, currency exchange gains, or movable assets. The general rule is applied to
assets situated in Nigeria. For residents, disposal of those assets are subject to taxation even if the
assets are located outside of Nigeria.
Dividends are generally subject to 10% withholding tax rate. The rate is reduced or eliminated in
cases involving treaty jurisdiction. The Nigerian tax legislation also provides various instances of
tax exemption on dividend payments, as part of general tax incentives.

Tax and Other Investment Incentives
In an attempt to make its tax regime more modern and more competitive in the globalization era,
the Nigerian government has enacted various tax and other investment incentives.
First, even though as indicated above the general corporate tax rate is 30%, Nigerian tax law
allows a reduction to 20% tax rate during the first five years of a company’s existence if the
company is engaged in agricultural or mining production. Similarly, companies are exempt from
the minimum tax requirement in their first five years of existence.
Second, Nigeria has implemented various tax holidays. For example, if a limited liability
company is operating in an industry that the government recognizes as vital to Nigeria’s
economic development; such company would be granted a general tax holiday of up to five
years. Any such company would have no tax liability in Nigeria during up to five years from
starting its operations in the country.
Third, Nigeria has instituted free-trade zones to encourage exports of Nigerian products.232 Any
approved Nigerian company operating in an export free-trade zone is exempt from all federal,
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state, and local government taxes, levies and fees. Additionally, any new export oriented
companies, even if located outside of the free-trade zones maybe eligible for the preferred tax
treatment.233
Fourth, new companies engaged in mining in Nigeria are eligible for a general tax holiday for up
to five years from their start of business.234 Similarly, companies engaged in downstream
operations in the oil and gas industry are eligible for a general tax holiday of up to five years.
Generally, at the end of the specified tax holiday period, the Nigerian tax legislation offers the
selected companies accelerated capital allowances.
Finally, Nigeria offers tax exemptions to interest payments on foreign loans. The exemption
from withholding is dependent on the time for repayment of the loan, and generally the
exemption is limited in time.235 The presence of a tax treaty might however make the exemption
permanent.

Tax Treaty Network
Nigeria has a relatively expansive tax treaty network, compared to other African countries.
Nigeria has entered into such treaties with Belgium (effective January 1, 1990), Canada
(effective January 1, 1993), China (effective January 1, 2010), Czech Republic (effective January
1, 1991), France (effective January 1, 1991), Netherlands (effective January 1, 1994), Pakistan
(effective January 1, 1990), Romania (effective January 1, 1993), South Africa (effective January
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1, 2009), and the United Kingdom (effective January 1, 1988). In addition, Nigeria has signed
double tax treaties with Bulgaria, Mauritius, the Philippines, Spain, Sweden, or Poland. Those
treaties have yet to be ratified. Nigeria is also engaged in many treaty negotiations including with
Algeria, Denmark or Tunisia.
In all tax treaties concluded by Nigeria, passive income, namely income from dividends,
interests, and royalties is subject to a 7.5% withholding tax rate.236 This is a preferential rate
compared to the regular rate of 10% on such incomes in transactions involving non-treaty
jurisdictions. It should be noted however that even though the treaties with China and South
Africa have not been updated to reflect the 7.5% rate, the Nigerian authorities apply that reduce
rate in those situations since the reduced rate was introduced in the budget pronouncement of
1999.

Transfer Pricing
For a long time, there were no special transfer pricing rules in Nigeria. There were general antiavoidance provisions in the tax laws that empowered the tax authorities to adjust the tax liability
of a company where they believed the company’s transactions were not conducted at arm’s
length. Transactions between a company and related entities were usually scrutinized by the tax
authorities, to ensure that they were conducted on competitive terms. Certain expenses (such as
management fees and offshore expenses), for which relevant regulatory approval was not
obtained, may also be disallowed for corporate income tax purpose.
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On August 4, 2012, transfer pricing regulations took effect in Nigeria.237 The regulations apply
to transactions between connected taxable persons.238 Under the regulations, the notion of
connected taxable persons refers to related parties as specifically defined in the regulations.
Related parties entering into transactions to which the regulations apply must determine the
taxable profits resulting from such transactions in a manner that is consistent with the arm’s
length principles. Further, for purposes of the regulations, a permanent establishment is treated as
a separate entity. Transactions between the permanent establishment and its head office or other
related persons are subject to the regulations.239
The transfer pricing regulations of 2012 in Nigeria incorporated the international norms of ALS
advocated in Article 9 of both the United Nations (“UN”) and the OECD Model tax treaties.240
The Nigerian regulations require that related parties transactions satisfy the arm’s length
principle and that the parties produce documentation to establish that the transactions are at
arm’s length. Nigerian tax authorities will receive information regarding the covered
transactions, however, the question remains as to whether the authorities would always be able to
determine what arm’s length should be, and adequately evaluate the methods used to arrive at the
company’s claimed arm’s length price.
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B. Current International Tax Positions in Latin America
Any regional study on South America has to refrain from any generalization because even
though the countries might be in close geographical proximity, their divergence is very profound.
South American countries differ largely including in their economic structure, their dimension,
their historical heritage, their wealth, and their administrative and political institutions. The
challenges posed by diversity are even more pronounced when it comes to the study of taxation
in South America. The region has known two major influences both from Europe and from the
United States that have shaped many of its cultural background and other political philosophies.
The northern part of the region was more exposed to American influence, while the southern part
was more impacted by forces from Europe. The selection of two countries with a hope they
would provide a general sense of taxation in the region was therefore a task bound to be
imperfect. However, similar to the approach adopted in the case study on Africa above, we have
selected two countries approximately at both ends of the spectrum. I fact, Argentina will offer a
view of taxation in the context of a south American large and heavily populated country while
Panama would offer a perspective of a smaller south American country and its experiences with
taxation in general, and international taxation specifically.
It should be noted that most African countries rely on indirect taxes, specifically Value Added
Tax (“VAT”) which since its introduction has usually followed an increased trend. The case
studies below disregard the study of VAT and it specific impact in the selected jurisdictions.
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1) Argentinian Fiscal Environment: A Case Study
The Argentine Republic (“Argentina”) is a country located in the southeastern part of South
America.241 Argentina became independent from Spain in 1816 following a fight for
independence that lasted for almost a decade.242 With approximately one million square miles of
territory, Argentina is the eighth largest country in the world, and the second largest in South
America. Argentina is classified as a middle emerging economy with historically high ratings on
the human development index.243 The country is organized as a federation of provinces with
Buenos Aires as the capital and largest city. The population of Argentina is estimated at
approximately 43 million inhabitants.244 The country has known a tumultuous modern history. In
fact, Argentina is classified as an emerging market today despite being the 7th wealthiest country
in the world in early 20th century. Political and social instability in the last few decades have
impacted the Argentinian economy. Today Argentinian leadership endeavors to deal with the
many economic challenges of the country through economic and tax policy philosophies that
encourage local production, attract foreign investment, encourage exports, and promote local
employment. Taxation, and international taxation policy plays a central role in the struggles for
Argentina for remain globally competitive while providing enough revenues for the optimum
functioning of the government.
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The government of Argentina is the sole entity in charge of national tax policy and tax
collection. Fiscal responsibilities are entrusted to a government agency known as the
‘Administracion Federal de Ingressos Publicos’ (“AFIP”) which is in charge of administering the
income tax system. Argentina has adopted a worldwide system of taxation. The tax system, like
many others, is divided both into individual and corporate tax, and into internal and international
taxation.
From an individual tax perspective, residents of Argentina are subject to tax on their worldwide
income while non-residents are only taxed on their income that is sourced in Argentina. To be a
resident of Argentina, one must satisfy either of three conditions: be a native or naturalized
citizen of Argentina; be a foreign individual who is granted permanent residence in Argentina; or
be a foreign individual who remain in Argentina under temporary authorization for a period of
12 months or longer.245
Argentina adopted a progressive individual tax system. Individual tax rates range from 0 to
approximately 40%. Argentina taxes various kinds of incomes including: employment and selfemployment income; education allowances; investment income; interests and royalties;
directors’ fees; capital gains; and employer provided stock options. Argentina, in an attempt to
encourage investment and development of its local stock exchanges, exempts from taxes, capital
gains from the sale of stock on national exchanges. Sales of real estate are subject to a transfer
tax at a rate of 1.5% of the sale price.
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From a corporate tax perspective and as indicated above, resident companies are taxed on a
worldwide basis. As a consequence, any profits, including capital gains of Argentinian
companies are taxable in Argentina whether earned in the country or not. Businesses in
Argentina as well as branches of foreign companies are considered residents of Argentina and
are subject to taxation in the country.

Taxes on Income and gain of Corporations
The statutory corporate tax rate in Argentina is 35% of companies’ profits.246 Additionally,
Argentina adopted the Tax on Minimum Presumed Income (“TMPI”). This tax is imposed on
resident companies in Argentina and is applied instead of the regular corporate income tax if the
regular corporate income tax rate leads to a tax liability that is lower that the TMPI. The TMPI is
similar to the notion of Alternative Minimum Tax in other jurisdictions; however, the TMPI is
calculated on the basis of the company’s assets. TMPI is imposed at a rate of 1% of the
company’s qualifying worldwide assets which constitute its tax base.247 In an effort to encourage
certain industry sectors, Argentina tax legislation provided for a special rate of TMPI (generally
lower rate) for certain industries.
Generally, Argentinian tax legislation provides that a tax year for a company is its accounting
year. AFIP, the Argentinian tax administration, requires that resident companies make advanced
tax payments each month, on the basis of the previous tax liability. In certain circumstances,
advance payments of TMPI may be required to be made by certain companies. At the end of the
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year, companies must file their tax returns, and make payments of any balances due. The
payments are generally due within five months of the end of the accounting year and Argentinian
tax legislation has adopted a system of interest and penalties for late tax payments.

Capital Gains and Dividends
Capital gains derived by Argentinian tax residents companies are included into their normal
taxable income and are taxed at the regular corporate income tax rate of 35%. However, capital
gains derived by Argentinian non-resident companies are taxed at a rate of 15%, which can be
decreased to 13.5% in certain circumstances, and generally, in the case of presumed income. The
capital gains arise generally from the transfer of shares, bonds and other securities. It should be
noted that capital gains tax is not applicable for the transfer of government bonds. Traditionally,
Argentina had maintained a tax exemption for transfer of stock by non-residents. In fact, Section
78 of the Decree N*2,284/1991 of 1991 established an exemption from tax for foreign
beneficiaries on income derived from Argentinian share transfer.248 In 2013, in an effort to
mitigate an expected decrease in tax revenues, the Argentinian tax legislator repealed the nonresident capital gains tax exemption and replaced it with a 15% or 13.5% tax rate. The transferee,
in these instances, is liable for the tax that applies to the transferor. This tax does not, however,
applies to indirect transfers which could produce the same result while remaining out of the
Argentinian tax net.
Dividends distributions from Argentinian companies are subject to a 10% tax rate. The tax is
administered through withholding mechanism whereby the distributing entity is required to
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withhold the tax and remit to the Argentinian tax authorities. Similarly, branch profits remittance
is subject to the 10% withholding tax rate if a branch located in Argentina distributes its profits
to its parent. Argentina has adopted the Argentine Equalization Tax currently imposed at a rate
of 35% through withholding. Under this tax, if any distribution or any branch profits remittance
exceeds the accumulated tax earnings of the distributing or remitting entity, then such excess
distribution or remittance is subject to the 35% withholding tax rate. The 10% withholding tax
rate is administered simultaneously with the 35% withholding tax rate, the latter being applicable
only to the excess distribution.
Argentina imposes a withholding tax on interest and royalty payments. The general rate for
interest payments is a 35% imposed through withholding. However, under certain circumstances,
the rate is reduced to 15%; such circumstances include interest payments on loans granted by
financial institutions not located in tax heavens, or interest on loans for the importation of
movable assets. The general rate for royalty payments is 31%. The royalty tax rate can be
reduced to 21% if certain conditions are met. The royalty tax is enforced through withholding tax
mechanisms.

Tax and Other Investment Incentives
Like many other developing nations and middle economies, Argentina relies on tax and other
investment incentives to boost its economic growth. Argentina introduced and maintains a tax
incentive to attract energy investment in the country. Introduced in 2013 and extended thereafter,
the tax incentive allows energy companies who invest $250 million over five years, to sell 20%
of their energy production in international markets without Argentinian export taxes.
Additionally, those energy companies are able, tax free, to keep some of the export revenues
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outside of the country.249 Tax incentives further exist for certain activities such as mining,
software production, biotechnology, and biofuel production.
In addition, Argentina maintains tax-free zones (“Tierra del Fuego”) with special incentives for
certain activities. The appurtenance in a tax-free zone, for qualifying industries results in an
exemption from taxation on the activities and production of such entities.
Tax Treaty Network
Tax treaties negotiations in South America in general, unlike other regions of the developing
world, have been very aggressive in the past decades. Argentina maintains one of the oldest and
most established tax treaty networks in South America. Countries that have signed bilateral tax
treaties with Argentina include: Australia (1999), Austria (1979), Belgium (1996), Bolivia
(1976), Brazil (1980), Canada (1993), Chile (1976), Denmark (1995), Finland (1994), France
(1979), Germany (1996), Italy (1979), Netherlands (1996), Norway (1997), Russia (2001), Spain
(1992), Sweden (1995), Switzerland (2000), United Kingdom (1996), or United States (1981).
Most Argentinian tax treaties have been drafted along the lines of the UN Model Convention
with general bias toward protecting source based taxation.
In general, the treaties above provide for preferential tax treatment compared to rules that apply
in the absence of treaties. For example, in the absence of a treaty, dividends income is subject to
a tax rate ranging from 10% to 35%. In most treaties signed by Argentina however, dividend
payments in a treaty situation are subject to a tax rate that ranges from 10% to 15%.250 Similarly,
interest payments in the absence of a treaty are subject to a tax rate ranging from 15.05% to 35%.
Whereas, in a treaty context, interest payments are subject to withholding tax rate ranging from
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0% to 15.05%.251 Further royalty payments in the absence of a treaty are subject to a withholding
tax rate ranging from 21% to 31.5%, but in the event a treaty is applicable, the withholding tax
rate for royalties can be reduced down to 3%.252 It should be noted however that certain
requirements must be satisfied for application of the preferential treatment provided for by the
bilateral income tax treaties.

Transfer Pricing
The law in Argentina includes transfer pricing rules generally applicable to transactions between
related parties. The law also applies to transactions that do not involve related parties if the tax
authorities believe or have reasons to believe that such transactions were not carried under the
ALS principles. A regulatory decree in Argentina contains a list of countries that are qualified as
low tax jurisdictions and any transactions with entities located in such jurisdictions are ipso facto
considered not carried on under the ALS principles and therefore, subject to transfer pricing
rules.
Argentina generally accepts five methods of transfer pricing analysis: the comparable
uncontrolled price method; the resale price method; the cost plus method; the profit split method;
and the transactional net margin method. However, in 2003 and under the General AntiAvoidance Rules (“GAAR”), Argentina introduced a law that in fact provided for a new method
of transfer pricing for the agricultural sector. The commonly known as the sixth method of
transfer pricing, is still pending litigation as to its constitutionality in Argentina. Under such de
facto sixth transfer pricing method, if exports of agricultural products with publicly quoted price
are made to related parties and if an international intermediary who is not the effective purchaser
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of the products is involved in the transaction, the appropriate transfer price is deemed the higher
of either the market quote on the day the products are delivered, or the transaction price.
To justify the use of any transfer pricing method, Argentinian tax authorities require that each
taxpayer submit specific documents that are part and based on their mandatory transfer pricing
study. The required documents include: special tax returns and other reports signed by
independent certified public accountants.
Argentina has adopted debt-to-equity rules. Under general rules and as indicated above,
transactions must be carried under the ALS principles. The debt-to-equity ratio in Argentina is
generally 2:1. As a consequence, interests paid on liabilities in excess of the debt-to-equity ratio
are non-deductible. Further, the disallowed interests’ deductions because of the debt-to-equity
ratio limitations are treated as dividend distribution and may not be deducted in future years.
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2) Panama Fiscal Environment: A Case Study
The Republic of Panama, as it is officially known, is a country in the most southern part of
Central America, at the junction of North and South America. Along with Colombia, Panama
was colonized by Spain and acceded to independence as part of Colombia. In 1903 however,
Panama separated from Colombia to become its own country. According to the World Economic
Forum’s for Global Competitiveness Index, Panama is the second most competitive economy in
Latin America.253 With only over six million inhabitants, Panama is one of the fastest growing
countries in Latin America. The relatively small size of the country makes it more realistic to
analyze the impact, if any, of tax policy on the economy as a whole. Panama is known for its
relatively clement tax system.
On an individual tax perspective, Panama taxes income of all those who qualify as residents,
regardless of their country of citizenship.254 To qualify as a resident and be subject to tax in
Panama, one must reside in Panama or must have remained in Panama, continuously or not, for a
period of more than 183 days in a calendar year.255 Panama adopted a territorial system of
taxation whereby all residents and non-residents are taxed only on their Panama sourced
income.256 Panama taxes individuals on various types of income including employment income,
self-employment income, investment income, dividend income, income from stock option plans,
or education allowances. The individual income tax structure in Panama is the progressive
income tax system with rates ranging from 0% to 25%.257 Panama draws no distinction in taxing
Panama sourced income whether the person entitled to the income is resident of non-resident. All
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income sourced in Panama is subject to taxation in Panama, a principle that constitutes a basic
foundation of the corporate tax system in Panama.
From a corporate income tax perspective, taxation in Panama is based on the territorial system of
taxation. Therefore, any person whether individuals or entities are subject to taxation in Panama
on any and all income derived or sourced in Panama. Resident branches and legal entities are all
considered Panama residents. However, for entities, it is relevant whether they are incorporated
in Panama or not; they will be subject to tax provided that they receive (and from wherever they
receive it) taxable income produced within Panama.

Taxes on Income and gain of Corporations
As indicated above, corporations, partnerships, branches, and any other entity considered as a
legal entity are subject to tax in Panama provided that they derive income from sources within
Panama. As a consequence, businesses in Panama organized for the purpose of generating
income outside of Panama and those companies would not be subject to taxation in Panama.
Further, Panama has designated some income as not arising from Panama even when the
activities are carried on Panama in order to encourage some activities. The sectors exempted
include income from managing outside of a Panama office, activities that take place abroad, as
well as certain invoicing and re-invoicing activities.
The general business income tax rate in Panama is 25%. The tax rate is applied on the all the
entity’s income derived from sources within Panama, and after deducting exempt income and
deductible expenses and costs. The income tax system is based on an accrual method whereby
revenues have to be recognized in the year in which they are earned. Panama enacted the
equivalent of a minimum tax regime for certain entities. In fact, entities with income exceeding a
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certain threshold specify by law, must pay in taxes, the higher of either the liability arising from
application of the regular corporate tax rate of 25%, or 4.67% of their total income taxable in
Panama.258

Capital Gains and Dividends
Panama tax system designed a special treatment to capital gains income. Pursuant to a policy of
encouraging investments and promoting economic growth, Panama allows for special tax
treatment of various kinds of capital gain income. In Panama, capital gains derived from the
transfers of shares or quotas are subject to capital gains tax if the shares or quotas were issued by
a company with operations or assets in Panama.259 In 2006, Panama passed a tax legislation to
regulate and provide more details on the taxation of various kinds of capital gains incomes.260
Under the 2006 tax law, taxable transfers of shares in Panama are subject to a 10% tax rate. The
2006 law required that the transferee of the shares withhold 5% tax on the transfer amount and
remit it to the tax authorities within 10 days of the share transfer. The transferor is responsible
for the remainder of the tax, if any, on the transfer. It should be noted that the 5% withholding
tax upon the transfer operates as a credit toward the 10% capital gains tax required overall upon
the transfer of the shares. The provisions of the 2006 law also apply to the indirect transfer of
shares deemed economically invested in Panama.
Similar to the transfer of shares, capital gains derived from the transfer of movable assets as well
as the sale of real estate are subject to income tax in Panama, at a rate of 10%. However, under
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Section 1 of Law N*6 of 2005, a transfer tax is imposed on all transfers of real estate in Panama.
The real estate transfer tax rate of determined at 2% of the higher of either the amount provided
in the signed public transfer deed, or the cadastral value of the real estate in Panama. Transfers of
real estate in Panama must be execute by a public notary for their validity, and the notary is
required to obtain proof of payment of both the capital gains and the real estate transfer tax
before they can execute the transfer deed.
Distributions of profits, by corporations, in the form of dividends, are subject to taxation in
Panama. A newly formed company in Panama obtains a Notice of Operations upon
incorporation.261 All companies that have the Notice of Operations or that generate income in
Panama must pay a tax on dividends, at a rate of 10%. Panama recognizes the notion of Bearer
Shares whereby the shares and therefore the interest in the company is owned by whoever
possess the physical share certificates. Share certificates of bearer shares do not have names of
the owners and transfer tax or other fees are applicable upon their transfer. In the event of
distribution of dividend to holder of bearer shares, Panama requires a dividend withholding tax
of 20%. It should be noted that Panama imposes a reduced and final withholding tax rate of 5%
on dividend distribution from foreign source income, income from export activities, and certain
types of exempt income. Dividends distributed by entities in free-trade zones are also subject to a
reduced and final withholding tax rate of 5%. Many exceptions apply this general rule, including
exceptions stemming from tax incentives.
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The Notice of Operations was formerly known as the Commercial License. The Panama Tax Law N*5 of January
11, 2007 streamlined incorporation in Panama, and specifically, the process of obtaining the Notice of Operations.
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Tax and Other Investment Incentives
Similar to many other developing countries and small economies, Panama has enacted many
forms of tax and other investment incentives to attract investment and promote economic growth.
Tax incentives make Panama very appealing to investments and the economy has seen various
forms of direct investments in recent years. The main incentives are the company headquarters
law and the free trade zones.
The regulation of MNEs’ headquarters has the main purpose of attracting MNEs to Panama and
encouraging them to maintain their headquarters there for their regional or global operations. The
headquarters law created a special incentive for MNEs that establish their headquarters in
Panama. The law indicates that headquarters of a company are entities engaged in activities such
as management and services. Headquarters services which must be part of the entity ordinary
course of business, include technical assistance, financial and accounting services, marketing and
publicity, or logistic and warehousing. Also, to qualify under the law, the entity must have
regional or global operations.
Qualified companies under the headquarters law receive a License to that end from the Ministry
of Commerce and Industry. Licensed MNEs are exempt from income tax for services rendered to
the entities domiciled abroad that do not generate taxable income in Panama. Licensed MNEs are
also exempt from VAT on their export of services. The tax benefits are in addition to the non-tax
advantage of a special immigration regime for management visas.
Panama has also adopted free-trade zones allowing special benefits to companies established
therein. The main special free-trade zones include the Colon Free Zone,262 and Panama Pacifico
Special Economic Zone. From a tax perspective, companies established in the special free-trade
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The Colon Free Zone is located on the Atlantic side of Panama.
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zones are exempt from taxation in Panama. In some instances, such companies benefit instead of
a reduced tax rate.263

Tax Treaty Network
The territorial nature of the tax system in Panama and the fact that the country does not tax
foreign income has led the country to not engage in tax treaty negotiations and to deem income
tax treaties irrelevant to its circumstances. Until recently therefore, Panama had not engaged and
had not signed many double tax agreements. In 2009, the OECD placed Panama on the “grey
list” due to its unwillingness to cooperate internationally through tax treaties.264 In an attempt to
be removed from the ‘grey list’ Panama engaged in a series of tax treaties negotiations
culminating in its removal from the list in July 2011. Panama has executed bilateral tax treaties
and exchange of information agreements with many countries including with France (2012),
Portugal (2012), Singapore (2011), South Korea (2012), US (2011), Finland (2014), UK (2013),
Canada (2013), Czech Republic (2013), Israel (2012), or Ireland (2012).
Panama Tax Treaty negotiations are largely based on the OECD’s Model Tax Convention and
tend to favor residence based taxation. The Tax Treaties executed by Panama provide
preferential tax treatment when a Treaty jurisdiction is involved as compared to non-treaty
jurisdictions. In the absence of a Tax Treaty, Panama subjects interests, dividends, and royalties
to the 12.5% withholding tax rate. However, in the presence of a Tax Treaty the withholding tax
rate for the same interests, dividends, or royalties would be subject to withholding tax ranging
from 0% to a rare maximum of 10%.
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For example, companies located in the Colon Free Zone are exempt from corporate income tax; however,
dividends distributions from those companies are subject to 5% tax rate.
264
See G20 Summit in London in April 2009 where the resolution was to put Panama on a “grey list” as a country
that is committed but has not substantially implemented the internationally agreed standards of transparency.
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Transfer Pricing
In Panama, transfer pricing is regulated by Law N*33, and the transfer pricing regulations apply
solely to transactions between related parties. Article 762-C of Law N*33 provides a definition
of related parties, including both horizontal and vertical relationship situations. Article 762-A of
Law N*33 requires that all transactions between related parties satisfy the ALS principles. In
fact, the law requires that such transactions be tested in comparison with similar but independent
and unrelated transactions. Panama has adopted the following transfer pricing methods: the
Comparable and Uncontrolled Price method, the Resale Price method, the Cost Plus method, the
Profit Split method, and the Cost Plus method.
Law N* 33 does not however, provide guidance on how to search for comparables and the use of
foreign comparables. The Tax Authority in Panama, the ‘Direccion General de Ingresos’
(“AGI”) reports transfer pricing provisions as the most difficult for them to administer and apply.
Nevertheless, Article 762-D of Law N* 33 establishes the application of the OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines to any transfer pricing matter that is not expressly addressed in the local law
in Panama.
Panama tax authorities are allowed to require extensive documentation in the event of
transactions within the transfer pricing regulations. Documentation may related to group
ownership information, description of the transfer pricing policy of the group, identification of
the related parties, description of the nature, amounts and characteristics of the payments
involved in the transactions, detailed comparability analysis, or transfer pricing method used and
the reasons for its use. The taxpayer has the burden of proving that the information provided is
accurate and the AGI has the ultimate decision on the validity of the transaction from a transfer
pricing perspective.
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The transfer pricing regulations in Panama were limited to related parties in jurisdictions having
executed a Tax Treaty with Panama. However, in 2012, Panama amended its transfer pricing
rules to expand their application to all related parties’ transactions, regardless of whether the
related parties are located in treaty or non-treaty jurisdictions.
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C. Current International Tax Positions in Asia
Similar to Africa or South America, any regional stud y of Asia is bound to be imperfect.
Countries in Asia, similar to North America or Western Europe are highly integrated from an
economic point of view. Nevertheless, and similar to South America, or Africa, there is a lesser
degree of homogeneity amongst Asian countries.265 In fact, there are large variations in policies
across Asian countries. Countries across Asia differentiate on their size, their level of
development, the political priorities, or their geographical situation. These major differences
have an impact on major tax policies adopted by the various countries in Asia. When compared
to other regional studies therefore, the case of Asia is particular, the many differences make
improbable to get a general and harmonized picture as a whole. An analysis that aims to provide
a general and complete picture of the tax atmosphere based on two sample countries is therefore
futile. The differences and variations are too profound and their implication too consequential.
Still, and in conformity with our previous approach, our choice of two countries aims at
providing at least two aspects of those many differences, aspects that many countries in Asia
would easily associate with. For our case study, we have selected two countries on the opposite
end, a priori, to provide a closer look at the current Asian tax systems. At first, we will focus on
Malaysia, a smaller country in terms of population266 and a relatively smaller economy. At a
further end of the spectrum, we will look at Indonesia, a more densely populated country,267 with
tax policies that carries a heavier impact on the economy, a priori.
It should be noted that most African countries rely on indirect taxes, specifically Value Added
Tax (“VAT”) which since its introduction has usually followed an increased trend. The case
studies below disregard the study of VAT and it specific impact in the selected jurisdictions.
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See Jorge Martinez-Vasquez, Taxation Asia, Asian Development Bank, ISBN 978-92-9092-337-4 (2011).
The estimated population of Malaysia as of 2014 was of approximately 30 million inhabitants.
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The estimated population of Indonesia as of 2014 was of approximately 250 million inhabitants.
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1) Malaysian Fiscal Environment: A Case Study
Malaysia is a country located in Southeast Asia bordering Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, and
Indonesia. As a former colony of England, Malaysia is politically organized as an elective
monarchy with executive powers resting on the Prime Minister. Malaysia became independent in
1957 and for decades after independence, the country enjoyed unique economic prosperity.268
Early from its independence and until the 1970s, the Malaysian economy relied heavily on
natural resources, the mining sector specifically.269 However, deep in its independence years,
Malaysia adopted politics to encourage and expand other sectors of the economy and other
business sectors. In the 1980s, the country’s growth was mostly driven by the industrial sector,
with large investments. A specific focus was on business sectors related to tourism, Commerce,
and Science. The economic diversification policies contributed to a stronger Malaysian
economy, ranking third in the Southeast Asia, and 29th largest economy in the world.270 Today,
Malaysia is an open economy, oriented toward the industrialized and global market economy.
The government aims to develop Malaysia as a developed country, and many economic and
financial experts are optimistic about Malaysia becoming a developed country in a near future.271
In Malaysia, the state defines macro-economic policies and plans, and there is a notable state
participation in the economy through various state owned enterprises.272
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From its independence and up until approximately 2005, Malaysia enjoyed at least a 5% GDP growth per year.
Sachs Jeffrey, and Andrew Warner, The curse of natural resources, 45.4 European economic review 827 (2001).
270
See World Bank data, available at
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD/countries/order%3Dwbapi_data_value_2013%20wbapi
_data_value%20wbapi_data_valuelast?order=wbapi_data_value_2012%20wbapi_data_value%20wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc&display=default
(last retrieved 1/07/2015).
271
See Statements from Credit Suisse Managing Director Wong Wei-Shen, as reported in The Star (7 May 2012),
"Malaysia got what it takes to be developed nation".
272
See for example, Malaysian Airline, Patronas, or Agrobank Malaysia.
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The tax system present in Malaysia today has its roots from the country’s British colonial period.
In fact, there was no unified tax law applicable all across Malaysia until 1967, with the passage
of the Income Tax Act,273 which consolidated the various tax laws and created a unified federal
income tax legislation. The Malaysian Inland Revenue Board (“MIRB”) is responsible of tax
administration across the country, and is under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. The
MIRB is highly decentralized with considerable powers and discretion of the administration of
the tax legislation. The dynamism of the Malaysian economy has led to an expanded tax base
and ever increasing need for uniquely designed internal as well as international tax policies.
From and individual income taxation perspective, Malaysia has adopted a territorial system of
taxation. Residents and non-residents of Malaysia are subject to taxation in Malaysia on all their
Malaysian sourced income only. One is treated as a resident of Malaysia if they are physically
present in Malaysia for a period of 182 days or more within a 365-consecutive day period.
Malaysian tax legislation taxes individuals on various kinds of income including employment
income, business profits, investment income, pensions and annuities, royalties and interest
income, or stock options. Individual income tax rates are structured in a progressive structure
depending on the amount of total taxable income of each individual. Malaysian individual
income tax rates range from approximately 0 to 26%. Individual income tax rates can be affected
by the very expansive tax treaty network subscribed by Malaysia, and such treaty network has a
significant impact on corporate tax system.
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See Laws of Malaysia, Act 53, Malaysia Income Tax Act (1967), available at
file:///C:/Users/pougaza/Downloads/ASEAN_Malaysia_Income%20Tax%20Act%201967.pdf (last retrieved
1/07/2015).
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Taxes on Income and gain of Corporations
From a corporate tax perspective, Malaysia applies a territorial tax system. The Tax legislation of
1967 provides that corporations, residents and non-residents, are subject to tax on income
accrued in or derived from sources within Malaysia. Income from sources outside of Malaysia is
generally not subject to Malaysian taxation. Under Malaysian tax legislation, place of
incorporation is irrelevant in determining the residence of a company. A company is a Malaysian
resident if and only if its place of management and control is Malaysia.274
Corporate tax rates in Malaysia are based on a set of circumstances and range from 0% to 38%.
In general, corporations are taxed at a rate of 25% in Malaysia. For specific kinds of income the
rate may vary significantly from the 25% general corporate tax rate. In fact, in Malaysia, income
from interest, and royalties is subject to a 15% reduced tax rate.275 As we will see below, such
rate is subject to further reduction if an income tax treaty applies. Further, income from use of
movable assets, as well as certain other services in Malaysia is subject to a 10% reduced tax
rate.276 For businesses the general rate of 25% is reduced to 20% if the paid in capital is less than
MYR 2,500,000.277 However, for residents and non-residents companies carrying on petroleum
operations, petroleum income is taxed at the higher rate of 38%.278
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Id. See also, Mustafa Hajah and Mohd Hanefah, An Evaluation of the Malaysian Tax Administrative System and
Taxpayers Perceptions Towards Assessment Systems, Tax Law Fairness and Tax Law Complexity, Dissertation
Universiti Utara Malaysia (1996).
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Id.
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See taxation of rental income from ships made by Malaysian Companies; or taxation of commissions and
guarantee fees.
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In general, companies with a paid up capital MYR 2,200,000 or less benefit from the 20% tax rate. However,
such reduction is not applicable when the company with such paid up capital is owned by a company with a higher
paid up capital amount.
278
See the Malaysian Petroleum Income Tax Act of 1967, as amended from time to time, imposing a general rate
of 38% tax on oil and gas income.

105

The general tax year in Malaysia is the calendar year, however, companies may adopt their
accounting year as their tax year and as a basis for assessment. Tax administration is based on
the self-assessment methodology and concept.279 Companies my provide an estimate of their
income and tax liability before entering their tax year, and shall make tax prepayments
throughout the year with any balance due to be settled and paid at the end of the fiscal year.

Capital Gains and Dividends
Historically, Malaysia has applied an imputation system for taxing dividends. Under this
historical system, the ability of a company to pay taxes was dependent on the availability of
distributive reserves and any cost incurred in production or distribution of the dividend was
deductible. The distributive capacity, known as the availability of “franking credits” or the
“section 108 credits” made the distribution of any amounts above the available credits to be
taxable at the ordinary corporate income tax rate in Malaysia.
However, in 2008, Malaysia introduced the single tier tax system, effective January 1, 2008.
Under the single tier system of taxation of dividends in Malaysia, any distributions to
shareholders as dividends are not subject to taxation in the hands of the shareholders. Income
properly distributed to shareholders as dividends is exempt income for tax purposes. As a
consequence, shareholders cannot deduct any expenses incurred in deriving the dividends and
situations whereby a shareholder may claim a refund no longer exist.280
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See James Simon and Clinton Alley, Tax compliance, self-assessment and tax administration, (2002).
Under the imputation system, the money distributed as dividend was deemed to already have sustained a
regular corporate tax rate. However, imputation allowed a shareholder to deduct any further expenses incurred in
deriving the dividend. As a consequence, some shareholders were entitled to receive a refund upon distribution of
dividends to them. The new legislation installing the single tier system of taxation for dividends makes the finds in
the hands of the shareholder exempt income. All tax effects having been accounted for at the corporate level.
280
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Under Malaysian tax legislation, dividends paid by resident companies are not subject to
withholding taxation at source. The absence of withholding tax on dividends paid by Malaysian
companies are a consequence of the single tier taxation and is in furtherance of Malaysian goals
of facilitating and encouraging investments in the country.
In general, Malaysia has no capital gains tax. Gains from sale or exchange of stock for example
are not subject to taxation as Malaysia does not provide rules for taxation of capital gains as a
general principle. Nevertheless, Malaysia maintains a real property gains tax. The tax is levied
on capital gains from the sale of real property located in Malaysia or the disposition of stock in
closely held corporations with substantial interest is real estate. Depending on the holding period
in the real property, the tax rate ranges from 0% to 15%.281 Under Malaysian law, purchasers of
real property located in Malaysia must withhold a rate of 2% on the sale price of the real
property. The legislation allows for losses incurred in the disposition of real property to be
carried forward indefinitely to offset future real property gains.282 In 2014, Malaysia proposed a
rate increase for taxation of gains from disposition of real property. Under the new proposal,
gains from the sale of real property maybe taxed at a rate of up to 30%. The proposal was seen as
an attempt by the Malaysian government to curb what they saw as an abuse of the real property
preferential tax rates. The changes would also apply to the sale of stocks in company having a
majority of their interest in real property.
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If the real property is held for two years or less, the tax rate on the gains from its disposition is 15%. If the real
property was held for more than two years but less than six years, the tax rate on the gains from its disposition is
10%. And if the real property was held for six years or more, Malaysian tax law provides for a 0% tax rate on the
gains, if any, from the disposition of the property.
282
See Malpezzi Stephen and Stephen Mayo, Getting housing incentives right: a case study of the effects of
regulation, taxes, and subsidies on housing supply in Malaysia, Land economics 372 (1997).
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Tax and Other Investment Incentives
As a developing country, Malaysia does not constitute an exception to the general urge by
developing economies to implement tax incentives. Malaysia has a wide range of tax incentives
aim at positioning the country as a regional hub for MNEs, and a hub for research and
development.283 Malaysia also uses tax incentives to encourage activity in some sectors that the
country deems desirable to its economy and its society. Throughout history, Malaysia has
enacted various tax incentives including tax holidays, investment allowances, or reduced tax
rates for selected industries or sectors.
The main incentive dates from 1990 when the Malaysian government enacted legislation that
created a business center on the Island of Labuan with its distinct tax and regulatory regime. 284
The legislation created a very friendly fiscal atmosphere for conducting business in Lubuan. In
fact and with the exception of companies in the financial sector, companies need no government
approval to operate in Lubuan. Companies in Lubuan are subject to a reduced tax rate of 3% on
their business profits from their trading activities, and are authorized to transact business with
other companies in Malaysia. Further, companies in Lubuan are exempt from the obligation to
withhold on their payments to non-resident recipients. Lubian companies may also open and
maintain, in Malaysia or abroad, bank accounts in foreign currency with no restrictions imposed
on the movement of funds through these accounts. However, companies in Lubuan are free to
make an election to taxed under the provisions of the Malaysian main tax law of 1967.
The other notable incentive is the Operational Headquarters Companies provisions. To attract
more MNEs to locate their regional headquarters in Malaysia, the Operational Headquarters
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See Siew Chuen Yong, Tax Incentives for Malaysia as a Regional Hub and for Research and Development, ACCA
(2011), available at http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/pdf/sa_nov2011_RandD3.pdf (last
retrieved 1/13/2015).
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See the Lubuan Island Act (1990) in Malaysia creating a separate tax and regulatory environment in Lubuan.
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Company provisions were introduced in 2005 and amended in 2007 to provide for a ten year
exemption from taxation for income derived from selected activities.285
Finally, Malaysia provides for research and development (“R&D”) incentives which many
commentators have argued not sufficiently attractive. In fact Section 34(7) of the Income Tax
Act of 1967 provides for a single deduction on scientific research. The government regularly
distributes generous research grants, as well as double deduction for approved R&D,286 or an
exemption of income for capital expenditures.

Tax Treaty Network
Malaysia has one of the most expansive tax treaty networks in Southeast Asia. With more than
sixty bilateral tax treaties executed, Malaysia bases its treaty negotiations on the OECD Model
Tax Convention. National tax legislations and provisions are preempted when a tax treaty is
applicable. However, the national law will preempt application of a treaty of the national law
provides for a more favorable treatment. Tax Treaties executed by Malaysia offer preferential tax
rates on various kinds of income. For example, all dividends involving a treaty jurisdiction are
not subject to taxation in Malaysia.287 Also, interest income under the treaty is subject to a tax
rate as low as 5%.288 Finally royalty income under the treaty is subject to a tax rate as low as
5%.289
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See Malaysia PU(A) 307 of 2005 as Amended by PU(A)260 of 2007.
See Section s34A of the Income Tax Act of 1967. The R&D must be approved by the Minister of Finance.
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See for example, Article 10 the Double Tax Convention between the United Kingdom and Malaysia (1998), as
amended from time to time.
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See for example, Article 11 the Double Tax Convention between the United Kingdom and Malaysia (1998), as
amended from time to time.
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See for example, the Double Tax Conventions concluded by Malaysia including with South Africa, Singapore,
Spain, the UK, Namibia, or Sweeden.
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Malaysia as a state incorporates the island of Lubian. Lubian has adopted several tax policies that
have prompted some countries to consider qualify the Island as a tax heaven. Some tax treaties
executed by Malaysia explicitly prohibit their application to Lubian Island. In recent treaties,
Malaysia has agreed to the exchange of information provisions, including for Lubuan companies.
The signing of the exchange of information is seen a s step toward non qualification of the
Lubuan Island as a tax heaven for international tax dealings.
It should be noted however that the majority of tax treaties executed by Malaysia do not include
treaty anti shopping provisions that are necessary to curb various forms of treaty abuse.

Transfer Pricing
Transfer pricing in Malaysia, like in many other parts of the world, is a constantly evolving story
and structure. The transfer pricing legislation is largely based on the separate accounting and
arm’s length standard principles. In 2003, Malaysia adopted the Transfer Pricing Guidelines that
closely mirrored the guidelines among the OECD countries. In January 2009, Malaysia adopted
specific Arm’s length and Advanced Pricing Agreements (“APA”) provisions to strengthen its
transfer pricing environment. In May 2012, Malaysia enacted transfer pricing rules and APA
rules to coordinate in transfer pricing regulations. In July 2012, Malaysia proceeded with a
revision of its transfer pricing guidelines and enacted new APA guidelines.
The rules of 2012 placed a greater responsibility on the taxpayer regarding transfer pricing
compliance. The rules expressed the need to prepare contemporaneous transfer pricing
documentation to substantiate that transactions involving related parties are carried under the
arm’s length standard. The guidelines provide a detailed list of information, documentation and
records that need to be compiled regarding intercompany transactions. The taxpayer, however, is
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not obligated to submit the above substantiating documentation with its tax return. In fact the
documentation is only provided to the tax authorities upon request.
Malaysia enacted thin capitalization rules as well as other anti-base erosion and profit shifting
measures.
In August 2010, the first and to date the only transfer pricing case was heard on an appeal to the
Special Commissioner of Income Tax (“SCIT”).290 The issue posed was in regard to application
of the arm’s length standard and use of comparables. The SCIT found for the taxpayer and the
case is currently pending before the Malaysian high court.
Since enactment of the 2012 rules, companies have seen a spike in transfer pricing audits by
Malaysian authorities and the difficulties to implement the complexities of arm’s length
standards have led to various disagreements among taxpayers and tax authorities. There is reason
to expect even more judicial controversies as the 2012 rules continue to be implemented.
Indonesia share border with New Guinea, Timor, and Malaysia.

2) Indonesian Fiscal Environment: A Case Study
Indonesia is a country in Southeast Asia officially known as the Republic of Indonesia, and
comprising a multitude of Islands. With over 250 million inhabitants, Indonesia is the fourth
most populated country in the world.291 Indonesia is one of the most diverse countries in the
world, with more than 300 ethnic group and approximately 700 languages spoken on the
territory.
Indonesia has a dynamic economy fueled by both public and private investment. Indonesia is the
largest economy in Southeast Asia, largely based on the industry and services sectors, along with
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See the August 2010 first transfer pricing case heard by the Malaysian Special Commission on Income Tax
(“SCIT”) witnessed by KPMG.
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The data bank of Indonesia estimated the population in Indonesia for the year 2015 at 255, 461, 700. See Bank
of Indonesia, available at http://www.bi.go.id/sdds/series/pop/index_pop.asp (last retrieved 1/14/2015).

111

a non-negligible agricultural sector.292 The World Trade Organization also ranks Indonesia as
one the biggest exporting countries in the world with the major partners being Japan, Singapore,
US, and China. Indonesia has various natural resources including oil, natural gas, copper and
gold. The diverse profile of the country has made taxation in Indonesia an intricate issue of
concern, with permanent struggles to strike a balance of a tax system that encourages investment
while supplying enough revenues for the functioning of the government and the provision of
basic public services to citizens.
The power to taxation in Indonesia is derived from Article 23A of the country’s Constitution of
1945.293 The legislative foundation in the area of taxation in Indonesia was further developed by
the General Provisions and Taxation Procedures of 1983,294 and the Income tax law of 1983.295
Indonesian tax law adopted the worldwide system of taxation. Indonesian residents are taxed on
all their income, wherever earned, whereas non-residents are only taxed on their income sourced
in Indonesia. Indonesia adopts the calendar as the fiscal year, and taxes returns must be settled at
the end of the year, after, generally, advances are made throughout the year.
From an individual tax perspective, all residents individual of Indonesia are subject to taxation
on all their income. Under Indonesian tax law, an individual is a resident of Indonesia if they are
present in the country for more than 183 days within any 12-month period, or if they resided in
Indonesia within the calendar year, with intention to stay in Indonesia. The country subjects
various kinds of income from individuals to taxation including income from employment, from
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The world bank estimated, in 2012, that 48% of GDP was based on the industry sector, 38% on the services
sector, and 22% on the Agricultural sector. See World Bank: Indonesia World’s 10th Largest Economy, Jakarta
Globe (May 2014).
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Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945, UUD '45.
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See Undang-undang Ketentuan Umum dan Tatacara Perpajakan/UUKUTp, Law No. 6 of 1983 as amended by
Law No. 16 of 2000.
295
See Undang-undang Pajak Penghasilan/UU PPh, Law No. 7 of 1983 as amended by Law No. 17 of 2000, and Law
No. 36 of 2008.
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other business, or from investment. The individual tax rate structure follows a progressive tax
rate system. Depending on the income, the tax rates range from 5% to 30%. The progressive
individual income tax rate structure is unlike the corporate income tax rate flat structure.

Taxes on Income and gain of Corporations
Companies, residents on Indonesia are subject to income tax there, on their worldwide income, A
company is a resident of Indonesia if it is incorporated or is domiciled there. In the event of
corporate branches situated in Indonesia, they are only taxed on the amount of income derived in
the country. In addition, Indonesia has adopted the force of attraction rule whereby income
accruing from Indonesia to a foreign company having a PE in Indonesia is taxed as income of the
PE if the business generating the income is of a similar nature to the business of the PE.
Indonesian resident companies and companies operating in Indonesia through PE are subject to a
corporate income tax flat rate of 25%. The income tax rate is reduced to 20% for all companies
with at least 40% of their equity listed on and traded on an Indonesian stock exchange. Small and
medium size companies (companies with gross turn over not exceeding IDR50 billion) are even
entitled to a 50% reduction on tax rate. Indonesia imposes a branch profit tax of 20%. The
branch profit tax is administered through withholding and it is payable regardless of whether the
profits are actually distributed to parent companies of not. Indonesian tax law provides for an
exemption to the branch profit tax if the income is reinvested in Indonesia.
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Capital Gains and Dividends
Indonesia applies a tax on capital gains. For residents, capital gains are included on their
ordinary taxable income and are subject to the regular income tax rate. Capital gains derived by
non-residents in Indonesia are subject to a withholding tax determined at 20% of an amount of
deemed income.296 The Minister of Finance established that the deemed income for sales of
unlisted shares, on which the 20% withholding tax should be applied, is the equivalent of 25% of
the gross sale proceeds. All sales or transfer of shares listed on an Indonesia stock market are
subject to a 0.1% final withholding tax rate. An additional 0.5% tax rate is added in the event of
a sale or transfer of shares by a founder shareholder. Sellers or transferors of the right to use land
or buildings are subject to a tax at the rate of 5%.297
In general, dividends paid to non-residents of Indonesia are subject to a final 20% withholding
tax rate.298 Dividends paid to an Indonesian resident company are subject to a 15% withholding
tax rate, which represents an advance payment on the dividend recipient’s tax liability. However,
if the recipient of the dividend is resident of Indonesia, and owns at least 25% of the equity in the
distributing entity, the dividend payment is exempt from taxation. If an individual resident of
Indonesia receives dividends locally, the individual recipient of the dividend is subject to a final
withholding tax rate, the maximum of which is set at 10%.
As indicated above, Indonesia adopts as a fiscal year, the calendar year. As a consequence,
annual corporate income tax returns must be filed by the end of the fourth month following the
fiscal year end. The government can extend the filing deadline by 2 months. It should be noted

296

Id.
The 5% rate is applied on the higher of either the transfer price or the government estimated value of the real
property.
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The 20% withholding overseas tax rate can be reduced if a tax treaty applies.
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that companies are required to make monthly installment payments, throughout the fiscal year, of
their tax liability and the balance is settled in the annual tax return.

Tax and Other Investment Incentives
Boosting investments and enhancing productivity are the main drivers of Indonesian tax and
other investment incentive policies. The country aims to meet the competitiveness of the current
global markets while reducing unemployment and poverty within its borders.
Indonesia has a long history of tax incentives. Early from the change of a nationalist government
to an open market economy, Indonesia instituted a New Order in 1967, granting a five years tax
holiday on foreign investments in the country.299 Very soon, in 1968, the incentive and five year
tax holiday was expanded to apply to domestic investors as well. However, due to lack of
concrete empirical evidence of the need for the generous tax incentives for increased investment,
the whole tax holiday system put in place in 1967 and 1967 was abolished in 1984.300
Upon termination of the tax holidays in 1984, many pressures amount on the Indonesian
government to reintroduce the tax incentives or enact new attractive regimes to promote
investments in the country. The government eventually caved to the pressures in 1994 by
providing special regimes on oil and gas operations,301 and in 1996, by introducing new tax
holidays with a different system of administration. In fact, the new tax holiday law was more
discretionary and the tax holiday was set to apply on a case by case basis and to be administered
by an intergovernmental organism chaired by the Minister in charge of economic affairs.
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The tax holiday covered, for 5 years, income tax as well as dividend withholding tax.
See Mohamad Ikhsan, FDI and Tax Incentives in Indonesia, available at http://www.econ.hitu.ac.jp/~ap3/apppfdi6/paper/INDONESIA.pdf (last retrieved 2/2/2015).
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The current tax incentives regimes available in Indonesia are largely based on the laws crafted in
the late 1990s. First, the Tax Allowance Incentive, granted to qualifying resident companies
provide them with accelerated depreciation and amortization; 10 year extension of tax losses
carry forwards, a reduced tax rate of 10%, or a reduction of the net income tax by 30%. The
above incentives only apply to new investments, or expansion of already existing investments in
Indonesia. Second, Indonesia adopted incentives for certain taxpayers engaged in pioneer
industry. The pioneer industry law, enacted in 2011, allows the government of Indonesia to
determine what industries are pioneer for the country. If admitted, the investor in pioneer
industry benefits from a 5 to 10 years corporate income tax exemption, followed by a 50%
reduction in corporate income tax for 2 years renewable. The Indonesian government has
explained the pioneer industries to include those that introduce new technology, provide high
value added, or have strategic value for the nationwide economy. Third and finally, the
Indonesian tax law provides for special tax rates as incentives in certain industries. For example,
the oil and gas industry in generally subjected to a 20% tax rate; foreign drilling companies
subject to 3.75% corporate income tax rate from their gross drilling income; or construction
companies subject to a tax rate ranging from 2% to 6% of their contract value.

Tax Treaty Network
Indonesia has a wide tax treaty network with a number of countries both in the developed and
developing world. The tax treaties generally provide for a more favorable tax treatment than the
general tax law in Indonesia. From an individual tax perspective, tax treaties signed by
Indonesia provide for relief of double taxation for individuals of treaty countries, deriving
income in Indonesia. The model generally followed in Indonesian tax treaty negotiations follows
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the 1920s consensus whereby active income is taxed at source and passive income taxed at
residence.
From a corporate income tax perspective, tax treaties signed by Indonesia provide for reduced
tax rates for the various forms of income earned in Indonesia by residents of treaty countries.
Therefore, in the absence of a tax treaty and as seen above, dividend payments to non-residents
are subject to a final 20% withholding tax rate. However, if a treaty country is involved, the tax
is reduced, and under the current treaties signed by Indonesia, the tax rate ranges from 5%302 to a
maximum of 15%.303 Similarly interest and royalty incomes under the treaties signed by
Indonesia are subject to a tax rate ranging from 0% to 15%, compared to the 20% final
withholding tax rate applicable from interest in the absence of a tax treaty.
Indonesia has adopted rigorous anti-treaty abuse rules and has granted the tax administration
wide powers in the enforcement of tax rules related to treaties. It is therefore not uncommon for
the Indonesian tax authorities to question and sometimes ignore the provisions of a tax treaty if
the anti-abuse rules are not satisfied. Such expanded powers are also granted in the area of
transfer pricing enforcement in Indonesia.

Transfer Pricing
Until recently, Indonesia was known as lagging in the area of transfer pricing. Compared to its
neighbors including India and China, Indonesia was known not to be aggressive in its transfer
pricing regulations and enforcement. In fact, since the tax law of 1984, the Indonesian tax
authorities were granted power to review transfer pricing but rarely did so in practice. By the
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year 2010 however, Indonesia was emerging as a mature transfer pricing jurisdiction with robust
regulations comparable to those in the developed world. To date, Indonesia has contemporaneous
transfer pricing documentation rules as well as Mutual Agreements Procedures and Advanced
Pricing Agreements.
Indonesian tax law provides for the use of five traditional methods in determining the arm’s
length pricing: the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method; the Resale Price method; the CostPlus method; the Profit Split method; and the Transactional Net Margin method.
Indonesian tax legislation requires that related parties transactions be carried at arm’s length and
in a commercially justifiable way. The tax authorities require that the taxpayer maintain
documentation to prove arm’s length character of related parties’ transaction for at least 10 years,
and the burden is on the taxpayer to prove that the transaction was carried at arm’s length.
Transfer pricing scrutiny has increased in recent years as the government and tax authorities aim
to counter phenomena of base erosion and profit shifting. Transfer pricing audits have increased,
and the government is more proactive in issuing Advance Pricing Agreement in transactions
between related parties in order to mitigate ex post transfer pricing disputes.304
The analysis above of the current international tax structures in various developing countries
jurisdictions provide a basis for the argument that most countries, including in the developing
world, are struggling the question of how to best approach taxation of international income. As
they deal with the question, developing counties are continuously encountering various problems
and many tax systems globally, suffer deep ills in their attempts at international income taxation.
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Chapter IV
Current Ills of the International Tax System
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Most academics do not like to talk about an “international tax system” because, they argue, it
really is a set of rules adopted by domestic jurisdictions so they constitute in fact national tax
systems.305 A look, in this part of the research of the international tax system does not suggest
that there is an overarching tax structure, above countries, and that govern all countries. In fact,
the analysis of the international tax system here refers to the way in which different countries and
some international organizations provide for the taxation of international income. The
international tax system is therefore the framework put in place, sometimes similar and other
times dissimilar, amongst the various countries to deal with issues on taxation of international
income. International tax system will thus refer to the taxation by a country of the income of
those persons who earned income there without claiming residency, and those persons who are
residents in said countries but earn income abroad.306
At the outset, it is important to note that the international tax system, as it currently stands, lives
and dies with the arm’s length principle. As indicated above, the international tax system was
created to eliminate instances of double taxation. The mechanics proposed aroused much debate
but the consensus of taxation of active income as the source jurisdiction and passive income at
the residence jurisdiction quickly became the universal norm and most countries subscribed to it.
As the economic activity grew and companies became bigger in an international stage, the
international tax structure faced significant issued posed by related operations and related
companies transactions. The question was how to access the true economics of a transaction
when the parties involved are related and do not possess divergent interests. The solution
painfully designed and widely accepted was to require the related parties to deal at arm’s lengh.
The ALS was adopted as a means to look at the transaction, disregarded its related parties
character and assure that the true economics of the deal, the arm’s length price, are achieved.307
ALS is the current cornerstone and the relatively beloved bedrock of the international tax system.
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The success, now admittedly outdated, of the international tax system was because of the
successes and merits of the ALS.308 The failures, more contemporaneous, of the international tax
system are because of the shortcomings of the ALS.309 The ills of the current system can
therefore directly be traced to the shortcomings of the ALS. We will look at the current
international tax ills on a global scale (A), and then will focus of the specific struggles of
developing countries with the current system (B), before looking at the current OECD BEPS
project as a case study of global failure of the current system (C).
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A. International Tax Ills Globally
It is important to clarify at the outset that the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion
bears a significant merit when it comes to tax enforcement.310 Tax avoidance is legal and consists
of the use of available laws to minimize one’s tax liability and exposure. Tax evasion however, is
illegal and consists of the non-application or misapplication of the tax legislation. As deserving
of attention that the distinction is, our research looks critically at both tax evasion and tax
avoidance for it has been shown in practice that the line is not that easily drawn.311 Further, any
attempt to influence policy, we believe, ought to critically look at the legal tax avoidance
schemes that lead to the discredit of the tax system as a whole. Our analysis shows how broken
the current international tax system is also through how many and how easily achievable tax
avoidance schemes are available.
The outcry is currently global regarding the failures of the international tax system. Developed
and developing countries, large and small business, civil society, the media, international
organizations, specialized groups, and various tax observers seem all to agree on one
proposition: the current system is broken. The system does not seem to work neither for
governments, nor business. In the meantime, the view in civil society is that taxes are only paid
by the naïve; world citizens increasingly express their feelings that wealthy individuals are
corporations not only choose what taxes to pay, if any, they also seem to easily decide where to
pay the tax.312 The president of the American Chamber of Commerce vociferously lamented that
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US international tax rules were rigged against US MNEs and at the same time, Congress
indicated that a number of companies, on a global scale paid an effective tax rate shy of 10%. In
the UK, the company Starbucks was reported to have accumulated about $700 million in sales in
2012 and paid no taxes.313 Similarly, the company Amazon was reported to have realized
approximately $4 billion in sales in 2011 in the UK and paid just about $2 million in taxes.314
For its part, the company Google accumulated about $500 million and paid approximately $7
million in taxes.315 There is overwhelming amount of evidence that profits appear in countries
inconsistent with economic motivation. As indicated in Table1,316 a study in location of US
MNEs profits as of 2005 suggested very little about their economic operations and a lot more
about their tax rate shopping. Table2317 indicates the percentage of Fortune 500 companies with
subsidiaries in tax heavens.

313

See Dowling Grahame, The curious case of corporate tax avoidance: Is it socially irresponsible?, 124.1 Journal of
Business Ethics 173 (2014).
314
See Fisher Jasmine, Fairer shores: Tax havens, tax avoidance, and corporate social responsibility, 94 BUL Rev.
337 (2014).
315
Id.
316
See Clausing, Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and Tax Policy, 72 Nat’l Tax J. 703 (2009). See also United States
Government Accountability Office, U.S. Multinational Corporations, Effective Tax Rates Are Correlated with Where
Income Is Reported, Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, August, 2008; U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Report to the Congress on Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing and U.S. Income Tax Treaties, November
2007; Martin A. Sullivan, “Extraordinary Profitability in Low-Tax Countries,” Tax Notes (August. 25, 2008).
317
Mark P. Keightley, Congressional Research Service, An Analysis of Where American Companies Report Profits:
Indications of Profit Shifting, 18 January, 2013.

123

Table1: Top 6 countries where profits of US MNEs are located and tax rates (2005)

Rank

Countries

Effective Tax Rate

1
2
3

Netherlands
Luxembourg
UK

5.10%
0.90%
28.90%

4
5
6

Bermuda
Ireland
Switzerland

0.90%
5.90%
3.50%
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Table2: Top tax heavens with US Subsidiaries from Fortune 500 companies (2013)
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The question is how are companies able to achieve that? How is the current international tax
system unfit? What are the main areas of weakness within the system? How can one locate
profits in a jurisdiction in which they have minimum to no operations? Several schemes and
methods are used by companies and their explanation goes a long way to showing the flawed
character of the current international tax system.
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1. The Transfer Pricing Global Dysfunction
Transfer pricing is one of the most challenging issues in international taxation for MNEs, tax
administrators and tax policy makers. The basic transfer pricing situation can exist in the example
below: imagine a scenario where a US MNE that manufactures Phones in the US, owns valuable
intangibles related to the know-how and the marketing of the phones. US MNE would like to
expand its business to Cameroon where intellectual property rights are not properly protected. In
order to avoid the intellectual property being compromised, US MNE to create a wholly owned
subsidiary in Cameroon (“Cam Sub”), responsible for selling the US manufactured phones to the
Cameroonian market. The decision allows US MNE to expand its business to Cameroon while
avoiding the independent local distributors and minimizing the risk of compromising its
intellectual property rights. However, the relationship between US MNE and Cam Sub is an intragroup relationship and US MNE has large discretion on the prices it sales to phones to Cam Sub
for resale to final customers.
In fact US MNE can easily use such pricing discretion in its interaction with Cam Sub to implement
various international tax planning technics. 318 For example if we assume US MNE incurs a cost
of $25 to manufacture a phone, and Cam Sub incurs $25 to distribute the phone in Cameroon. The
phone is sold to the final customer for $100. If US and Cameroon were the same tax jurisdiction,
there would be no issue as US MNE and Cam Sub would file consolidated returns showing a net
gain of $50 ($100 - $25 - $25). However, since US and Cameroon are two separate tax jurisdictions
with presumably different tax rates, the allocation of the income between the two jurisdictions will
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be dependent on the price charged to Cam Sub by US MNE in the their intra group transaction.
Assuming neither party wants to operate at a loss, the minimum price acceptable by US MNE is
$25 (equivalent to the amount it incurs to manufacture the phone) and the maximum price
acceptable by Cam Sub is $75 (representing $25 of its cost and the $50 maximum profit he can get
from the final consumer). There is therefore, a continuum of possible prices at which US MNE
can charge the manufactured phone to Cam Sub.
If we assume that the US has a higher tax rate than Cameroon, US MNE and Cam Sub would
structure the transaction so as to charge for the phone as low a price as possible. Under this
scenario, US MNE would be inclined to charge Cam Sub $25 (the minimum US MNE can accept)
for the manufactured phone. As a consequence and after incurring and additional $25 for
distribution, Cam Sub would sale the phone to the final customers in Cameroon for $100 realizing
a profit of $50. Because of the intra-group price, the MNE has managed to locate all its profits
from the manufacture of the phone to Cameroon, the lower tax jurisdiction.
If conversely, we assume Cameroon has a higher tax rate than the US, US MNE and Cam Sub
would structure the transaction so as to charge for the phone, as high a price as possible. Under
this scenario, US MNE would be inclined to charge Cam Sub $75 (the maximum Cam Sub can
accept) for the manufactured phone. As a consequence, and after incurring an additional $25 for
distribution, Cam Sub would sale the phone to the final customers in Cameroon for $100 realizing
no profit. Because of the intra-group price, the MNE has managed to locate all its profits from the
manufacture of the phone to the US, the lower tax jurisdiction.
As seen in the illustration above, the flexibility to determine the price in the related party context
is unavailable in the circumstance of unrelated independent parties involved in a transaction. The
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determination of intra-groups prices known as transfer pricing, cause two major problems: first
and as illustrated above, transfer pricing allows for manipulations on the location of profits and
defeats the purposes of taxation. In addition, transfer pricing harms competition as it is only
available to big MNEs and provides a flexibility that local small companies do not possess. The
net effect of transfer pricing in to increase the after-tax profits of the MNEs as a group. The profits,
wherever located, belong ultimately to the same shareholders of the group.
Since the implementation of the first regulations in this area in the UK in 1915, tax legislations
continue to struggle in their attempts to find ways to police transfer pricing and curb its abuses.
From these attempts, a regulation emerged, that now enjoys international recognition: the ALS.
As a basic principle, the ALS attempts to impose to intra-group transactions, the realities of similar
transactions but amongst unrelated parties. As such, the ALS was conceived a system that requires
related parties to set the prices of their transaction in similar manner independent parties would set
the prices in comparable transactions. ALS therefore consists of comparing intra-group
transactions to open market transactions and taxing them accordingly. Transfer pricing leads to
various adjustments in the event the intra-group pricing does not agree with the independent
parties’ open market transactions. At its inception transfer pricing regulations remained unclear as
to how to assure a reasonable and comparable price leaving courts to use their best judgment as to
what transfer price was at arm’s length. In 1968, the US adopted regulations that provided for
methods of enforcing arm’s length. Originally, there were three methods (known as the traditional
methods) to access the reasonableness of intra-group pricing. The OECD quickly incorporated the
traditional methods in its transfer pricing guidelines of 1977. However, due to the various
limitations of the traditional methods observed in practice, policy makers adopted two additional
methods. We will review the methods consecutively.
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The first transfer pricing method (one of three the traditional methods) is the Comparable
Uncontrolled Price (“CUP”). Under this method, the transaction between the related parties is
compared to a transaction in the same good or service, in the same market, under similar
conditions, but between unrelated parties. The CUP method is only useful is the goods or services
are standard enough that they can be found in the open market. There is a requirement that the
comparable be close to the actual transaction if not identical to the actual transaction except that it
is occurring between unrelated parties unlike the actual transaction which is between related
parties. If such comparable is found, the transfer price is adjusted to the price in the comparable
transaction and taxed accordingly. The main issue with this method is that it is very hard if not
impossible nowadays to find transactions as close to the intra-group transactions. It is hard, if not
impossible to find comparables. MNEs today have grown so large and continue to grow very large
and distinguish themselves for offering innovative products and services, products that are not
available in the markets and have no real comparables. The case of patented products is a telling
example where exact comparables required under the CUP method cannot and are not supposed
to be found. The CUP method is therefore fundamentally flawed and unfit for current business
practices of the MNEs world.
The second transfer pricing method (one of three the traditional methods) is the Cost Plus. The
cost-plus method compares gross margins of controlled and uncontrolled transactions. Under this
method, the arm’s length price is measured by adding an appropriate gross profit to the controlled
taxpayer’s cost of producing the property involved in the controlled transaction. Under Cost Plus,
the amount needed to produce is added to the prevalent profit margin (from uncontrolled
transactions) to determine the arm’s length transfer price. The main issue with the Cost-Plus
method is its limited scope. The method is ordinarily used in cases involving the manufacture,
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assembly, or other production of goods that are sold to related parties. Cost plus is only useful, like
CUP is there are comparables, and Cost Plus is most appropriate for the manufacturing and
assembly industries. Today’s economy is less reliance on brick and mortar and the search for
comparables remains a lacking endeavor.
The third transfer pricing method (one of three the traditional methods) is the Resale Price Method
(“RPM”). The RPM evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled transaction is at arm’s
length, by reference to the gross margin realized in comparable uncontrolled transactions. Under
this method, the arm’s length price is measured by subtracting an appropriate gross profit from the
applicable resale price of the property involved in the controlled transaction. RPM uses
Comparable profitability, and comparable profitability is determined by calculating the ratio of the
initial purchase price of comparable tangible goods to their resale price to an unrelated party. This
ratio (expressed as a percentage) is then used to calculate the value of the goods in a related-party
transaction. Like the other traditional methods, the RPM relies heavily on the availability of actual
comparables; however, as we have seen, exact comparables are very difficult if not impossible to
find. Further the workings of this method gives it a relatively limited scope as the RPM is most
often used for distributors that resell products without physically altering them or adding
substantial value to them. Current economies, as indicated above rely as much on intangibles and
alterations in the chain are common practice. All three traditional methods require a high standard
of comparability. In practice, however, such comparability has been difficult to establish
prompting the OECD to amend its transfer pricing guidelines in 1995 in order to add two new
methods, which arguably require a lesser degree of comparability.
The fourth transfer pricing method (one of the two additional methods) is the Comparable Profits
Method (“CPM”) which is also known as the Transactional Net Margin Method (“TNMM”). This
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method evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled transaction is at arm’s length by
comparing the profitability of one of the parties to the controlled transaction (the “tested party”)
to that of companies that are similar to the tested party. The advantage of this method is that it
draws not from comparables in the same industry; instead, the method uses reasonably similar
industries. The analysis of the reasonably similar industries would provide a range of prices
allowing for a curve where the bottom 25% and the top 25% of the curve are excluded. If the
profits realized on the controlled transaction fall within the middle 50%, no further analysis is
required. However, if the related parties’ transaction does not fall within the middle 50%, then tax
authorities are allowed to proceed to adjustments. The main weakness of this method is that is
requires a tremendous amount of available information in order to examine a wide range of
reasonably similar transactions for a reliable curve. Tax authorities have difficulties assembling
this information and big four accounting firms have establish a de facto monopoly for these
analysis and charge a considerable amount for their services. CPM is therefore not available to
small companies (since they cannot afford the services of the accounting firms) and tax authorities
do not have all the necessary information to potentially challenge the position taken by MNEs of
a transfer price reasonably comparable to the open market price.
The fifth and last method (the second of the two additional methods) is the Profit Split. This method
allocates operating profits or losses from controlled transactions in proportion to the relative
contributions made by each party in creating the combined profits or losses. Relative contributions
must be determined in a manner that reflects the functions performed, risks assumed, resources
employed, and costs incurred by each party to the controlled transaction. After the functions of the
related parties are analyzed and a standard market based return is assigned to them based on
publicly available data, the residual, if any, is to be assigned and there is disagreement as to who
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gets assigned any residual of profits. Under US law, the residual, if any, should be assigned to the
developer of the group’s intangibles due to the presumption that intellectual property is responsible
for the residual. This view is not shared by the OECD which is yet to determine how the residual
should be assigned. Many countries, specifically developing countries, are left to guess if and when
they are skilled enough to get to that point.
The various transfer pricing methods reveal their imperfect nature and the continued effort to
designed better technics to curb abusive use of transfer pricing. The global and relentless litigation
on the issue is testament that transfer pricing is an existential threat to the integrity of the
international tax regime and might support an extreme view of the complete elimination of its
necessity, as argued in this dissertation, through the use of Unitary Principles. We will look at the
case law and transfer pricing litigation in various sample countries.
In the US, the struggles with transfer pricing and its consequences have a long history. As argued
by Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah, the history of transfer pricing in the US can be traced along
with that of the ALS.319 Transfer pricing cases therefore can be traced and tied to the period or
either rise or fall of the ALS. Before the adoption of use of the ALS by courts, transfer pricing
disputes were litigated and decided on, on the basis whether there is ‘clear reflection of income’
or rather, ‘evasion of taxes’.320 For example, in Seminole Flavor Co. v Commissioner,321 the Tax
Court indicated that to determine whether the transaction is arm’s length, one should not wonder
whether unrelated parties would have entered into a similar transaction; instead, the inquiry
should be as to whether the actual transaction was fair and reasonable. For some Courts in this
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era, the comparison with independent and unrelated parties to determine arm’s length was
irrelevant and unnecessary.322 On the other hand during the same period, other courts applied the
ALS in deciding transfer pricing disputes, leaving total uncertainty as to the standard to be
applied in transfer pricing cases. For example, in Hall v. Commissioner,323 the Tax Court used
comparables from uncontrolled and unrelated transaction to adjust the otherwise price set at 90%
to 10%. The Court indicated that gross income has been arbitrarily shifted and the Commissioner
adjustment ‘reflected Hall’s income as if he had been dealing with unrelated parties.’324 Finally,
in late 1960s, the legislation attempted to settle the debate by requiring that transfer pricing
methods and ALS principles relying on comparables be used in examining the cases.325 The
Courts eventually agreed that for all Section 482 cases, ALS should be mandatorily used to
determine if an adjustment is necessary.326 This period marked the rise and pinnacle of the ALS
which soon came to wide scrutiny.
Early in the 1990s, there was emerging a wide realization that the sacro saint principle
established in late 1960s, the ALS, did not work in the large majority of cases. Repeatedly, the
government lost in trial because most situations could not be properly examined under the ALS
due to the lack of comparables. Various cases prompted this realization and the outrage
therefrom. In U.S. Steel Corp. v. Commissioner327for example, US Steel owned a Liberian
subsidiary, Navios which it used to ship steel to the United States. The prices set by Navios were
set in a way that it would allow a match with the prices of the domestic steel manufactured in the
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US. Navios which also shipped very minimum amounts of steel for unrelated parties, did so at
the same price as its intra group pricing. The Tax Court ruled that the internal price was not at
arm’s length. However, the Court of Appeal reversed and argued that because Navios charged
the same amount to unrelated albeit negligible parties, the intra-group price was at arm’s length
in the absence of other comparables. Even the E.I. Dupont de Nemours &Co. v. United State328
where the government had a sounding and last major victory in transfer pricing litigation in the
US, many commentators have attributed such victory to the internal damaging memorandum of
the taxpayer revealed in court, instead of a clear understanding and application of the ALS
methods. In recent years, many transfer pricing disputes have come through the umbrella of Cost
Sharing Agreements and continue to show the lacking character of the ALS through resounding
taxpayer victories at trial.329
In Germany, the struggle to prevent companies from shifting taxable profits out of or into
Germany by way of inappropriate transfer pricing arrangements has led to the creation of five
basic defense mechanisms with respect to adjustment of income and has generated extensive
litigation. The defense mechanisms are: (1) attribution of assets and income and determination of
tax base;330 hidden profits distribution;331 hidden capital contribution;332 deduction of corporate
interest cost;333 and the adjustment of income in the case of business connections abroad.334 All
five defense mechanisms are designed to curb abusive transactions and allow for appropriate
adjustment whenever necessary, even though litigation. For example, in 1986, the German

328

See E.I. Dupont de Nemours &Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
See Xilingx Inc. v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 37 (2005) and subsequent history. See also Veritas Software Corp. v.
Commissioner, 133 T.C. 14 (2009).
330
See Section 39 to 42 of the German Fiscal Code (Abgabenordnung).
331
See Section 8(3) of the German Corporate Tax Act (Korperschaftseuergesetz).
332
See Section 8(1) of the German Corporate Tax Act (Korperschaftseuergesetz).
333
See Section 8a of the German Corporate Tax Act (Korperschaftseuergesetz).
334
See Section 1 of the German Foreign Tax Act (Aubensteuergesetz).
329

135

Federal Tax Court dealt with the transfer of an operating unit between sister companies without
compensation for the goodwill involved in Decision IR 150/82.335 The Court found that the
transfer constituted a hidden distribution of the goodwill to the common parent and a subsequent
contribution by the common parent to the subsidiary. Also, the Court ruled that substantial losses
over a three-year period elicit a presumption that the agreed transfer price is inappropriate if the
transaction is intra-group.336 The presumption, the Court indicated, is rebuttable and taxpayer can
show that the losses over three years are not due to an inappropriate transfer price. This decision
caused the German legislator to engage in an overhaul of the regulations concerning taxpayers’
documentation and cooperation in the area of transfer pricing.337 It should be noted that transfer
pricing litigation has increased in Germany in recent years. Further, other methods of resolving
transfer pricing disputes are used in Germany and are arguably preferred. The other methods
include technics used though Double Tax Treaties, Mutual Agreement Procedures, Advanced
Pricing Agreements, and Arbitration.
In Australia, there has been a long history applying transfer pricing principle and the ALS. 338
The long history of Australia with transfer pricing offers a rather rich jurisprudence, mostly
made of settled cases. Overall, the Australia Tax Authority (“ATO”) does not hold an impressive
record of winning transfer pricing cased. Similar to the US, transfer pricing litigation in Australia
is mostly won by taxpayers. However, the ATO regularly settle cases with taxpayers, leading to
considerable payouts from taxpayers, mostly due to procedural mishaps from the taxpayer.
Additionally, there has been an increasing importance afforded to alternative methods of dispute
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resolution. Arbitration is very often used in transfer pricing litigation in Australia. Similarly,
Advance Pricing Agreements and Mutual Agreements Procedures are increasingly used as a way
to avoid or decrease future disputes between the ATO and taxpayers.
Current transfer pricing rules in Australia are based on the Income Tax Assessment Act
(“ITAA”) of 1936,339 and continue to produce ample disputes, specifically on the method used to
establish transfer prices. One of the main and recent cases decided in the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal of Australia (“AATA”) is the Roche Products v. Commissioner of Taxation litigation.340
The main question before the court was the appropriate transfer pricing method to be used to
determine whether prices are arm’s length. The case was initiated because the ATO determined
that the Australian subsidiary of the Swiss Roche Pharmaceuticals Group was insufficiently
profitable due to the overpayments made to affiliated group companies located in Switzerland
and Singapore. Both parties to the litigation both forward a number of experts to examine the
method used by the group for transfer pricing, but also to establish a possible arm’s length price
for the transactions. All four expert testimonies were different. Each expert arrived at a different
conclusion and used slightly different information, methodologies, and adjustments. The tribunal
and judges had a tremendous amount of difficulties resolving the case due to conflicting expert
testimony along with very conflicting interpretation of the rules from the ATO and the taxpayer.
At the end, the tribunal aligned itself with most of the taxpayer’s claims and believed in
taxpayer’s experts. The ATO lost in all its claims but one. The acknowledged that
pharmaceutical companies rarely sale their products through independent sellers. Instead they
use related parties for distribution of the drugs and other products. As a consequence, the tribunal
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reasoned, there is usually no free market in which these products are sold and there are rarely
comparable markets for such products. This analysis is not only true for pharmaceutical
companies; it is true for most MNEs in the 21st century. The differences in this case provide an
explanation as to why most transfer pricing cases are not litigated.
Another case, SNF (Australia) v Commissioner of Taxation,341 was litigated in the Federal Court
of Australia and centered on a substantive transfer pricing issue of applicable transfer pricing
methods in determining the arm’s length price. Again, the court decision was largely unfavorable
to the ATO which sought to recast sales at a lost to a related party. Similar to the Roche Products
case, there were remarkable difference amongst the experts who testified and the court ultimately
indicated that there was no prescribed transfer pricing method that a taxpayer shall use, but rather
it was up to the courts to decide whether the one used by the taxpayer was accurate in
establishing the transfer price. The court held, on first instance, that the prices paid by SNF
(Australia) were equal in some cases, to prices paid by unrelated parties; rejecting the ATO’s
TNMM approach establishing otherwise. The ATO appealed the decision to the full Federal
Court.342 On appeal, the Federal Court, after acknowledging some mistake in the first instance,
nevertheless upheld the decision and rejected the ATO’s appeal; another resounding victory in a
major transfer pricing case in Australia.
In Brazil, the rules and legislative structure around transfer pricing are relatively recent. In fact,
the 1990s saw Brazil switch from a territorial tax system to a worldwide tax system; 343 and it is
only in 1996 that Brazil enacted its transfer pricing legislation.344 Since then however, Brazil has
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known rapid developments in the area of transfer pricing through the changes in its legislation,
the judicial actions and the measure taken by the tax authorities. The study of transfer pricing in
Brazil is of particular interest because the country does not necessarily align with the
internationally known principle of ALS. In the original transfer pricing legislation of 1996, the
legislator in Brazil indicated its intent to adopt and comply with the internationally accepted
ALS. However, in the making of the law, Brazil endeavored to incorporate the necessary and
practical limitations to the ALS. Aware of the compliance and enforcement cost that are
necessary with the ALS, the legislator in Brazil aimed to adopt a transfer pricing legislation
efficient enough to mitigate those costs, albeit at the behest of completely embracing the ALS.
The law in fact establishes a presumption for acceptable prices and charges.345 The presumptions
allow the tax authorities in Brazil to decide on a case without having to go through the lengthy
and uncertain procedure of determining the accurate price through comparables. The legislator
basically established workable parameters, which do not totally align with the exigencies of the
ALS. The Brazilian system relies of legislative benchmark for its comparability analysis, and
uses the presumption in determining the arm’s length price of related parties’ transactions.
Although this is a departure from the internationally accepted ALS driven by the OECD, it is
worth nothing that Brazil is not a member of the OECD and OECD guidelines and rules are
regularly referred to by Brazilian judges as secondary laws, laws with secondary authority.
Nevertheless, the law recognizes the three traditional transfer pricing methods in arriving at the
arm’s length price through application of the legislative benchmarks.
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In 2005, the Administrative Taxpayers’ Council reached a decision clarifying Brazilian transfer
pricing rules.346 In this case, the tax authorities prohibited a taxpayer, a pharmaceutical company,
from using the RPM in applying the legislative benchmarks and establishing the arm’s length
price. The tax authorities reasoned that the RPM could not apply to imported goods where the
goods are further manufactured in Brazil before their ultimate sale. The judge in first instance
agreed with the tax authorities and upheld the tax authorities’ decision to not apply RPM for
imported goods that are further manufactured locally before sale. On appeal, the Administrative
Taxpayers’ Council reversed the decision. The appeal judges indicated that the law allows
taxpayers to use any of the three traditional transfer pricing methods to establish the arm’s length
price and that the tax authorities had no power to exclude that. The appeal judges underlined that
even though the OECD guidelines would preclude the use of the RPM in similar situation,
OECD is merely secondary law in Brazil, and cannot override the express provisions of the
Brazilian tax legislation which allows taxpayers to choose any of the three pricing methods. This
decision is very important in many regards. One of the aspects that this decision clarifies is that if
the transfer pricing rules in Brazil are in contradiction with the internationally accepted ALS, or
if they are contrary to the OECD guidelines, there is direct and unquestionable primacy of the
local transfer pricing provisions.347 Facing the growing transfer pricing disputes, the Brazilian
government continues to encourage alternative methods of dispute resolution and encourage
taxpayers to dialogue with tax authorities, a premise that was set early on, in Article 21 of the
1996 founding transfer pricing tax legislation. The 2010 law that revisits the 1996 law and
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reshapes the use of benchmarks emphasizes the need for a dialog between taxpayers and the tax
authorities to minimize transfer pricing disputes.348
In Chile, transfer pricing rules were not adopted until the late 1990s. Up until then, Chile
approached transfer pricing transactions with the general tax provisions and the notion of ‘fair
value’.349 In the past two decades however, Chile has engaged in an effort to increase its
participation in the global markets by actively seeking to reduce barriers to outbound
investments, while providing incentives for inbound direct investments from foreign companies.
For that end, Chile joined the OECD and signed dozens of bilateral tax treaties.350 Effective
January 1, 1998, the Chilean government enacted transfer pricing legislation and regulations and
formally introduced the ALS to the Chilean system.351 Although the regulations are largely based
on the OECD concepts and ALS foundation, there are slight details and practical adaptations as
to how the ALS should be applied.352 Further, there has not been enough detailed legislation on
the application of the Chilean transfer pricing documentation above and beyond the general
provisions. For example, Chile allows several transfer pricing methods to be used in arriving at
the arm’s length price. One of the methods is the ‘reasonable profitability’ method for which the
law does not attach a specific meaning.353 The law only states that arm’s length price should be
arrived at through comparison of the controlled transaction with the uncontrolled similar
transactions, however no mechanisms as to how the comparability analysis should be done or
how the adjustments should be made are provided in the law or the regulations. There is
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therefore an uncertainty as to how the transfer pricing rules in Chile would apply. The lack of
guidance, whether legislative or regulatory, leads to an atmosphere of uncertainty as to the
Chilean transfer pricing regulatory environment. As a member of the OECD, it is arguable that
Chile would subscribe to the methods and guideline endorsed by the OECD. However, in an
unofficial opinion, the Chilean authorities indicated that the OECD commentaries only have a
secondary value and can be used as complementary methods. In addition, the fact that Chile just
recently joined the OECD begs the question as to whether its legislative, regulatory and judicial
systems have been able to digest, and understand the OECD guidelines as to be able to use them
when facing difficulties with local legislations.
Notwithstanding the lack of regulatory guidance and the uncertainty in the Chilean transfer
pricing environment, transfer pricing disputes in Chile remain rather embryonic and timid. The
most activity has been observed in the arena of transfer pricing audits that have been intensified
by the Chilean Internal Revenue Service. The low but increasing level of transfer pricing audits
and disputes generates hopes that the judicial system will help in developing a set of clear rules if
possible, around transfer pricing in Chile. In the meantime, Chile has positioned itself as one of
the fastest growing small economies in the world. Foreign direct investment continues to flow at
an exponential rate and Chile is recognized as one of the most ‘attractive’ countries to date.354
The question is whether MNEs are getting a free pass at to their transfer pricing transactions, or
are abiding in a satisfactory way, with the general rules of transfer pricing currently applicable in
Chile. And even in the hope of an active judicial system, and further details on the application of
the ALS, it is safe to predict that taxpayers would be pre-dominant in ligation because any
system based on comparability, as seen for other countries, seems bound to fail tax
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administrations and optimum tax collection. Chile also adopted alternative methods of dispute
resolution as well as preventative methods such as Mutual Agreement Procedures or Advance
Pricing Agreement (mostly through the ruling request procedure). The recent changes, in 2012,
aim at providing more guidance on the application of the Chilean transfer pricing rules, and the
compliance requirements on taxpayers.355
In South Africa, transfer pricing regulations came as a necessity as the country realized the
magnitude of revenues being eroded from its tax base through questionable pricing in intercompany transactions. With the opening of South Africa to the world in early 1990s and the
exponential growth of transnational transactions both in terms of foreign direct investment and
exports, the country realized the need to protect its tax base and prevent abusive tax structuring
transactions. Sparked by the revelations by Rustomjee, in 1991, that South African capital
outflows were approximately double the amount of the country’s foreign debt of the time by
1991.356 The South African Minister of Finance, in 1994, appointed a special commission,
chaired by Judge Katz, to inquire into the matter of capital flight and offer recommendations.
The main recommendations of the Commission were the establishment of solid mechanisms to
counter tax avoidance; the need for protective measures against abuse of transfer pricing.357 The
Commission recommended several methods to counter capital flight but explicitly encouraged
the South African Government to adopt the procedures and methodologies put in place by the
OECD to prevent tax avoidance. The transfer pricing rules were consequently introduced in
1995, following an amendment to the South African Income Tax Act of 1962.358 Section 31 that
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emerged from the amendment and introduced transfer pricing rules, also discusses thin
capitalization measures. Transfer pricing rules, following the recommendations of the 1994
Commission have largely embraced the OECD ALS and the OECD guidelines to transfer
pricing. The specifically indicates that the rules only apply in a cross border sphere, when
transactions involved related parties. Further, the law indicates that the arm’s length price must
be arrived at from the comparison with similar transactions between unrelated parties.
Since its introduction in 1995, transfer pricing legislation in South Africa has continued to
emerge, and ameliorate. The South African Tax Authority continues to issue notices and
guidelines on the application of the transfer pricing rules in the South African Context. In one of
the Notices, in 1999, the Tax Authority clarified the procedures to be followed in South Africa
and under local countries circumstances, to determine the arm’s length price.359 In 2010, South
Africa initiated changes to its transfer pricing legislation in order to better align with the OECD
provisions, specifically with provisions of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. The
law change in 2010 specifically aimed to widen the scope of application of the South African
transfer pricing rules. Another major change of 2010 is the reversal, in the burden of proof, from
the government to the taxpayer in transfer pricing litigation. The taxpayer must establish its
transfer pricing method, and show that the method accurately reflects the arm’ length price in its
inter-company transactions.
Transfer pricing litigation in South Africa, like most developing countries, is rather embryonic.
There are no major cases that been litigated in the area of transfer pricing. A typical transfer
pricing controversy in South Africa goes through the following channel: the review of the tax
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returns provided by taxpayer; if transfer pricing risk is identified, the case is referred to a transfer
pricing audit specialist. The auditor reviews and weighs the risk, if credible; the transfer pricing
auditor can issue a questionnaire to the taxpayer for further information of the covered
transactions. The auditor then presents its findings to a panel in charge of determining whether
the transfer pricing risks identified are material to bring the dispute forward. If the panel, after
transfer pricing review, decides to audit the matter, the taxpayer is issued a Letter of Findings
outlining the review from the audit and the proposed transfer pricing adjustments. If the taxpayer
objects the position of the tax authority, the matter may go to settlement or alternative dispute
resolution. Most cases are settled and the procedure stops here. However, if an agreement cannot
be found, the matter is then prone for litigation. South Africa, like many other countries, has
increased its scrutiny of potential transfer pricing abusive transactions. The number of transfer
pricing audits has increased significantly in recent years. South Africa also provides procedures
for Advance Pricing Agreements to anticipate and mitigate transfer pricing disputes.
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2. Earning Stripping Through Debt Allocation
One method of shifting profits from a high tax jurisdiction to a low tax jurisdiction is to borrow
more in the high tax jurisdiction and less in the low tax jurisdiction. When the borrowings are
coming from a low tax jurisdiction to a high tax one, the subsequent interest payments generate
interest deductions in the high tax jurisdiction providing more income, interest income, in the
low tax jurisdiction. A more common use of this strategy is known as the earning stripping
technique whereby debt whether with related or unrelated party does not give rise to tax payment
from the interest recipient. For example, a technique commonly used was for a foreign parent in
a jurisdiction where interest income is low or not taxed, to grant a loan to its US Subsidiary with
the effect that the interest payments on the loan would wipe out all the US earnings of the
Subsidiary in the form of interest deductions, minimizing or eliminating US taxation. The related
character of modern MNEs makes this shifting of debt achievable without a change in the overall
debt profile and exposure of the company as a whole.360 It is well accepted that tax planning has
a significant effect on the distribution and location of taxable profits of MNEs.361
Many countries, specifically developed countries have adopted tax legislation aiming to curb to
use of debt and interest to shift profits.362 The US for example has adopted rules related to
interest allocation and earning stripping.363 Tax authorities in the developed world have designed
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and continue to thrive to implement rules to curb MNEs ability to us debt and financing to shift
income to low/no tax jurisdictions.364 In the developing countries however, the struggle is more
pronounced. Most developing countries struggle to adopt policies that encourage investment
while aiming to generate enough national revenues in order to provide basic social services for
their people. Enactment of arguably generous tax policies related to interest deduction,
specifically on foreign investments, or the non-taxation of interest income from local entities are
common practice. MMEs operating in these jurisdictions regularly use them to maximum their
overall tax exposure as a group. Many developing countries have enacted US style rules to avoid
shifting of income through the use of debt and interest. Nevertheless, those countries face
tremendous difficulties in enforcing such rules. Difficulties faced include the lack of appropriate
human resources to comprehend the complex rules related to complex strategies that aim and
curbing earning stripping for example.365 Developing countries have imported most of the
developed world complex tax mechanisms design to respond to complex structuring of tax
transactions. The level of expertise needed is to equal the level of expertise afforded major
MNEs. The issue however is that in developing countries, institutions, including tax institutions
are not necessarily ran by experts, most appointment and positions are still dictated by family
relations and various political affiliation. The issue is not that the expertise to enforce complex
rules is inexistent, the reality that the expertise is not used in an appropriate manner, if at all. For
example, one technique used to reduce profit shifting through the use of debt is the interest
allocation scheme designed by tax authorities in order to get to the true economics of MNEs
transactions and tax them accordingly. Interest allocation technic requires application of very
sophisticated formulas and requires a wealth of information on the MNEs. On the one hand, the
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importing developing country of the allocation of interest technic must assure that it has
dominium on the formula to be applied. Secondly, the importing developing country must have
access to the required information for the technic to be effective. Access to MNEs’ global
operations information is a major issue in taxation in developing countries, an issue that manifest
itself best in the struggle of those countries with transfer pricing.
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3. The Distortive Effect of Hybrid Entities
As discussed above, the past decades have seen a tremendous growth in highly sophisticated tax
planning in the international arena. International tax professionals have specifically used
differences in tax systems to exercise, at time, questionable tax arbitrages. The commonly known
as the hybrid mismatch arrangements and their proliferation is a testament to the ever growing
distortion of intended tax effects on the face of internationalization and globalization of commerce.
A hybrid mismatch arrangement is an arrangement that exploits differences in national tax
treatment of an instrument, an entity or a transfer between two or more countries. The
arrangements usually lead to income being tax in neither of the involved jurisdictions (double non
taxation), or lead to tax deferrals which is sustained for a long term, have a similar effect as double
non-taxation. In the international tax arena, the most widely used form of hybrid mismatch is a
planning scheme that focuses on tax treatment of different entities in different taxing jurisdictions.
The same economic operation can be characterized as a taxable person in the US, for example,
while not being a taxable person in the Netherlands. A payment might be taxable in the
Netherlands, for example, while not being taxable in the US. Hybrid mismatch regularly distort
the working of tax systems and produce consequences that neither taxing authority anticipated.
Hybrid mismatch arrangements require a hybrid entity (entities that are treated as transparent for
tax purposes in one country and not transparent in another); dual residency (entities resident in at
least two different countries). Hybrid mismatch arrangements generally produce the same results
including double deduction (each country involved allows a deductions);366 deduction and no
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corresponding inclusion (taxpayer is allowed a deduction in one country and is not required a
corresponding inclusion in the other country);367 or foreign tax credit generation (arrangements
that allow for tax credits that would not have been allowed outside of such arrangements).368
In general therefore, hybrid mismatch arrangements, though seemingly in compliance with the
letter of the law of each country involved, result in non-taxation for all countries involved which
is a result neither country intended in adopting its tax policy. The reality of hybrid mismatch
arrangements can be analyzed from at least four different policy perspectives: their impact on tax
revenues (the goal of hybrid mismatch arrangements is always the lowering of the taxpayer’s
overall tax burden, draining the tax revenues of one or all the countries involved); their impact on
competition (hybrid mismatch arrangements are only available to MNEs, companies that have
operations in at least two countries. The tax advantages those MNEs may derive from hybrid
mismatch transactions are not available to smaller companies, making them unable to effectively
compete); their impact on transparency (hybrid mismatch benefit more often than not, on their
secret character, the general public would usually be unaware of the low effective tax rate that the
MNE enjoys, and if the public is aware, they generally don’t fully appreciate the hybrid mismatch
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transactions as being at the root of such low effective tax rates); and their impact on fairness (only
certain tax persons, MNEs, are able to implement hybrid mismatch arrangements and enjoy the
tax benefits therefrom, a situation that denotes the unfair character of preferable rules applicable
only to a group). Hybrid mismatch opportunities were further developed after the adoption in the
US of the so-called Check the Box Election rules (“CTB”).369 Originally envisioned to established
simplicity and clarity in the classification of entities and the tax treatment therefrom, CTB elections
quickly became the prime medium of achieving hybrid mismatch arrangements. If there is an
opportunity whereby a partnership or a disregarded entity is treated more favorably than a
corporation in a jurisdiction in which MNEs operate, the simple solution is the ‘check’ the entity
in a form that yields mismatch tax advantages while not altering the economic reality of the entity
and its operations.
The amount of lost revenue to governments from hybrid mismatch transactions is significant and
many governments have become more aggressive in identifying and negating the effects of those
arrangements. Many rules have been implemented to prevent hybrid mismatch transactions and
tax authorities enjoy a rather successful scorecard from hybrid mismatch arrangements litigation.
In the US for example, the amount involved in the hybrid mismatch transactions was estimated at
approximately $3.5 billion through the foreign tax credits generated by such arrangements.370 New
Zealand settled, in 2009, cases involving hybrid mismatch arrangements with the taxpayer
remitting approximately $1.5 billion to the tax authorities. In Italy, a number of cases involving
hybrid mismatch arrangements settled for approximately $2 billion. The noted success of tax
administrations in these proceedings, even though the taxpayers arguably respect the letter of the
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law, is due to the fact that the hybrid mismatch arrangements clearly violate the intent of the letter
law, and the government would usually have an upper hand in these disputes. By speculation
therefore, we can forecast that any initiative to limit and/or eliminate these arrangements could
easily gather an impressive international coalition and maybe met by a reduced resistance from
MNEs. The speculative and simplistic view however, remains questionable as we continue to
witness more, not less hybrid mismatch arrangements by MNEs in their international operations.
The international tax system and countries globally continue to face serious risk as to tax revenues,
tax sovereignty, and tax fairness. The issues presented generally rotate around tax base erosion
through profits shifting. There are many aspects to the problems faced by international taxation
but one of the main once is transfer pricing and how easily MNEs seem to be able decide how
much taxes to pay, if at all, and where to pay it at. The vast majority of rules currently governing
international tax transactions still are based on tax policy considerations founded on the
majoritarily territorial nature of taxation in early days. Globalization is not new but, the pace of
inter-connectedness and intra-group activities at the global level has never been more pronounced.
The internationalization of business activities has never been more accentuated and international
tax planning structures have never been at the center of the global debate with such urgency. From
the standpoint of MNEs, no transactions is seriously considered unless it global consequences are
analyzed. The international dimension and perspective dictates all actions of modern MNEs.
Nevertheless, the responses of tax authorities remain largely territorial and local, showing a major
disconnect between tax policy and economic reality. The major global of international taxation is
the public perception that only the naïve pay taxes, and that is just too easy, for a certain class of
taxpayers, to avoid taxation. The global ills of international taxation are made apparent through
various tax planning technics including transfer pricing, debt allocation, or hybrid mismatch

152

arrangements. The global outcry proves that a consensus is forming as to the characterization of
the international tax system as a globally failed system. The question now, is how the international
tax system has and continues to fail the developing world and developing countries specifically.
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B. Ills Specific to Developing Countries
Above and beyond the global ills of international taxation, the ways in which the international
taxation is failing globally, there are specific circumstances and specific areas in which the failures
are sui generis to developing countries. The importance of effective taxation and the ability of the
country to effectively tax economic activities within its borders are of central importance in the
developing world. Effective corporate taxation is even of higher importance in the developing
world as they rely more heavily on revenues from corporate taxation as compared to the developed
world.371 Increasing number of MNEs continue to expand their operations in the developing
markets, making international tax policy and rule-making in those markets ever more relevant and
important. The corporate taxation, if ineffective at an international level, would make the entire
system a failure and would result in inability to raise the adequate tax revenues. Historically
however, developing countries have not been proactive in designing international tax rules that
take their individual practical situations into account. Instead, most developing countries have
incorporated, throughout time, the international tax rules, policies and doctrines adopted by
developed countries. The resulting international tax system applicable in these developing
countries has shown to be a total disaster in many fronts.
First, there is a difference in the nature of cross border transactions between the developed and
developing world and they should not be addressed in a similar fashion. Historically, highly
sophisticated tax planning was less prevalent in the developing countries. Developing countries
had basic international tax rules and mere basic international tax planning suffixed to achieve
sought results in these jurisdictions. The lack of appropriate rules had the door open to basic tax
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planning and the irregularity of tax audit did very little to discourage more aggressive tax planning.
The basic rules are now in need of more sophistication as MNEs are cramping up their international
tax planning sophistication in those jurisdictions. The current international tax structures in
developing countries have shown, at times, not sophisticated enough to govern highly complex
transactions. Much legislation in these countries is still incomplete. In several circumstances, the
rules can be and have easily been circumvented by taxpayers specifically MNEs. For example a
law that prevents the use of transfer pricing to realize profit shifting would have very limited effect
in the overall situation of the taxpayer and the tax authorities if similar measures are not adopted
to prevent excessive leverage and the use of debt in the country. The result, in either situation, is
the erosion of the countries tax base. The closure of the transfer pricing route without a
corresponding closure of the excessive indebtedness route can only have limited effect on the
overall goal of reducing and or eliminating gamesmanship.
Second, the general issue raised by each developing country tax administration is the difficulty to
obtain information necessary to apply most of the international tax law provisions. Developing
countries are unable to obtain from MNEs the information they need to understand their global
transactions, and assess the risks involved.372 For example, many developing countries tax
administrations report having constant difficulties obtaining information about MNEs foreign
operations. The foreign operation information is vastly important in fully understanding the risk
of tax losses of the operations in the local country. The inability to access MNEs information in
developing countries can be attributed many variables including the following. First, the
information issue is due to the lack of effective information gathering rules in developing
countries. In the developed world, there are strict rules regarding information gathering for
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taxpayers, specifically MNEs. In the US for example, MNEs are required to provide, by law
various types of information on their operation. In fact, such information is also usually received
from third parties upon whom the US imposes a legal duty to provide the information. In many
instances, the US authorities have not relied on third parties to obtain such information; the US
authorities have mandated such entities to provide the information. Moreover, the US has found
proactive and innovative ways, and working through the applicable rules, to obtain the required
information. On an international perspective, the US has expanded its reach and its ability to get
information on foreign operations.373 Initially, the US led a coalition that continues to advocate for
information exchange between governments. Additionally, the US now requires certain foreign
institutions to provide information on foreign possessions or operations of US persons. The recent
legislative enactment, known as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”) 374 is an
information gathering law requiring foreign financial institutions to provide information to the US
tax authorities about their US account owners (or the US policyholders or insurers as the case may
be).375 However, in the developing world, there is a blatant lack of effective information gathering
rules. Second, there is poor compliance with whatever structure is in place for disclosure and
information gathering, and developing countries tax authorities have limited capacity to enforce
those rules. Many developing countries have incorporated some rules, albeit ineffectively,
regarding disclosures and information gathering. In practice however, it is noted that taxpayers do
not comply with these requirements and the inability of tax authorities to enforce such
requirements is apparent. Many tax legislations in the developing world require that taxpayers
disclose information on their foreign operations for example. But, not many taxpayers satisfy such
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disclosures in fact. The dispute system is weak in these countries, leading to a relatively scarce
enforcement of such disclosure requirements. In developing countries, audits are not widespread,
and international tax litigation is almost inexistent. Finally, developing countries lack adequate
tools for obtainment of the required information and their analysis. Very few developing countries
have sophisticated e-filling system able to absorb and arguably accurately analyze the massive
amounts of taxpayers’ information. The information is still mostly provided in a rudimentary
manner, to be processed individually by human resources in a widely ineffective manner and
leading to misunderstanding of the global tax picture of the taxpayer with foreign operations.
Third, developing countries face a significant lack of expertise in applying complex international
tax rules.376 In many cases, developing countries transplanted rules that were applicable in the
developed world to counter tax abuse within their jurisdiction. However, it is worth noting that for
most these rules, the level of complexity is so significant, requiring a highly informed and
profoundly specialized workforce. This expertise is lacking in most developing countries, and even
when it is available, the government is not a competitive enough employer that the expertise
generally finds itself in the private sector, arming it best, at times, to realized highly sophisticated
tax planning technics that continue to erode the tax base in these jurisdictions. The insufficiency
of man power and the scarcity of skilled staff are chief impediments to the application of rather
complex rules of international tax aimed at curbing erosion of tax base in the developing world.
The asymmetry between tax authorities in the developing world and well advised MNEs predict
the outcome of MNEs mostly getting their way in the face of impotent and not enough qualified
tax authorities. Additionally, developing countries have not set up adequate alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms. For developed countries, the complex and fact intensive native of
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international tax dispute constantly lead to the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to
achieve acceptable settlements. In developing countries, there is no structure for alternative dispute
resolution to encourage and lead to acceptable settlements. Furthermore, a granting of discretion
to tax authorities to settle large disputes may lead to increased widespread corruption. In fact, many
observers have argued that the rather limited number of tax audit and other disputes in international
tax for MNEs in developing countries is also attributable to the corrupt nature of the tax
administration who generally negotiate personal ‘deal’ with taxpayers and let them off the hook
when their personal needs are satisfied.377 The lack of expertise, combined with a weak alternative
dispute resolution structure, leads to rather major failures for international tax in developing
countries.
Finally, developing countries have to deal with a tricky balance of adopting aggressive enough
rules to curb tax avoidance while not being viewed as anti-investments. For many countries in the
developing world, encouraging investment and attracting foreign investment specifically is a
central of policy making.378 Many developing countries still have weak economies and
conventional wisdom instructs them not to do anything that might be perceived as a
discouragement to investments. The debate over the effects of tax policy on investment and
specifically foreign direct investment is still brewing. A multitude of empirical evidence seems to
indicate that at best, the impact of certain tax policy measure on investments is relative. For
example, many developing countries have adopted various forms of tax incentives to attract
investment, specifically direct foreign investment. Empirical evidence has overwhelmingly
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indicated that tax incentives have no direct impact on investment, and foreign direct investment
specifically.379 Nevertheless, tax incentives continue to flourish in the developing world on the
very same and overwhelmingly disproven argument that they increase investment. The struggle
for developing countries is that they are afraid to provide an impression of being investments
adverse jurisdictions. Since one country has such incentives, other developing countries continue
to implement them, regardless of whether they actually of themselves increase investments. At
least, the existence of the incentives in the legislative structure is an antidote to the impression of
investment adversity within the jurisdiction. In the area of international tax rules, many developing
countries continue to witness the constant erosion of their tax base and are reluctant implement
aggressive rules as they would provide that very same impression of investment adversity so feared
within the developing world. For developing countries, the market, the customer base, the reliable
judicial system, and the relatively coherent legislative structure are enough to attract investments
and developed countries are not overly worried about establishing an investment adverse
atmosphere when adopting common sense rules to curb tax avoidance. In fact, the level of potential
coordination in the developed world leads to the very same aggressive scheme being collectively
applied leaving taxpayers with few places to escape in the developed world. The US and/or the
EU can easily adopt more aggressive rules to combat tax avoidance without overly worrying about
businesses not being able to locate there. In fact, developed countries are confident in their markets
and labor force and know MNEs will want to locate there notwithstanding. The reality in the
developing world is different. Economies are weak, customer base arguably negligible, and no
overall coordination. Any tax policy consideration shall pass the muster of its impact on attraction
of investments, and least from the perspective of other developing countries having adopted such
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measure. Many developing countries may have turned a blind eye on abusive tax practices for the
sake of encouraging investments and development within their borders. As developing countries
continue to be more aggressive toward MNEs abusive tax practices, the question remains as to
whether the relatively lack of aggression in the developed world is due to the lack of information,
the lack of efficient rules, appropriate expertise, the struggle to find a balance between curbing
abusive tax practices and encouraging investments. The answer seems to us, is all of the above,
but whatever the explanation, the failures of international tax in developing countries are profound
and vastly consequential are require an urgent attention and remediation.
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C. The BEPS Project: a Case Study
The OECD base erosion and profit shifting ("BEPS") project is the most significant multilateral
effort to date to change the taxation of corporate cross-border income. The initiative comes after
the most significant financial market turmoil since the Great Depression and high levels of
unemployment and government deficits within developed countries. As countries look to balance
their budgets, MNEs have come under scrutiny on their tax affairs not only from tax authorities,
but also from government and non-governmental bodies and the media. There is also an
acknowledgement that corporate taxation has not kept pace with the changes in the global
economy, particularly the growth in e-commerce, the growth of outsourcing and contract
manufacturing, and the changes to global supply chains.
The speed with which the OECD BEPS project has moved has been quite remarkable. The
impetus for the project came from the G20 finance ministers meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico, in
June 2012,380 and the ensuing 24-month period has seen a flurry of activity. In January 2013, the
OECD published a report titled "Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting" ("the Report").381
The Report was presented to the G20 finance ministers meeting in Moscow on February 2013,
expressing the urgent need to deal with BEPS in a multilateral and coordinated manner.
According to the Report, action was required because BEPS presented an urgent risk to "tax
revenues, tax sovereignty and tax fairness for OECD member countries and non-members alike."
The OECD indicated that the international tax rules have not kept up with the realities of doing
business in a globalized world, and that gap between domestic tax systems, combined with
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economic incentives and legal accounting practices, have all given rise to avenues of double nontaxation, allowing some MNCs to pay little to no corporate tax at all. The Report received full
endorsement from the G20 finance ministers in Moscow, invited the OECD to move forward and
develop an action plan. In July 2013, the OECD released the Action Plan on Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting ("Action Plan"),382 identifying actions needed to address BEPS, setting deadlines
to develop these actions, and identifying the resources needed and methodology to implement
these actions.
The Action Plan lists 15 Action Items and their timelines for finalization:
1. Address tax challenges of the digital economy (September 2014).
2. Neutralize the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements (September 2014).
3. Strengthen Controlled Foreign Company ("CFC") rules (September 2015).
4. Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments (September 2015).
5. Counter harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into account transparency and
substance (September 2014/September 2015/December 2015).
6. Prevent treaty abuse (September 2014).
7. Prevent the artificial avoidance of Permanent Establishment ("PE") status (September 2015).
8. Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation – Intangibles (September
2014/September 2015).
9. Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation – Risk and Capital
(September 2015).
10. Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation – Other high risk
transactions (September 2015).
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11. Establish methodologies to collect and analyze data on BEPS and the actions to address it
(September 2015).
12. Require taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning arrangements (September 2015).
13. Re-examine transfer pricing documentation (September 2014).
14. Make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective (September 2015).
15. Develop multilateral instruments (September 2014/December 2015).

There have been many Action Item Discussion Drafts released. These include Action 1 on
addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy; Action 2 on neutralizing the effects of
hybrid mismatch arrangements (two Discussion Drafts released); Action 6 on preventing treaty
abuse; and Action 13 on transfer-pricing documentation. Each of these Action Items had a
September 2014 report-out date. A Discussion Draft on intangibles was released prior to the
Action Plan with a revised Discussion Draft issued on July 30, 2013, which leveraged off the
prior work undertaken by the OECD. The Discussion Drafts provide suggested changes to both
domestic law and to the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty to be implemented by OECD
members in an agreed manner. The Discussion Drafts acknowledged that they are in "early
stage," do not reflect any consensus view, and were designed to elicit comments and be later
refined. Even though the comment period for each of the action items was brief, they attracted a
large number of comments from practitioners, trade associations, non-governmental agencies,
and academics. We will look at the Discussion Drafts in turn.
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Action Item 1: E-commerce
On March 24, 2014, the OECD released a Discussion Draft "BEPS Action 1: Address the Tax
Challenges of the Digital Economy" (the "E-commerce Draft"). 12 The draft contains a lengthy
discussion of the key features and business models in a digital economy, the opportunities for
BEPS that can arise in a digital economy, and potential options to address the tax challenges
raised by the digital economy. The E-commerce Draft notes the changes in the modern economy
and the expansion of direct to- customer sales vs. the traditional manufacturer distributorcustomer model. This change allows companies to make cross-border sales without a physical incountry presence, which results in local countries suffering a loss of in-country sales and
distribution revenues and income becoming more difficult to trace. The E-commerce Draft is
organized into six substantive sections that roughly align with focus areas identified in Action 1
of the OECD BEPS Action Plan: Information and Communication Technology and Its Impact on
the Economy (Section II); The Digital Economy, Its Key Features, and the Emergence of New
Business Models (Section III); Identifying Opportunities for BEPS in the Digital Economy
(Section IV); Tackling BEPS in the
Digital Economy (Section V); Broader Tax Challenges Raised by the Digital Economy (Section
VI); and Potential Options to Address the Broader Tax Challenges raised by the Digital
Economy (Section VII). Section VII provides an overview of four possible options presented to
the task force to address the challenges of taxing the digital economy. Though these options are
not task force recommendations and are still under development, they have attracted significant
attention from commentators, in fact more attention than the other five sections combined, as
they would represent a significant departure from existing tax rules.

164

The first potential option would modify the exemptions to PE status under paragraph 4 of Article
5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention ("the Convention").383 The Ecommerce Draft states that
several variations of this option are possible. One approach would eliminate paragraph 4 of
Article 5 entirely. Another variation would eliminate just the enumerated exceptions of
paragraphs (a)–(d) of Article 5(4) or make them subject to the overall condition that the character
of the activity conducted be preparatory or auxiliary in nature, rather than a core activity, thus
making such exceptions unavailable to businesses if such activities constitute one of their core
activities or functions.
The second option, a variation on alternative PE thresholds, would establish an alternative nexus
based on a significant digital presence to address situations in which business is conducted
wholly digitally. An enterprise engaged in certain "fully de-materialized digital activities" would
have a PE if it maintained a "significant digital presence" in another country's economy. The
third option includes three broad alternatives: (1) a "virtual fixed place of business PE" (when the
enterprise maintains a website on a server of another enterprise located in a jurisdiction and
carries on business through that website); (2) a "virtual agency PE" (extension of the dependent
agent PE concept of contracts habitually concluded with persons located in the jurisdiction
through technological means); and (3) an "on-site business presence PE". The fourth option
would impose a final withholding tax on certain payments for digital goods or services.
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Action 2: Neutralize the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements
The Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements Discussion Draft was issued on March 19, 2014. The draft
is in two parts, with the first part (First Discussion Draft) making recommendations on changes
to domestic law, and the second (Second Discussion
Draft) discussing the impact of new domestic rules of the Convention and recommended changes
to the Convention.384
The draft defines hybrid mismatch arrangements generally as arrangements that use hybrid
elements in the tax treatment of an entity or instrument under the laws of two or more tax
jurisdictions to produce a mismatch in tax outcomes. It specifically identifies the key elements of
a hybrid mismatch as (1) an arrangement that results in a mismatch of the tax treatment, (2) an
arrangement that contains a hybrid element, and (3) the hybrid element causes a mismatch in tax
outcomes. The First Discussion Draft identifies two types of mismatch results: (1) payments that
are deductible in one jurisdiction but not picked up in another (so-called deduction/no inclusion
D/NI outcome), (2) payments that give rise to duplicate deductions on the same expense (socalled deduction/deduction D/D outcome). The draft discusses how to approach hybrid
mismatches and states that any hybrid mismatch rules should "meet the criteria for good rule
design," which would include clarity, transparency, ease of administration and compliance for
both companies and tax authorities, and workability.
The preliminary recommendations target three categories of hybrid mismatch arrangements:
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Hybrid financial instruments for which a deductible payment made on a financial
instrument is not treated as deductible income in the payee's jurisdiction;



Hybrid entity payments for which differences in the characterization of the hybrid payer
results in a deductible payment being disregarded or triggering a second deduction in the
second jurisdiction; and



Reverse hybrid and imported mismatches which cover payments made to intermediate
payees.

Preliminary conclusions of the draft include changes to domestic law and linking rules that base
the tax treatment of a hybrid arrangement on tax treatment in the other state and result in either a
denial of a deduction on the payment or a requirement that the payment be included in income.
There is a linking rule that applies if the domestic law fails to address the mismatch. The linking
rule contains both a "primary response" and a defensive rule. Primary responses generally focus
on the payor or investor jurisdiction, and defensive rules focus generally on the payee or
subsidiary jurisdiction. For example, for a hybrid instrument that would be treated as a debt
instrument in the payer jurisdiction and as equity in the payee jurisdiction, the firs discussion
draft recommends that domestic law be amended so that no dividend exemption is available for
deductible payments. If domestic law did not capture this, the linking rule would then kick in,
first applying the primary rule – denying a deduction, and then applying the secondary rule –
having the payee include the payment in income, if the payee jurisdiction did not act.
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Action Item 6: Treaties
On March 14, 2014, the OECD released BEPS Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty
Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances (the "Treaty Draft"). 385 The Treaty Draft is divided into
three sections corresponding to the specific areas identified in Action Item 6.
First, the Treaty Draft discusses the development of model treaty provisions and outlines
recommendations regarding the design of domestic rules to prevent the granting of treaty
benefits in inappropriate circumstances. The Treaty Draft makes several recommendations to
prevent treaty abuse and treaty shopping, including the inclusion of an anti-abuse rule based on
the limitation-on-benefits provision found in most US income tax treaties, and the inclusion of a
more general anti-abuse rule (main purpose rule) designed to address other forms of treaty abuse
that would not be covered by the specific limitation-on-benefits provision. Second, the Treaty
Draft clarifies that tax treaties are not intended to be used to generate double non-taxation and
recommends the amendment of the Convention to state clearly that the prevention of tax evasion
and avoidance is a purpose of tax treaties. Additionally, the Treaty Draft indicates that the
Convention should include a preamble expressly providing that the states that enter into a tax
treaty intend to eliminate double-taxation without creating opportunities for tax avoidance.
Third, the Treaty Draft discusses the identification of the tax policy considerations that countries
should take into account before deciding to enter into a tax treaty with another country. The
Treaty Draft states that the clearer articulation of the policy considerations that countries should
take into account prior to entering into a tax treaty may limit the number of tax treaties executed
with low/ no-tax jurisdictions.

385

OECD, BEPS Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances (March 14,
2014) Available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/treaty-abuse-discussion-draft-march-2014.pdf (last retrieved
3/3/2015).

168

Many commentators welcomed the Treaty Draft's effort to deal with treaty shopping and other
treaty abuse situations. There is general agreement from commentators that the entitlement to the
benefits of tax treaties should be clarified.386
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Action Item 8: Intangibles
On June 6, 2012, the OECD published a Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Aspects of
Intangibles.38751 The OECD requested public comments on the draft, and a public consultation
was held in November 2012. On the basis of the comments received and in light of the
subsequent launch of the BEPS project, the OECD prepared a revised version of the draft on
transfer pricing aspects of intangibles ("Intangibles Draft") adopting the process under Action
Item 8. 52 Action Item 8 specifically aims at developing rules to prevent BEPS from moving
intangibles among group members. This will involve: (i) adopting a broad and clearly delineated
definition of intangibles; (ii) ensuring that profits associated with the transfer and use of
intangibles are appropriately allocated in accordance with (rather than divorced from) value
creation; (iii) developing transfer pricing rules or special measures for transfers of hard-to-value
intangibles; and (iv) updating the guidance on cost contribution arrangements. The Intangibles
Draft is a work in process, and some of the issues identified will be dealt with in other BEPS
Action Items. The Intangibles Draft outlines the OECD's view on how comparability factors
such as location savings, workforce-in-place and group company benefits should be treated for
transfer pricing purposes and proposes changes to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The
Intangibles Draft states these factors are not intangibles but can involve intangible assets, e.g., a
movement of a workforce can involve the transfer of knowhow. Section A of the Intangibles
Draft also provides a broad definition of an intangible asset and a definition of unique and
valuable intangibles.388 Section B of the Intangibles Draft provides guidance on when entities in
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a multinational group should be entitled to the economic profits from exploiting intangibles, with
a focus on the importance of functions performed, assets used and risks assumed in the
development and protection of intangibles. Here the focus is on contribution, not economic or
legal ownership. The Intangibles Draft clarifies that an entity can outsource intangible functions
but must control the provider, and also notes that the return to an entity that merely funds
intangible development should be reduced vs. an entity that performs these functions.
Section C covers transactions involving the use or transfer of intangibles, while Section D
provides guidance on determining arm's length values for intangibles. Most commentators
acknowledged the difficulties posed by the complex transfer pricing structures of intangibles.
Several commentators expressed concerns about the definition of intangibles; the OECD
approach to defining intangibles was to adopt a broad understanding of the notion of intangibles
while requiring specific identification of intangibles.389 The OECD specifically included
goodwill and going concern as intangibles while excluding workforce or group synergies. The
Intangible Draft also received general push-back on its tight timing. Many commentators argued
that the issues to be addressed are too complex to be considered, even with bifurcated delivery
dates of September 2014 and September 2015 (for special measures on hard to- value
intangibles).390

to parties in potentially comparable transactions and (ii) whose use in business is expected to yield greater future
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On 5 October 2015, the OECD released final reports on all 15 focus areas in its Action Plan on
BEPS.391 In an accompanying explanatory statement,392 the OECD described the next steps in its
work on BEPS, including additional work on technical matters and plans for monitoring with
respect to the implementation of the BEPS recommendations. In conjunction with the release of
the reports, the OECD held a press conference followed by a technical briefing, both by webcast,
to provide an overview of the final BEPS output.
The OECD described the final BEPS packages as containing recommendations that fall in
several different categories:
 Agreed minimum standards: the recommendations on harmful tax practices (Action 5),
treaty abuse (Action 6), country-by-country reporting (Action 13) and dispute resolution
(Action 14)
 Reinforced international standards: the revised OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
(Actions 8-10) and the revised OECD Model Tax Convention (including Action 7 on
permanent establishment status)
 Common approaches and best practices for domestic law: hybrid mismatch arrangements
(Action 2), controlled foreign company rules (Action 3), interest limitations (Action 4)
and disclosure of aggressive tax planning (Action 12)
 Analytical reports: tax challenges of the digital economy (Action 1), data and analysis
with respect to BEPS (Action 11) and the multilateral instrument for implementing treaty
based recommendations (Action 15).393
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The OECD also briefly discussed the “post-BEPS environment,” stressing the importance of
focusing on implementation of the BEPS recommendations in a consistent and coherent manner,
monitoring the impact on both double non-taxation and double taxation. The explanatory
statement indicates that OECD and G20 countries have agreed to continue to work together on
BEPS until 2020. The intention is to develop a more inclusive framework to support and monitor
the implementation of the BEPS package. Below is an overview of each of the BEPS Final
Reports.394

394
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Item 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy
The final report on Action 1, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, 395 largely
follows the initial Action 1 deliverable on the digital economy released by the OECD in
September 2014 . Like the 2014 report, the final report provides conclusions regarding the digital
economy and recommended next steps to address the tax challenges presented by the evolving
digital economy. The final report acknowledges that special rules designed exclusively for the
digital economy would prove unworkable, broadly stating that the digital economy “cannot be
ring-fenced as it is increasingly the economy itself.” The final report summarizes key features of
evolving digital business models that the OECD considers relevant for the overall
BEPS analysis; in addition, the final report considers broader direct and indirect tax challenges
raised by the digital economy. As an update to the 2014 report, the final report recommends: (i)
modification of the list of exceptions to the definition of Permanent Establishment (PE)
regarding preparatory or auxiliary activities as they relate to a digital environment and
introduction of new anti-fragmentation rules to deny benefits from these exceptions through
fragmentation of certain business activities; (ii) modification of the definition of a PE to address
artificial arrangements through certain “conclusion of contracts” arrangements (See Action 7);
(iii) a correlative update to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (see Actions 8-10); and (iv)
changes to controlled foreign company (CFC) rules to address identified challenges of the digital
economy. The final report also addresses the indirect tax treatment of certain digital transactions,
recommending that countries should apply the principles of the OECD’s International Valueadded Tax/ Goods and Services Tax (VAT/GST) Guidelines and should consider introduction of
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the collection mechanisms included therein. Future work in the area of Action 1 will be
conducted in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders, and on the basis of a detailed
mandate to be developed by the OECD during 2016 in the context of designing an inclusive postBEPS monitoring process. A supplementary report reflecting the outcome of continued work on
the overall taxation of the digital economy should be released by 2020. The OECD also intends
to develop a coordinated implementation mechanism with respect to the International VAT/GST
Guidelines.
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Action 2 – Neutralizing the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements
The final report on Action 2, Neutralizing the Effect of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements,396
supersedes the interim report that was released in September 2014. Similar to the 2014 report,
the final report consists of two parts with detailed recommendations to address hybrid mismatch
arrangements and reflects the consensus achieved on these issues. Part I contains
recommendations on domestic law rules to address hybrid mismatch arrangements. Part II
contains recommended changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention.
The recommendations in Part I include “Specific Recommendations” and “Hybrid Mismatch
Rules.” The Specific Recommendations are modifications to provisions of domestic law aimed at
avoiding hybrid mismatches and achieving alignment between those laws and their intended tax
policy outcomes (e.g., by not applying a dividend exemption at the level of the payee for
payments that are deductible at the level of the payer). The Hybrid Mismatch Rules are linking
rules aimed at neutralizing one of the following three mismatches in tax outcomes arising out of
certain hybrid mismatch arrangements:
 Payments that give rise to a deduction with no taxable inclusion arising from a hybrid
financial instrument (including a hybrid transfer), a disregarded payment made by a
hybrid entity or a payment made to a reverse hybrid
 Payments that give rise to a double deduction arising from a deductible payment made by
a hybrid entity or a dual resident
 Payments that give rise to an indirect deduction with no inclusion arising from an
imported mismatch
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The Hybrid Mismatch Rules are divided into a primary response and, where applicable, a
secondary or defensive rule. The defensive rule only applies where there is no Hybrid Mismatch
Rule in the counterparty jurisdiction or where the rule is not applied to the particular entity or
arrangement. Furthermore, each of the Hybrid Mismatch Rules has its own scope of application.
In a significant expansion from the 2014 report, the recommendations in Part I of the final report
have been supplemented with further guidance and a wide array of detailed examples to explain
the operation of the rules. Some outstanding issues that were identified in the 2014 report are
addressed, such as the treatment of stock lending and sale and repurchase transactions, the
treatment of non-interest bearing loans and the treatment of branch structures within the hybrid
mismatch arrangement category for hybrid financial instruments. Furthermore, there is detailed
guidance on how to treat a payment that is included under a CFC regime. Significant new
guidance on the operation of the imported mismatch rule is provided as well, which includes
three tracing and priority rules to determine the extent to which a payment should be treated as
set-off against a deduction under an imported mismatch arrangement.
The recommendations in Part II with respect to the OECD Model Tax Convention are similar to
those included in the 2014 Report, namely: (i) a change to Article 4 of the Model Tax
Convention to deal with dual resident entities; (ii) a new provision in Article 1 and changes to
the Commentary to address fiscally transparent entities; and (iii) various proposed changes to
address treaty issues that may arise from the recommended domestic law changes.
The final report recommends that every jurisdiction should introduce all the rules contained in
the report and that jurisdictions should cooperate on measures to ensure these rules are
implemented and applied consistently and effectively.
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Action 3 – Strengthening CFC rules
The final report on Action 3, Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules,397
provides recommendations in the form of building blocks with respect to the constituent
elements that are necessary for effective CFC rules. The final report notes that the
recommendations are not minimum standards, but instead are designed to ensure that
jurisdictions that choose to implement them will have rules that effectively prevent taxpayers
from shifting income into foreign subsidiaries. The report indicates that the recommended
building blocks would allow countries without CFC rules to implement recommended rules
directly and countries with existing CFC rules to modify their rules to align more closely with
the recommendations.
The six building blocks for the design of effective CFC rules are:
 Definition of a CFC (including the definition of control)
 CFC exemptions and threshold requirements
 Definition of CFC income
 Computation of income
 Attribution of income
 Prevention and elimination of double taxation
The final report recognizes that there are shared policy considerations for jurisdictions in the
context of Action 3 (e.g., providing a backstop to transfer pricing and balancing effectiveness
with compliance burden and with avoidance of double taxation), as well as different policy
objectives that relate to the overall domestic tax systems of individual jurisdictions. Thus,
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because each country prioritizes specific policy objectives differently (e.g., the balance between
taxing foreign income and maintaining competitiveness), the recommendations provide
flexibility to implement CFC rules in a manner consistent with the policy objectives of the
overall tax system and the international legal obligations of the specific country concerned. In
particular, with respect to the definition of CFC income, the final report recognizes that countries
should be allowed flexibility in the design of CFC rules that are consistent with their domestic
policy frameworks. As a result, similar to the Action 3 discussion draft, Strengthening CFC
rules, released in April 2015, the final report sets out a non-exhaustive list of approaches that
could be used for the definition of CFC income that raises BEPS concerns.
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Action 4 – Limiting base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments
The final report on Action 4, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other
Financial Payments,398 recommends that countries implement a “fixed ratio” rule that would
limit net interest deductions claimed by an entity (or a group of entities operating in the same
country) to a fixed percentage of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization
(EBITDA). The final report provides that this ratio should be somewhere between 10% and 30%
of applicable EBITDA, levels that are described as having been designed to provide meaningful
caps on net (not gross) interest expense, while still allowing most multinationals to deduct all
their third-party interest.
The final report further recommends that countries adopt a “group ratio” rule to supplement (but
not replace) the fixed ratio rule, and to provide additional flexibility for highly-leveraged groups
or industry sectors. Under the group ratio rule, for example, an entity with net interest expense
above a country’s fixed ratio could deduct such interest expense up to the level of the net thirdparty interest/ EBITDA ratio of the worldwide group to which it belongs. Countries could also
apply an uplift of up to 10% to the group’s net third party interest expense to prevent double
taxation. An alternative group ratio rule also could be considered such as an “equity escape” rule,
which would allow interest expense so long as an entity’s debt-to-equity ratio does not exceed
that of its worldwide group.
Beyond this basic framework, the final report recommends that countries consider the following:
(i) using an average of EBITDA for the current year and prior years, to minimize the impact of
earnings volatility on interest deductions; (iii) providing for carryforward and/or carryback of
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disallowed interest expense and/or unused interest capacity, within limits; (iv) providing for
exclusions for interest paid to third party lenders on loans used to fund public-benefit
(infrastructure) projects and for entities with net interest expense below de minimis thresholds;
and (v) providing targeted rules that would close down any remaining BEPS opportunities.
The final report indicates that limitations on interest deductions arising under hybrid mismatch
arrangements as described in Action 2 should be applied before the interest limitations under
Action 4, and the final report suggests that other limitations on interest expense, such as those
arising under a country’s application of the arm’s-length principle or thin capitalization rules,
also should be applied first. Moreover, interest disallowed under Action 4 should be subject to
withholding tax.
The final report reflects the choices made by the OECD, having considered the pros and cons of
the various alternatives discussed in the discussion draft, BEPS Action 4: Interest Deductions
and Other Financial Payments, released in December 2014. In particular, the final report
elevates the fixed ratio rule above the group ratio rule. However, while the final report provides
clear direction on the basic framework for limiting net interest expense deductions, a number of
questions remain. Many of these relate to implementation of the group ratio rule. For example,
the final report does not conclude on whether group EBITDA should include tax-advantaged
income such as dividend income that is either exempt or sheltered from home country tax due to
foreign tax credits, or how to accommodate groups that have members with losses rather than
positive EBITDA. In addition, no concrete suggestions are provided for applying the limitations
on net interest expense to banks and insurance companies, which the report indicates have
specific features that must be taken into account. These remaining items are to be addressed in
work to be completed in 2016. Beyond that, the final report leaves open the timetable for
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adopting the new rules, but recommends that countries introducing the fixed ratio rule and group
ratio rule should give taxpayers reasonable time to restructure existing financing arrangements,
and that any grandfathering provisions should primarily apply to third party loans.
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Action 5 – Countering harmful tax practices
The final report on Action 5, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into
Account Transparency and Substance,399 covers two main areas, (i) defining a “substantial
activity” criterion to be applied when determining whether tax regimes are harmful; and (ii)
improving transparency. In doing so, it touches on a wide variety of topics, including substance
requirements for intellectual property (IP) and other regimes, the determination of which IP
regimes are allowable and which need to be phased out, what constitutes a harmful preferential
regime, which ruling information is to be mandatorily exchanged and to whom, what qualifies as
a “ruling” and best practices for cross-border rulings (process of granting rulings, terms,
publication).
In the first instance, the final report defines the substantial activity requirement in relation to IP
regimes by presenting the “nexus approach” as the agreed approach. Under this approach, the
application of an IP regime should be dependent on the level of research and development
(R&D) activities carried out by the taxpayer itself. In addition, IP regimes should essentially be
limited to patents (under a broad definition) and copyrighted software. Sixteen existing IP
regimes were reviewed and found not to meet the nexus approach. No new entrants should be
permitted to these regimes (or any other IP regime that does not meet the substantial activity
requirement) after 30 June 2016 (or the effective date of a new regime consistent with the nexus
approach if this is introduced before that date). The grandfather period may not be longer than
five years after the date the regime is closed to new entrants. Enhanced transparency
requirements will apply to new entrants into an IP regime after 6 February 2015 and the benefits
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of an IP regime should not be granted in respect of IP acquired directly or indirectly from related
parties after 1 January 2016 ( except in cases of acquisitions as a result of a domestic or
international business restructuring).
When applying the nexus approach to activities other than IP, there would also need to be a link
between the income qualifying for benefits and the core activities necessary to earn the income.
The final report lists types of core activities that are necessary to earn the income under different
types of regimes focused on financial and other service activities, such as headquarters regimes,
distribution and service centers, financing or leasing, fund management, banking and insurance
and shipping. With respect to holding activities, the final report states that there may not in fact
be much substance required but many of the concerns raised by holding regimes may be dealt
with through existing factors that indicate a regime is harmful or through the recommendations
under other aspects of the BEPS project (e.g., through the recommendations under Actions 2 and
6).
The second priority area is improving transparency through a framework for the compulsory
spontaneous exchange of information on certain rulings.
This framework will apply to taxpayer-specific rulings that are (i) rulings on preferential
regimes, (ii) unilateral Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) or other cross border unilateral
rulings in respect of transfer pricing, (iii) cross-border rulings providing for a downward
adjustment of taxable profits (in particular excess profit and informal capital rulings), (iv) PE
rulings or (v) related party conduit rulings. The framework may be expanded to other types of
ruling in the future. The information exchange requirement would not relate to the ruling itself,
but to certain information with respect to the ruling as contained in a template included in the
final report. The framework also deals with questions such as time limits, legal basis,
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confidentiality and the countries with which such information would have to be exchanged.
Information exchange is to apply not only to future rulings, but also to rulings that were issued
on or after 1 January 2010 and were still in effect as from 1 January 2014. An ongoing
monitoring and review mechanism, including annual review, is to be put in place to ensure
countries’ compliance.
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Action 6 – Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances
The final report on Action 6, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate
Circumstances,400 which supersedes the interim version issued in September 2014, contains
changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention and related changes to the Model Commentary to
address the inappropriate granting of treaty benefits and other potential treaty abuse scenarios.
The final report notes that a number of changes have been made to the report that was issued in
September 2014 and that further work will be required with respect to certain provisions,
including the limitation on benefits (LOB) rule.
The final report is organized in three sections. Section A includes anti-abuse provisions that
provide safeguards against the abuse of treaty provisions and offers flexibility in implementation.
In this regard, the final report notes that countries have committed to a “minimum standard” to
provide a minimum level of protection against treaty shopping. Under the minimum standard,
countries would implement: (i) the combined approach of a principal purpose test (PPT) rule and
LOB rule; (ii) a PPT rule alone; or, (iii) an LOB rule, supplemented by specific rules targeting
conduit financing arrangements. In cases where a county decides to use a combination of the
PPT and LOB rules, the final report includes a variation on the LOB rules referred to as the
“simplified version,” details of which are outlined in the Model Commentary. In addition to the
minimum standard, the final report includes targeted rules to be included in tax treaties that
would address other forms of treaty abuse, including situations of dual resident entities, and rules
that apply to permanent establishments situated in third states.
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Section B of the final report contains revisions to the title and preamble of the OECD Model Tax
Convention so that it is clear that the intention is to eliminate double taxation without creating
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion and avoidance, including
through treaty shopping arrangements. Section C identifies tax policy considerations relevant to
the decision to enter into a tax treaty with another country, which would also be relevant in
determining whether to modify (or ultimately terminate) a treaty if there has been a change in
circumstances.
Finally, as indicated above, the final report outlines further work that will be required under
Action 6. In particular, the final report refers to the proposals by the United States to modify the
LOB rule in the US Model Treaty. It is noted that the LOB rule, and Commentary related thereto,
contained in the final report should be considered as draft and subject to change pending further
review that will take into account the finalization of the proposed revisions to the LOB rule in
the US Model Treaty. Final versions of the LOB rule and Commentary are expected to be
completed in the first part of 2016. In addition, the final report specifies that further work is
needed with respect to the treaty entitlement of non-collective investment vehicles (non-CIVs)
and pension funds and indicates that such work would benefit from consultation with
stakeholders. Further work would need to be completed in the first part of 2016 in order to be
relevant for the negotiation of the multilateral instrument under Action 15, which is expected to
be finalized in 2016.
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Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of PE status
The final report on Action 7, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment
Status,401 proposes changes to the PE definition in Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention
to prevent the use of the following arrangements and strategies that are considered to enable a
foreign enterprise to operate in another country without creating a PE:
 Commissionaire arrangements and similar strategies
 The use of specific preparatory or auxiliary activity exemptions, including the artificial
fragmentation of so-called “cohesive” business activities into several smaller operations
such that each part is able to benefit from the use of such specific activity exemptions
The final report also proposes the use of the PPT rule that will be included in the OECD Model
Tax Convention under Action 6 to deal with strategies involving the splitting-up of contracts
between closely related enterprises in the context of construction contracts, and an alternative
provision in the Commentary consisting of an automatic rule requiring the aggregation of time
spent by closely related enterprises at the same building site or construction or installation
project to calculate the 12 month threshold.
The final report, compared to the revised discussion draft, BEPS Action 7: Preventing Artificial
Avoidance of PE Status, issued in May 2015, contains no major changes in terms of the position
taken by the OECD on the perceived BEPS abuses arising from the artificial avoidance of PE
status. However, the final report reflects some refinements to the proposed amendments to
Article 5(5) as well as Article 5(6). Currently, Article 5(5) requires a person (other than an
independent agent) acting on behalf of a foreign enterprise to have the “authority to conclude
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contracts in the name of the enterprise” in order to create a PE. The final Action 7 report would
refer to persons (other than an independent agent) that habitually conclude contracts or
“habitually play the principal role leading to the conclusion of contracts that are routinely
concluded without material modification by the enterprise,” while the discussion draft referred to
“persons that habitually concluded contracts or negotiated the material elements of contracts.”
Changes also were made to the proposed wording to tighten the definition of independent agent
in Article 5(6) by replacing the concept of “connected parties” with “closely related enterprises;”
the final report now includes for this purpose cases where a person possesses directly or
indirectly more than 50% of the beneficial interest in the other or, if a company, more than 50%
of the aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares or the beneficial equity interests.

189

Actions 8-10 – Transfer pricing aspects
The OECD has included its updated transfer pricing guidance in one report under Actions 810,402 covering:
 Amended guidance on applying the arm’s length principle (revisions to section D of
chapter I of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines), notably providing guidance on the
identification of the actual transaction undertaken, on what is meant by control of a risk,
and on the circumstances in which the actual transaction undertaken may be disregarded
for transfer pricing purposes
 Guidance on comparability factors in transfer pricing, including location savings,
assembled workforce, and MNE group synergies (additions to chapter I of the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines). This guidance remains unchanged from the guidance issued
as part of the 2014 report on transfer pricing for intangibles
 New guidance on transfer pricing for commodity transactions (additions to chapter II of
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines)
 A new version of chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines addressing
intangibles, including new guidance on the return to funding activities and on hard-tovalue intangibles
 New guidance on low-value adding intragroup services (revisions to chapter VII of the
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines)
 An entirely new version of chapter VIII of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines,
covering cost contribution arrangements
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In addition, the Actions 8-10 package describes additional work to be conducted by the OECD to
produce new guidance on the application of the transactional profit split method. The aim is to
produce a discussion draft in 2016 and final guidance during the first half of 2017.
Intangibles
The intangibles final report consists of a new version of chapter VI, which builds on the version
issued in September 2014. The structure of the final report is the same, containing four sections
providing guidance on: (i) identifying intangibles for transfer pricing purposes, including a
definition of intangibles for transfer pricing purposes; (ii) identifying and characterizing
transactions involving intangibles, including the determination which entity or entities should
share in the costs and risks of intangible development and the economic returns from the
intangibles; (iii) identifying types of transactions involving intangibles; and (iv) determining
arm’s length conditions and pricing in cases involving intangibles, in particular addressing
intangible valuation, and arm’s length conditions for hard-to-value intangibles.
The key features of the final report, and key differences from earlier reports on intangibles, are:
 Guidance on which entity or entities are entitled to share in the economic return from
exploiting intangibles. The final report clarifies and confirms previous work, stating that
mere legal ownership of an intangible does not confer any right to the return from its
exploitation. Instead, the economic return from intangibles will accrue to the entities that
perform the important value-creating functions of developing, enhancing, maintaining,
protecting and exploiting the intangible, and that assume and manage the risk associated
with those functions.
 New guidance on determining the arm’s length return for providing funding for
intangible development. Where the entity providing the funding exercises control over
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the financial risk assumed, that entity is entitled to an expected rate of return
commensurate with the risk (for example, based on the rate of return that might be
achieved by investing in comparable alternative investments). Where the entity does not
exercise control over the financial risk, it is entitled to (no more than) a risk-free return
only.
 Guidance on valuation methods. The final report confirms that database comparables are
seldom appropriate for pricing intangible transactions, and provides guidance on the use
of other valuation techniques that may be more applicable.
 Guidance on hard-to-value intangibles. Where intangibles are transferred or licensed in
development or where their value is highly uncertain, the tax administration is entitled to
use the ex post evidence about financial outcomes to inform the determination of the
arm’s length pricing arrangements, including any contingent pricing arrangements, that
would have been made between independent enterprises at the time of the transaction.
The taxpayer can prove the original pricing was based on reasonable forecasts taking into
account all reasonably foreseeable eventualities. There are some similarities with the US
“Commensurate with Income” standard.
The guidance on intangibles is effectively final, although one small section within part D on the
application of the transactional profit split method for pricing intangibles transactions is likely to
be revised when the OECD completes its new guidance on this transfer pricing method.
Cost contribution arrangements
The section on cost contribution arrangements (CCAs) replaces existing chapter VIII of the
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in its entirety. The objective of the final report is to align the
guidance on CCAs with the new guidance elsewhere in the final report on control of risk and on
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intangibles transactions. The guidance contained in the final report is similar to the guidance in
the discussion draft issued in April 2015, although some aspects have been refined in light of the
OECD consultations with business representatives.
The key points contained in the final report are:
 CCAs are contractual arrangements among business enterprises for sharing contributions
and risks associated with the joint development, production or obtaining of intangibles,
tangible assets or services, in the expectation of mutual benefit from the pooling of
resources and skills.
 The expectation of mutual benefit is a pre-requisite for participating in a CCA.
Participants must expect to benefit from the output of the CCA, for example by being
able to exploit the rights acquired or services developed in their own businesses.
 Control is a pre-requisite to be considered as a participant in a CCA. Participants must
have the functional capacity to exercise control over the risks taken in the CCA. This
means they must be capable of making the decision to take on the initial financial risk of
participation in the CCA, and must have the ongoing decision-making capacity to decide
on whether or how to respond to the risks associated with the CCA.
 The value of the contributions made by CCA participants must be in proportion to their
reasonably anticipated benefits from the CCA. Where contributions are not in proportion
to reasonably anticipated benefits, true-up payments may be required.
 The value of each participant’s contribution should be determined in line with the value
that would be placed on it by independent enterprises in comparable circumstances.
 While contributions should be measured based on value, the final report recognizes that it
may be more practical for taxpayers to compensate current contributions at cost.
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However, this approach may not be appropriate where the contribution of different
participants differ in nature (for instance, where some participants contribute services and
others provide intangibles or other assets).
Hard to value intangibles
The final report contains a specific transfer pricing approach with respect to hard-to-value
intangibles (HTVI). The guidance finalizes an earlier discussion draft released
June 2015. HTVI are defined as intangibles or rights in intangibles for which, at the time of their
transfer between associated enterprises, (i) n reliable comparables exist; and (ii) at the time the
transactions was entered into, the projections of future cash flows or income expected to be
derived from the transferred intangible, or the assumptions used in valuing the intangible are
highly uncertain, making it difficult to predict the level of ultimate success of the intangible at
the time of the transfer. The approach is intended to ensure that tax administrations can
determine in which situations the pricing arrangements with respect to a HTVI as set by the
taxpayers are at arm’s length and are based on an appropriate weighting of the foreseeable
developments or events that are relevant for the valuation of certain HTVI and in which
situations this is not the case. Under this approach, ex post evidence provides presumptive
evidence as to the existence of uncertainties at the time of the transaction, whether the taxpayer
appropriately took into account reasonably foreseeable developments or events at the time of the
transaction, and the reliability of the information used ex ante in determining the transfer price
for the transfer of such intangibles or rights in intangibles. Such presumptive evidence may be
subject to rebuttal if it can be demonstrated that it does not affect the accurate determination of
the arm’s length price. Compared to the discussion draft, the final report provides more detailed
exemptions and safe harbors when a transfer does not fall within the rules on HTVI.
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Risk & Capital
The final report also contains revisions to Section D of Chapter I of the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines following the work under Action 9 (transferring risks or allocating excessive capital)
and Action 10 (clarifying circumstances to re-characterize transactions). More specifically, the
revisions include the following main guidance to consider in conducting a transfer pricing
analysis:
 The importance of accurately delineating the actual transactions between associated
enterprises through analyzing the contractual relations between the parties together with
evidence of the actual conduct of the parties.
 Detailed guidance on analyzing risks as part of a functional analysis, including a six-step
analytical framework. This framework considers the identification of the economically
significant risks with specificity, the determination of contractual allocation of these risks
and the functions relating to these risks. For transfer pricing purposes, the associated
enterprise assuming a risk should control the risk and have the financial capacity to
assume the risk.
 A capital-rich MNE group member without any other relevant economic activities (a
“cash box”) that provides funding, but cannot control financial risks in relation to the
funding, will attain no more than a risk-free return, or less if the transaction is
commercially irrational.
 In exceptional circumstances of commercial irrationality, a tax administration may
disregard the actual transaction. The main question is whether the actual transaction has
the commercial rationality of arrangements that would be agreed between unrelated
parties under comparable economic circumstances.
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With respect to risk and re-characterization, the final report contains significant changes
compared to the discussion draft in December 2014, including the inclusion of guidance on risk
as an integral part of a functional analysis, the new six-step analytical framework to analyze risk,
the inclusion of a materiality threshold by considering economically significant risks with
specificity, the importance of financial capacity to assume risk, which was generally ignored in
the discussion draft, and elimination of the moral hazard concept.
Low value added services
The guidance on low value adding services under Action 10 finalizes an earlier discussion draft
released in November 2014. It takes the form of a rewrite of chapter VII of the
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines on services. The updated guidance has the stated aim of
achieving a balance between appropriate charges for low value adding services and head office
expenses and the need to protect the tax base of payor countries.
Key features of the proposed guidance include:
 A standard definition of low value-adding intra-group services as being supportive in
nature, not being part of the MNE’s core business, not requiring or creating valuable
intangibles and not involving significant risks.
 A list of services that would typically meet the definition. In essence the services listed
are back-office services.
 An elective simplified approach to determine arm’s length charges for low value-adding
services:
•

A process for determining the costs associated with low value adding services

•

Allowing general allocation keys

•

A simplified benefits test
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•

A standard 5% mark-up

 Prescriptive guidance on documentation and reporting that should be prepared for the
MNE to be able to apply the simplified approach.
 The ability for tax administrations to include a threshold above which the simplified
approach may be denied. Further work on the threshold will be performed as part of step
two mentioned below.
Implementation will take place in two steps. As step one, a large group of countries has agreed to
endorse the elective simplified mechanism by 2018. The second step looks to provide comfort to
other countries that the elective simplified mechanism will not lead to base-eroding payments. It
will entail further work in relation to a potential threshold above which the elective simplified
mechanism will not apply and other implementation issues.
Finally, the revised guidance encourages tax administrations to limit any withholding taxes on
low value-adding services to the profit element in the charge only.
Profit split
One of the objectives of Action 10 was to prepare transfer pricing rules or special measures to
clarify the application of transfer pricing methods, in particular profit splits, in the context of
global value chains. In order to determine for which matters additional clarification would be
useful, the OECD released a discussion draft in December 2014. That discussion draft did not
include revised guidance. The final report released in respect of Actions 8-10 includes a “scope
of work for guidance on the transactional profit split method” which explains, among others, that
the revised and improved guidance should:
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 Clarify the circumstances in which transactional profit splits are the most appropriate
method for a particular case and describe what approaches can be taken to split profits in
a reliable way
 Take into account changes to the transfer pricing guidance in pursuit of other BEPS
actions and take into account the conclusions of the Report on Addressing the Tax
Challenges of the Digital Economy, developed in relation to BEPS Action 1
 Reflect further work being undertaken to develop approaches to transfer pricing in
situations where the availability of comparables is limited, for example due to the specific
features of a controlled transaction, and clarify how in such cases, the most appropriate
method should be selected.
This scope of work as included in the final report will form the basis for draft guidance to be
developed by the OECD during 2016 and expected to be finalized in the first half of 2017. A
discussion draft will be released for public comments and a public consultation will be held in
May 2016.
Commodities
The new guidance on commodity transactions under Action 10 finalizes an earlier discussion
draft released in December 201416 and includes additional paragraphs to be inserted
immediately following paragraph 2.16 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The stated aim
is an improved framework for the analysis of commodity transactions from a transfer pricing
perspective which should lead to greater consistency in the way that tax administrations and
taxpayers determine the arm’s length price for commodity transactions and should ensure that
pricing reflects value creation. The key features of the released guidance on commodity
transactions include:
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 Clarification of the existing guidance on the application of the comparable uncontrolled
price (CUP) method to commodity transactions and the use of publicly quoted prices to
apply the CUP.
 Recommendation that taxpayers document their price-setting policy for commodity
transactions to assist tax authorities in conducting informed examinations.
 Guidance regarding the adoption of a deemed pricing date for controlled commodity
transactions in the absence of evidence of the actual pricing date agreed by the parties to
the transactions.
Compared to the discussion draft, the final guidance has minor changes, including a more
specific list of the types of adjustments applicable when using a CUP method and clarification
that the functions performed, assets used and risk assumed by other entities in the supply chain
need to be compensated properly.
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Action 11 – Collecting and analyzing data on BEPS
Action 11 is different from the other BEPS Actions because it is concerned with measuring
BEPS activity rather than addressing it. Action 11 is intended to estimate the size of BEPS,
identify indicators of BEPS, and provide recommendations for improving the measurement of
BEPS. The final report on Action 11, Measuring and Monitoring BEPS,403 estimates that global
corporate income tax revenue is reduced by 4% to 10% (i.e., US$100 billion to US$240 billion
annually).
The six indicators of BEPS identified in the final report are: (i) the concentration of foreign
direct investment in low tax countries; (ii) the profit rates of MNE affiliates in low tax countries
compared to those in high tax countries; (iii) the profit rates of MNE affiliates in low tax
countries compared with the profit rate of their own global groups; (iv) the effective tax rates of
MNEs compared to those of domestic-only enterprises; (v) the separation of intangible assets
from the location of their production; and (vi) the concentration of debt in
MNE affiliates located in higher-tax rate countries.
The final report recommends greater cooperation between the OECD and taxing authorities in
the collection and sharing of data. It also identifies several additional measures of BEPS that will
become possible using the data collected under Actions 5, 12, and 13.
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Action 12 – Disclosing aggressive tax planning arrangements
The final report on Action 12, Mandatory Disclosure Rules,404 makes a series of
recommendations about the design of mandatory disclosure regimes. The objectives of such a
regime are to increase transparency through providing early information to tax authorities, deter
the implementation of potentially aggressive schemes and early identification of promoters and
taxpayers associated with abusive schemes which are considered to pose BEPS-related tax risks.
Countries are free to choose whether or not to adopt a mandatory disclosure regime and the
recommendations set out within the Action 12 final report do not constitute a minimum standard.
Countries can elect whether to place the primary responsibility for disclosure either on the
promoter or on both the promoter and the taxpayer. To the extent a promoter has the primary
obligation to disclose a reportable scheme or transaction, the OECD suggests that the burden to
disclose switches to the taxpayer in situations where the promoter is offshore, there is no
promoter, or the promoter has legal privilege. A promoter should disclose a scheme at the time it
is made available to the taxpayer; whereas if the onus for disclosure rests with the taxpayer, the
taxpayer should disclose at the time of implementation of the scheme.405
Hallmarks are used to test what types of arrangements should be disclosed, with the
recommendation being that a mixture of generic (e.g., confidentiality, premium fee) and specific
(to target specific transactions such as loss schemes or leasing transactions) hallmarks are used,
although just one hallmark needs to be met to trigger a disclosure obligation. In order to reduce
the burden of compliance, the final report recommends that certain thresholds are introduced
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(i.e., a main benefit test and/or a de minimis filter). It should only be necessary to consider the
hallmarks if such an initial threshold is exceeded.406
The main amendments to the final report compared to the discussion draft issued in March 2015
relate to how the mandatory disclosure regimes should be implemented in order to capture
international tax schemes which have a material tax revenue risk in the reporting jurisdiction.
The final report emphasizes that the hallmarks introduced in relation to such schemes should
focus on BEPS-related risks in particular (as opposed to general tax planning risks as stated in
the discussion draft). The OECD recommends that these schemes should require disclosure
where the domestic taxpayer (or the taxpayer’s adviser) could reasonably have expected to have
been aware of the cross-border outcome of an arrangement, and they should make reasonable
inquiries at the time of entering into such arrangements to determine whether they include crossborder outcomes (such recommendations were not originally contemplated in discussion draft).
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Action 13 – Guidance on transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting
The final report on Action 13, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country
Reporting,407 sets out a three-tiered standardized approach to transfer pricing documentation and
country-by-country (“CbC”) reporting, in line with the report issued in September 2014. This
standardized approach consists of:
 A “master file” that provides tax administrations with high level information regarding a
multinational enterprise’s (MNE’s) global business operations and transfer pricing
policies
 A specific “local file” that provides a local tax administration with information regarding
material related party transactions, the amounts involved, and the company’s analysis of
the transfer pricing determinations they have made with regard to those transactions
 A CbC reporting template that requires large MNEs to report the amount of revenue
(related and unrelated party), profits, income tax paid and taxes accrued, employees,
stated capital and retained earnings, and tangible assets annually for each tax jurisdiction
in which they do business. In addition, MNEs are required to identify each entity within
the group doing business in a particular tax jurisdiction and to provide an indication of
the business activities each entity conducts
The master file and the local file are to be delivered directly to local tax administrations. CbC
reports should be filed in the jurisdiction of tax residence of the ultimate parent entity and shared
between jurisdictions through automatic exchange of information, pursuant to government to
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government mechanisms under the multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance
in Tax Matters, bilateral tax treaties or tax information exchange agreements.
The new CbC reporting requirements are to be implemented for fiscal years beginning on or after
1 January 2016 and apply to MNEs with annual consolidated group revenue equal to or
exceeding €750 million.
In order to facilitate the implementation of the new reporting standards, an implementation
package has been developed consisting of model legislation, which could be used by countries to
require MNE groups to file the CbC report and competent authority agreements that are to be
used to facilitate implementation of the exchange of those reports among tax administrations. As
a next step, it is intended that an XML Schema and a related User Guide will be developed by
the end of 2015 with a view to accommodating the electronic exchange of CbC reports.
The OECD states it is mandated that countries participating in the BEPS project carefully
monitor the implementation of these new standards and reassess no later than the end of 2020
compliance and effectiveness of the new three tier approach.
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Action 14 – Making dispute resolution mechanisms more effective
The final report on Action 14, Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective,408
reflects the commitment of participating countries to implement substantial changes in their
approach to dispute resolution. The final report contains measures aimed at strengthening the
effectiveness and efficiency of the mutual agreement procedure (MAP) mechanism, such as
specific actions to be taken by countries, suggested changes to legislation and administrative
practices, and changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention and its Commentary. The main
objectives of the measures are (i) to allow taxpayers access to the MAP process when the
requirements for taxpayers to access the MAP process are met; (ii) to ensure that domestic
administrative procedures don’t block access to the MAP process; and (iii) to ensure that
countries implement Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention in good faith.
A number of these measures constitute a minimum standard on treaty-based dispute resolution to
which all OECD BEPS and G20 countries have agreed to adhere. Compliance with this standard
will be subject to peer based monitoring that will be executed through the Forum on Tax
Administration’s MAP Forum. The minimum standard is complemented with additional
measures designated as best practices to which only some of the OECD BEPS and G20 countries
were willing to commit. Finally, the report lists 20 countries that have agreed to implement
mandatory binding MAP arbitration in their bilateral tax treaties. According to the OECD, the
countries that have made that commitment were involved in more than 90% of the outstanding
MAP cases at the end of 2013.
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Action 15 – Developing a multilateral instrument to modify bilateral tax treaties
Action 15 explores the technical feasibility of a multilateral instrument to implement the treaty
related measures developed during the course of the BEPS project and to amend bilateral tax
treaties. The final report on Action 15, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral
Tax Treaties,409 provides an overview of the current status of this multilateral instrument and
mainly reproduces the report issued in September 2014 (the 2014 report).
Drawing on the expertise of public international law and tax experts, the report explores the
technical feasibility and desirability of a multilateral instrument and its consequences on the
current tax system. This report considered that such an instrument is desirable as it would
achieve swift and consistent implementation of the measures developed during the course of
BEPS by avoiding the need to individually renegotiate existing bilateral tax treaties. The report
also identifies several obstacles to a multilateral instrument from a technical (public international
law and international tax law) and political perspective. Drawing from numerous examples of
multilateral treaties in areas other than tax, it describes that these obstacles can nevertheless be
overcome, thereby concluding that a multilateral instrument also appears feasible. The report
suggests that the scope of such a multilateral instrument should initially only include the treaty
based measures of the BEPS project once finalized (e.g., multilateral mutual agreement
procedure, provisions on dual residence structures, hybrid mismatch arrangements, triangular
cases involving PEs in third states and treaty abuse).
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Based on the analysis in the 2014 report, a mandate for the formation of an ad hoc Group to
develop the multilateral instrument was approved by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs and
endorsed by the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in February
2015. This Mandate also was reproduced in the final report on Action 15.410 The Group is open
to all interested countries, including non-OECD or G20 members, with all participating on an
equal basis. The Group began its work in May 2015 with the aim to finalize the multilateral
instrument and to open it for signature by 31 December 2016. To date, approximately 90
countries are participating. Participation in the development of the multilateral instrument is
voluntary and does not require any commitments to sign such instrument, once it has been
finalized.
These final reports represent the culmination of work on the BEPS project. These reports include
recommendations for significant changes in key elements of the international tax architecture.
Such changes are reflected in revisions to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the OECD
Model Tax Convention and in recommended domestic law provisions. Participating in the
discussions that led to these consensus recommendations were all OECD and G20 countries and
about a dozen developing countries.
With the release of the OECD final reports, attention turned to countries to determine whether,
when and how to implement the various recommendations. Countries had already begun taking
action in anticipation of the OECD recommendations, and there has been significant BEPSdriven legislative and tax administration activity around the world since the OECD issued its
Action Plan on BEPS in July 2013. Moreover, the G20 Finance Ministers have asked the OECD
to develop an inclusive framework for monitoring the implementation by countries of the BEPS
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recommendations. That framework is to be developed by early 2016. At the same time, the
OECD will be completing follow-on technical work related to several of the BEPS focus areas,
including interest limitations under Action 4, treaty abuse under Action 6, permanent
establishment under Action 7 and transfer pricing under Actions 8-10. Companies are to evaluate
the implications of the recommendations contained in the final reports for their business models
and operating structures. Companies also need to closely monitor legislative and tax
administrative developments in the countries where they operate or are considering investing.
The release of the final reports ushered in a time for companies to prepare for significant
potential changes in the international tax environment.

In conclusion, the BEPS Project has moved very fast, and generated enormous interest and
comments from both the public and private sectors. The Project has shown a quasi universal
agreement that there is a need for a fundamental review of the international tax system. The
ambitious timetable assigned to each of the Action Items was a testimony to the urgency of the
matter. The urgency is further developed by the worldwide media attention of the perceived tax
inequities and the need to provide tax authorities broad enough rules that they could use as they
see fit to combat international tax problems causing base erosion and profits shifting. The BEPS
has come to terms with the need for global solutions to the international tax problems. Many of
the solutions offered mirror the formulary apportionment method and satisfy many tenets of a
unitary taxation even though the authors of such measures publicly deny that very fact.411 Ideas
of combined reporting, the multilateral global treaty model or the coordination with all interested
parties are in conformity with the requirements of a unitary taxation system. It's clear that several
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OECD stakeholders want the broadest rules possible to use against taxpayers; however, this
means companies will be walking on egg shells with more subjective rules and uncertainty. The
likely increase in taxpayer disputes then gets thrown back into an already stretched competent
authority network. In the absent a proactive approach and a revamp of the system, solutions and
recommendations offered by the BEPS project are mostly bound for failure, and in the process,
will generate unnecessary and overwhelming complexity. The need for a new order, based on UT
principles has never therefore been more urgent and opportune.
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Part 2

The UT as the Panacea for the Current Ills of the
International Tax System

210

As seen above, there is not much disagreement on the fact the current international tax system is
broken. The issue however, is the deep disagreement on how to solve it, how to move forward.
The idea of a UT at an international level has been floated around but has not attracted much of a
thorough research and comprehensive work as to its viability and merits or lack thereof. In many
cases, opponents of a global UT have rushed to show how it lacking without measuring from the
standpoint of the current ALS system.412 In this research, we believe that UT has to be
understood and appreciate in comparison with the current ALS system. We agree that UT is not a
perfect system and does not provide a flawless solution to each and all the problems faced in
international taxation. UT, we acknowledge, is not perfect. Nevertheless, it is our belief that a
better understanding of the principles around UT would lead any reasonable observer to the
conclusion that UT is a far much better system than the current ALS system. Like every rose, the
UT has its thorns, but no reasonable person should deny the fact that it remains a rose; at least
when compared to current failed system. The goal for this research is not to argue that the UT is
a perfect system; one would never find a perfect system. The goal instead, is to revisit and
explain what a UT is, provide a better comprehension about its tenets and its functioning, and
then opine that in all respects, the UT is a better system that the ALS. We believe that an
explanation of what a UT is, and an understanding of its functioning would lead a reasonable
reader and observer to conclude that UT is dramatically better than the current ALS. This second
part of the research starts with an analysis of what a UT really is, what it entails and how it
functions. Then, we will refute the ordinary arguments that are casually levelled against adoption
of a UT. Also, we will advocate and outline the major areas in which we believe UT is better
than the current ALS. And finally, we will mock a reform proposal based on UT principles.
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Chapter V
The Building Blocks of a Unitary Tax System
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Any idea of a UT comprises and must comprise at least three main tenets: a unitary business
combined reporting, and formulary apportionment. We will look at each in turn.

A. The Unitary Business
To have a UT, there is a need for a unitary business. Whether a unitary business exists depends,
as it should, on economic realities. It is therefore important to examine what a unitary business
is. This notion is so important that success of any UT will depend on a careful construction and
delicate definition of the notion of a unitary business. In the United States for example, the
Supreme Court stated in the Mobil case that “the linchpin of apportionability… is the unitary
business principle”,413 and there is rather extensive case law in the U.S. regarding the definition
of the unitary business as it applies to state taxation within the federation.414 On a cross border
level however, it is important to conduct an in-depth analysis and examine what definition would
be more appropriate. The appropriateness or not of an approach to a unitary system would
depend on its impact on the international arena. Questions to be answered include whether the
notion should be construed narrowly, or rather widely. What would a narrow or wide
construction of the notion of unitary business mean to the international tax system? What would
it mean to multinational companies? What would it mean to tax authorities and developing
countries tax authorities in particular? What would be its impact on attempts to promote a wide
adoption of the unitary tax system across the globe? Do we need a de minimis provision?
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On a very superficial perspective, businesses would be considered unitary if activities of one in
one country are “inseparable” with activities of the other in another country. 415 There are
currently two approaches to the notion of unitary business. On the one hand a three-prong test,
and on the other hand, the so-called alternative approach.
The three-prong test aims at combining at least two factors out of three in order to declare a
business unitary. First, there is a need for “common ownership”.416 Under this test, businesses
have to be owned by the same person. This includes both vertical ownership as well as brother
sister corporations’ situations. This element can be approached from a wholly legalistic point of
view. For instance, one could define the ownership to be certain percentage of stock holding in
the corporation. Under this view, any corporation owning for example 50% of another would
form a unitary business with that corporation. Such legal ownership could be reduced or
increased to some other percentage that could be judged appropriate in view of the circumstances
and legal realities and concerns. Likewise, ownership can be approached from a wholly
economic point of view. This approach therefore could give less weight to the legal ownership
percentage of stock, but rather the substance of the economic relationship between the entities.417
415
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Under this first element, there need to be an agreeable construction of ownership able to trigger
unitary business qualification. There is a need for common ownership, but maybe most
importantly, common control, whether the control is arrived at through legal ownership
percentage or economic substance of the relationship.418 Our position is that the common
ownership prong be measured using all available tools. As a consequence, it is our position that
legal ownership at a set percentage should constitute unitary business. However, any such rule
should be accompanied by the possibility of including within a unitary business, entities that may
not have legal required ownership but for which the economic ownership is determinable. A
legal threshold along with an economic reevaluation is a workable standard for establishing a
unitary business.
The second element under the three-prong test is the need for a unity of operation.419 Under this
element, the operations of the different business, though in separate geographical areas, must be
very related and dependent. Here, the other business would not be able to operate for itself but
for the constant interaction with other businesses. All the business must have very close and
dependent operations, and the business of one should be reasonably tied to the other or others.
Under this element, the frequency of interaction between the businesses could be helpful. Factors
as to whether the costs are shared within the business entities are also helpful. Unity of operation
as evidenced by central purchasing, advertising, accounting and management divisions. As
indicated by Olivia Klein, the regularity of transactions between the entities as well as their
constant use of transfer pricing and the potential for transfer pricing rules manipulation are
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helpful indicators. This element emphasizes the unity of operation and indicates that if the
operations tie the entities together, then such entities may eligible for unitary business treatment.
The last element of this test is the unity of use prong, centralized executive force and general
system of operation.420 This element emphasizes the use in the business, whether the entities
commingle assets, whether assets used by one business are put in use by the other. The unity of
use focuses on the use element and factors such as the industry in which the entities operate and
the specificities of their use and practices are helpful.
The three-prong test is an analysis of element by element in determining whether a business is
unitary. It should be noted that most actors agree that at least two of the element should be met in
order to qualify as a unitary business. In the United States, the reading of the Supreme Court
cases suggests that the common ownership element should always be met, combined with either
the unity of operation or unity of use element.
Aside from the three-prong test, there has been developed a more generalized approach called
the “dependency test”.421 The inquiry under this approach is as to whether the business
operations of an entity in a jurisdiction contribute or depend in any way on the business
operations outside that jurisdiction. The inquiry here is focused on the contribution and
dependency between activities of various affiliated businesses, or parts thereof. Areas of inquiry
include: whether the there is a centralized decision making authority; is there outside control;
whether risks are shared. This test looks at a unitary business as a functional integration,
centralization of management, and economies of scale marked by a flow of value among the
affiliated entities. Here, the term “unitary business” means that the taxpayer to which it is applied
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is carrying on a business, the component parts of which are too closely connected and necessary
to each other to justify division or separate consideration as independent units.422
This is the very first step is designing a unitary tax system and this step is very important because
the credibility, promotion, and enforceability of such a unitary system would also depend on a
careful construction of what constitute a unitary business. This task goes beyond the mere need
to provide a definition but lies in the heart of whether there could be a widely adoptable unitary
tax system. Further, the definition whether large or narrow, could determine whether a unitary
tax system is successful. This part of the research will require in depth analysis and a construct of
an approach to the notion of unitary business, an approach that will be consistent with our overall
goal of designing a system fair to multinational companies and fair to all tax administrations and
those in developing countries specifically. Our analysis will also strive to come as close as
possible to the economic reality of business transactions reducing the potential for
gamesmanship by multinational companies, specifically.
Once a Unitary business is established, the next step is to require a combined income report for
all the corporate entities within the Unitary Business.
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B. Combined Reporting
UT requires that items of income be reported on a combined basis. Under combined reporting,
the separate accounting would be mitigated as the global entity would be required to account for
their operations and items of income globally. One of the preliminary issues to arbitrate here is
whether the combine reporting is a combine reporting of income, or a combine reporting of net
income.423 This as much an accountings issue that it is a tax law issue. There are two major
accounting procedures in the world: the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP),424
and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).425 An adequate application of
combined reporting would be more enhanced if either one of these accounting systems is applied
uniformly and globally, or if both systems are abandoned for the benefit of a new system that
could enjoy global consensus.
A requirement of a combined reporting of gross income would carry specific mechanical
specification and would lead to burdensome consequences. Under a global combined reporting
of gross income, the unitary business as a whole, would report all of its revenues. At a local
level, members of the unitary business would not take deductions, would not account for
expenses. The unitary business will in fact report the equivalent of its global revenues under a
combined reporting of gross income system. Under this system, expenses and deductions will be
taken into account at the global level, at the level of the global unitary business. This approach
will render the system cumbersome and might not be practical. The first issue under this
approach is the tax base problem that is a very country specific item. A combined reporting of
gross income would require a harmonization of accounting standards. All countries will need
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similar accounting mechanisms in getting to their tax base. The other issue with a combined
reporting of gross income is the ineffectiveness of various country specific incentives and
economic booster measures. Under the combined reporting of gross income, deductions are not
allowed at the local level, making all country specific incentives inoperative. The combined
reporting of gross income is therefore not desirable as it would engender dysfunction and
confusion in various respects including the definition of the tax bases, as well as operation of
country specific economic booster measures.
A requirement of a combined reporting of net income, on the other hand, will have its
operational mechanisms and would yield to more desirable consequences. First, global combined
reporting of net income would require that each local country member of the unitary business
takes into account its expenses and deductions locally. This will allow for application of each
local country accounting principles and a respect of each countries definition and understanding
of the notion of tax base. Each member of the unitary business will calculate, locally the amount
of its net income by taking into account local deductions and other deductible expenses, and
other costs that the local country allows as an offset to gross income and in arriving at taxable
income. Second, a global combined reporting of net income would allow for local measures of
economic enticement to be effective. For example, under the global reporting of net income,
many measures of tax incentives, applicable in various developing countries, would still be
effective in achieving the desired encouragement to economic growth. Local members of a
unitary business would be able to take the various incentives into account in arriving at their net
income that is then communicated the global unitary business. Further, the global combined
reporting of net income offers various advantages as regards to simplicity and efficiency. Once
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the global unitary business reports its global net income, the application of apportionment
formula would be more appropriate.
It is also important, as a preliminary matter, to distinguish the combined reporting with the
consolidated return. The consolidated return is a notion that exists in most if not all tax
legislations.426 Under the consolidated return, the rules usually pertain to ownership of the
corporate entity. As a matter of fact, most tax legislations require consolidated returns to be filed
when stockholding in a corporate entity reaches a certain percentage point, usually eighty percent
ownership.427 As a consequence, consolidated returns are not based on the business activities of
the consolidated corporate entities. In fact a parent company could conduct business in truck
manufacturing and file consolidated returns with its wholly owned subsidiary conducting
business in a totally unrelated business enterprise. On the other hand however, combined
reporting is required when there is a unitary business, and unitary business will usually exist
when several corporate entities conduct a common business enterprise.428 The careful
construction of the notion of unitary business, as discussed above, would take these
considerations into account. In addition, consolidated return would usually require a higher
percentage ownership, while a unitary business hence the combined reporting could exist with a
more relaxed percentage ownership.429
The philosophy behind combined reporting is the belief, legitimately so, that the income earned
by a related group of corporations engaged in a common enterprise is, in fact, the income of the
enterprise as a whole and not that of the various members of the group that have sometimes been
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established solely for intergroup reasons.430 Combined reporting therefore reinforces the basic
tenet of unitary taxation: approaching multiple but connected entities as a single enterprise and
single entity for tax purposes. In the case of multinational companies, combined reporting
effectively treats the parent and most or all of its subsidiaries as a single corporation for a
country’s income tax purposes. There is a requirement that the profits of the parent and most or
all of the subsidiaries be added together in the calculation of the corporation’s profit in a
particular country. The country then taxes a share of the combined profit using an apportionment
formula. As indicated by Michael Mazerov, combined reporting thus unitary tax is a powerful
tool for fighting tax evasion and other tax avoidance schemes.431
Practically, combined reporting would be heavily oriented on companies accounting
departments. Large companies would be required to provide the overall income of their entire
group that meets the criteria of the unitary business. Some have argued that combined reporting
would add compliance cost to large companies. However, this argument is not based on
economic reality of accounting practices of multinational companies. In fact, multinational
companies possess data for all their operations worldwide; they know the performance of each of
their permanent establishment or subsidiaries on a regular basis.432 Combined reporting would
provide such an antidote to various scheme of tax evasion and would allow adequate taxation by
developing countries. The reporting would provide all countries in which the unitary business
exists with the necessary information in order for it to apply its taxes, if any. This is specifically
advantageous for developing countries because unlike the Arm’s Length Standard which
compels them to use the resources they do not have to obtain information the accuracy of which
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they are not sure, combined reporting would shift the obligation to multinational companies in
order for them to report their global income (and preferably net income) that would be separately
and non-cumulatively subject to tax in their different locations. Even though this sounds like an
added compliance burden upon MNEs, in practice we notice that most MNEs already have this
information. One could think that the UT would require further efforts from MNEs to find,
compile and provide the combined reporting, but this is not accurate as most MNEs already
house this information and regularly compile items of income on their global operations.
Combined reporting is arguably not an added transaction and compliance cost to MNEs, it is
therefore just a matter of compelling MNEs to turn in the information they already have, and
have grown accustomed to compiling on their global operations. As indicated above, combined
reporting of net income would safeguard the countries’ ability to provide incentives, tax
incentives, and would not result in an unreasonable added compliance cost for MNEs. Combined
reporting provides a necessary look at the group’s overall performance, after taking into account
the country specific requirements for taxability of income, and the overall look for a reasonable
economic basis for application of a formula.
Combined reporting will help treat MNEs as a single business entity. Such multinational
companies would be under the obligation, to the extent they qualify as unitary business, to
provide tax authorities with a combined report of their global income. At this point, the tax
authority is left with a simple but very consequential task of applying an adequate formula to
levy its tax on its share of the global income.
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C. Formulary Taxation
Throughout the history of the current international tax regime, complaints about tax avoidance
have mostly stem from the fact that foreign corporations are able to manipulate the rules of
transfer pricing based on a legal fiction of separate entities to shift income from high tax
jurisdictions to low or no tax jurisdictions. Tax authorities across the globe have constantly tried
to design ways to avoid or at least diminish foreign corporations’ ability to manipulate the rules.
But recent developments have shown that governments have mostly failed in their efforts to
adequately tax income earned within their borders. The primary cause of this failure is the
government’s inability to design effective and proactive methods of taxing income of foreign
corporations earned in their jurisdictions. The ease with which foreign corporations use transfer
pricing rules to pay taxes, if at all, in the jurisdiction of their choosing is perplexing.433 This
situation which causes much concern to developed countries is a real threat to developing
countries which rely heavily on corporate income tax to finance their operations because much
too often, income earned in such countries ends up in tax heavens. It is hard to imagine how the
income tax can survive as an effective revenue raising device for countries in general and
developing countries in particular unless they design an effective method of taxing income of
MNEs specifically. Such system is urgently needed to save the income tax as a whole because
the perception that foreign companies do not pay tax could (and probably already does) affect
domestic companies’ voluntary tax compliance; after all, it would be politically difficult to
sustain a harsher tax regime for domestic corporations. Worse, most domestic companies could
pursue merging with international affiliates to rip tax benefits.
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UT, through formulary apportionment, emerges as the solid alternative to the current system, and
a response to the current problems of the international tax regime. This system relies heavily on a
formula to reconcile economic realities. In fact, much of the debate and writing about unitary
taxation has been around formulary apportionment.434 Proponents of the unitary tax system have
advanced the idea of formulary apportionment as a curb to income shifting while opponents of
the system have raised legal and economic downfalls of formulary methods.435 Impossibility, in
their view, to find a formula that countries around the world could adopt remains the main
concern of opponents of the Unitary Tax system. The major task at the heart of each analysis of a
UT is therefore to design a formula that could be acceptable to tax authorities across the globe.
Such formula design work, in order to be attractive, should keep in mind the necessity to design
an effective yet simple enough formula as to assure that it would not require undue
administration cost to tax authorities. The goal shall be to design a formula that would contribute
to realign international tax rules with global economic reality of MNEs specifically. The formula
would be a mathematical combination based on “real economics” of operations, a method that
would apply to the combined reporting to basically render the separate entities Arm’s Length
Standard irrelevant. As a matter of fact, income will be reported globally through the combined
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reporting system by the unitary global business, and each country will blindly apply its adopted
formula to such income to assess a fraction of the global income that is taxable in its jurisdiction
because representing the economic reality of the income earned in that jurisdiction. While the
definition of the unitary business and the combined reporting are important aspects of the
Unitary Tax system, designing a formula is the most daunting and consequential aspect in the
advocacy for such a system.436 Finding a formula that is acceptable to developing as well as
developed countries, not to mention multinational companies sounds very difficult, and some
would argue improbable on its face.437 Most writing in the area has stonewalled at this
conclusion. This explains the current lack of a complete Unitary Tax system proposed as an
alternative for the current system. There is a need to fill that gap. Design of formula remains
deeply an endeavor of economists. We will discuss several formula proposals that exist as well
as the formulas currently applied by US States. In the presentation of a sample reform proposal,
we will present a tentative formula that we would have concluded is a viable solution under this
research. However, this research does not supplement the need for economists to develop a
complete formula, credible enough to cause global buy-in, and complete enough to serve as the
foundation of a complete unitary system capable of replacing the current international tax
system. Although such formula proposal would not constitute an insurance policy for universal
acceptability, it should result from serious research in the area and offer arguments for as much
able to cause consensus as possible. It is also important to note at this point that economists
should be guided in the design of this formula by the need to optimize the revenue raising
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capacities in the developing world specifically. The guiding philosophy should therefore be to
structure a formula that is most suited to developing countries while not alienating developed
countries and MNEs. While all countries are suffering from the current manipulation of transfer
pricing rules and would benefit from a well-crafted alternative, it is clear that developing
countries with limited resources yet deep reliance on income taxes have the most to lose under
the current system and their survival and ability to meet their most basic responsibilities to their
people depend on such well-crafted alternative to the current system. It is rarely disputed, as seen
above, that a potential unitary tax system would provide much needed simplicity in the
international tax arena.
Unlike the current system where compliance with the rules of international tax is just as
expensive if not more as paying the tax itself, unitary tax would basically eliminate undue
compliance costs to MNEs and administrative burden to tax authorities. The rules would be
simpler and their application easier. Many acknowledge that a unitary tax system would provide
much needed revenues for developing and developed countries.438 The complaint however, is
that MNEs would have to pay more taxes. I intend to show in this research that this is not
necessarily true. The simplification that would accompany a unitary tax system would exempt
multinational companies from paying tremendous amounts of compliance costs. Rerouting such
payments to actual tax payment could in fact lead to MNEs reporting less overall tax and tax
related expenses.
The idea of a unitary tax system and formulary approach is not entirely new. As indicated above,
writing and proposals exist in the area, however, there is not proposal embodying a detailed and
complete system to totally replace the current international tax regime. Further, there is no major
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research as to how a switch to unitary system would affect developing countries and what
formula design would be more appropriate to them.
There are currently two separate institutional reform proposals for formulary taxation. One
published under the auspices of the Brookings Institution’s Hamilton Project and aiming at
reforming U.S. international tax rules and drawing inspiration from the U.S. states’ experience
with formulary apportionment.439 The second, coming from the E.U. is part of the works in the
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).440 Both proposals suggest a departure
from the current and failed Arm’s Length Standard and adoption of the formulary approach. It is
therefore important to draw from the experience of the unitary taxation and formulary approach
in the U.S.441 for example in designing a formula with developing countries in mind. Any design
of a formula would have to come from an in-depth analysis of the use of formula by the states in
the U.S. The experience of the U.S. states however is not a symbol of uniformity. Each state has
historically used its constitutional power to design a formula that best represented its interests.442
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There has been a growing trend throughout history, however, to encourage uniformity of
methods between the different states.443 Although the difference of formulas between states
could make the description difficult, it is the ideal situation in order to examine the effects of the
various formulas from experience. Most states have approached formulary taxation through the
so called “Massachusetts Formula” advocated by the American National Tax Association and
calling for equal weight of three factors: Assets, Payroll, and Sales. The idea is to allocate onethird of the total income to jurisdiction where the assets are allocated, one third to the jurisdiction
of the payroll, and the last third to the jurisdiction of the sales.444 This aims at making sure that
the income is allocated and taxed in every jurisdiction where the business has a taxable presence.
It is important to examine these factors separately.

discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) the amount of the tax is fairly related to services provided by the
state.
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First, the asset factor derives from the assumption that the presence of significant assets shows
real economic activity. Assets show an economic presence, a taxable economic presence. Under
this factor, income would be apportioned to a tax jurisdiction depending on the number of assets
held in that jurisdiction as compared to the group. For example, company X dealing in the
manufacture of computer bags, operates in the U.S. and Cameroon. Company X owns 2 assets:
one is a manufacturing plant located in Cameroon and worth 80% of the company’s total assets;
and the second is an office building located in the U.S. and worth 20% of the company’s total
assets. If a UT is adopted with a formulary apportionment based on the sole one factor assets
formula, any income earned by the company as a unitary business would be taxed 80% in
Cameroon and 20% in the U.S. The single factor assets formula is easy to apply provided an
adequate asset valuation. The asset factor is very applicable to the brick and mortar, the so called
‘old economy’. In fact, a company’s worth used to be measured by the amount of tangible assets
it held. The application of the asset factor to assess the true economic reality of transactions and
the true MNEs presence leads to respectable results in the old economy context.
The asset factor, though still used in some U.S. States, has very much been criticized as easily
subject to manipulation. The asset factor is lacking because it can easily be manipulated by
companies. Companies can decide to make massive physical investments in low or no tax
countries while maintaining the minimum assets in the country of operations. In example above,
it would be rather easy for Company X to locate the manufacturing plant in a low to no tax
jurisdiction, channeling most of its income there even though the sales might occur in a different
jurisdiction.
Further, the asset factor does not seem appropriate for the current economy and the phenomena
of intangible assets. Most of the current corporate assets are in the form of intangibles, hard to
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value and easy to relocate. The modern economy relies heavily on intangible assets and the
current international tax system continues to struggle in determining their location. With the
phenomenon known as the cloud, location of intangible assets has not been more difficult
ascertain.445 To the location issue, adds the evaluation problem. How to evaluate, for tax
purposes, intangible assets? The asset factor will only be effective in revealing the true
economics of transactions if the assets involved are adequately valuated. The difficulty is more
pronounced when the taxpayer’s valuation is different from a potential valuation from the tax
authorities. Litigation does not provide any help in this area as the courts are usually left with
fundamentally competing expert testimony as to the value of the assets at a specific time.446 The
difficulty of valuing assets is shown in the current international tax system where taxation of
intangibles often operates on a presumptive value basis.447 For intangible assets, time of
valuation is very important as those assets fluctuate in value on a daily basis.
The use of the asset factor should find a way to incorporate intangible assets and deal with the
fact that such assets are very easy to manipulate or relocate. While physical investment simply
for tax advantages could be cumbersome for corporations, intangible assets are very easy to
move around and relocate; a well-crafted formula should be mindful of this fact due the growing
importance of intangible assets in the MNEs’ world. An estimated 70% of the value of the top
150 U.S. companies is in the form of intangibles.448 If the asset factor is used alone, most of the
income would go to the low or no tax countries because of the heavy physical investment
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therein, or the easily rellocable intangible assets there. As a consequence, an undue weight
should not be given to this factor even though it clearly constitutes a valid indication of
economic activity.
Second the payroll factor is based on the idea that salaries reflect the location of the real income
producing activity. The payroll factor is an important factor as it tracks the remuneration that is
arguably associated with productivity. It tracks employees of the company and could present a
good indication of what income was produced, and where. There is a need to adopt a wide
definition of payroll in order to anticipate attempts for creative compensation arrangements
unable to meet the payroll factor. The payroll factor will require that the unitary group be taxed
at local levels depending on the amount of salaries that are attributable to the specific jurisdiction
as compared to the group as a whole. In our example above, if we assume that salaries paid to
employees in the U.S. represent 80% of the total salaries of the group, and salaries in Cameroon
represent 20% of the total salaries of the group, under a single payroll factor of a UT, 80% of the
income of global company X would be taxed in the US and 20% in Cameroon.
Adoption of a payroll factor requires a wide definition of the notion of payroll. Under this factor,
payroll will include salaries and wages, as well as all other forms of compensation and friend
benefits to employees.
However, providing for an adequate definition of payroll is not the only challenge of this factor.
In fact, the economic substance of allocating income according to payroll can be manipulated. If
this factor were to be taken alone, developing countries would suffer unless there are methods of
evaluation and other various adjustments of salary brackets. It is known that the cost of labor in
the developing countries is far less that of the developed countries. In including this factor, it will
be important to design an adjustment method that would not entirely rely on the volume of the
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salary, but also on what it means in the national context of the country’s operations. In addition,
there will be a need to address potential manipulation of the payroll factor by locating most
employees in the low or no tax jurisdiction location with any otherwise business impact.449 A
well-crafted payroll factor would therefore contemplate the possibility of linking the location of
the payroll to the relevant economic activity in that location.
Third, the sales factor is based on the idea that income must be allocated according to the
location of sales. This is a theory of consumption whereby the company derives its profits from
its consumers and hence should be taxed at the location of its consumers, the location of sales.
The sales factor is an important factor in that it strives to track the source of the income. At an
age where the determination of the source of income is more and more difficult, the sale factor
provides a method to tax the income by sourcing it to its consumers. The U.S. experience shows
a growing preference for the sales factor which has shown rather effective at sourcing and raising
revenues.450 The Majority of US States now have opted to provide double weight to the sale
factor as compared to the other two factors.451 Many commentators, in the US, continue to
predict that all the US States will have to adopt, at some point in the future, a single factor
formula based on sales.452The sales factor seems to better track the real economic activity and
shows not as subject to manipulation as the other factors. In the U.S., many States including
Iowa and New York moved to adopt a single factor formula based on the sales factor. This factor
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assures that the tax authority (and for our purposes the country) from which the money is earned
through sales, gets to tax it. In addition, proponents of the sale factor argue that a single sale
factor would in fact be beneficial to the tax jurisdiction as it would encourage companies to
locate property and payroll in the jurisdiction, thereby creating employment and wealth. If assets
and payroll are no longer used to determine tax liability, one would argue that location of payroll
and assets would be more beneficial to certain jurisdictions.
On the one hand, the sales factor can be characterized as beneficial to developing countries. The
developing world is and will continue to be, arguably, a consumer heavy world. Many
companies in the developed world continue to expand into developing countries and continue to
strengthen their efforts in selling their products in these countries. With the projected explosion
in the developing countries population and the ensuing increase in the consumer headcount, a
sales factor can be seen as beneficial to developing countries tax authorities. For example, the
United Nations project that by year 2050, population in the developing world would
approximately 80% of the total world population.453 Major companies including General Motors,
Apple or Microsoft are all currently refining their strategies to be more aggressive in reaching
the developing countries markets with their products. As the customer base continues to grow in
the developing world, the sale factor can show very important for developing countries tax
authorities.
On the other hand, nevertheless, many developing countries are building their economies by
serving as factories where products are made and sold to the larger market, specifically in the
developed world.454 Developing countries’ economies are currently relatively small and many
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countries have provided the workforce necessary for the making of goods for the purpose of
selling abroad. This reality does not negate the importance of the sales factor to the developing
countries; however, it does put into question the use of developing countries as factories for
purposes of selling to the developed world. A single sale factor would have all those products
made in the developing world and sold to the developed market, not taxed by developing
countries tax administrations. For example, if assets and payroll factors are disregarded for the
benefit of the sales factor alone, Apple would have the ability to install countless plants in India,
manufacture iPhones there and sale all of them in the US and Europe. India would not be entitled
to tax any of the income from the sale of the iPhones manufactured within its territory. For major
MNEs currently, only a small proportion of the goods manufactured in their developing countries
factories are in fact sold in the developing world. Most of the products made in the developing
world, at least some relatively luxurious products, are sold in the US and Europe, not in Africa,
Asia or South America for the most part.
In addition, the sale factor is not totally immune from manipulation and attempts thereof. The
main issue with the sales factor is the location of the sale. To determine the location of the sale,
the main factor used is the location of the customer. One must determine where the purchaser of
the goods is located. In practice, the address of the shipment or the physical place of delivery
would determine the location of the customer hence the location of the sale. The issue however,
is that such location can be manipulated. One can determine for the goods to be shipped at a
place where the sale factor may not be implemented or may be loosely implemented. How to
assure that the customer, when ordering goods for shipment, provides the address of his actual
location? How to assure that the company, when invoicing customers, provides a place of
delivery that is exactly the location of the customer. In this era of ecommerce, how to determine
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the physical location of intangible products bought electronically? Similar to all other factor
standing alone, the sales factor is limited and would not contribute to a fair system is applied
alone.
From the above analysis, it is clear that no one factor, standing alone, could provide a
satisfactory formula for global implementation. Each factor, notwithstanding its merits, is
malleable and lacking if implemented on a stand-alone basis. The task therefore is to design and
agree on a combination of some or all of the factors in building the formula. The task is
inherently for economists to wrestle with. Nevertheless, based on available literature on the
issue, our tax reform proposal below suggests a formula implicating all three factors, but
providing for different weights and different levels of importance in the formula for each of the
three factors.

235

Chapter VI
Current Experiences with UT and Rebuttal of
The Regular Arguments Levelled Against UT
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Any proposal to adopt a UT has to contend with the various criticisms that have been levelled
against UT principles notwithstanding the fact that there is yet to be major research as to its
viability. UT is regularly dismissed both in the academic circles as well as in practice circles.
Most arguments raised against UT however, are shallow to say the least and not worthy of much
attention in reality. We will address three of those common arguments below. To contrast with
the criticisms against UT for global application, UT principles have been in place in US States
taxation for decades and continue to thrive. The experience os US States with UT can provide
significant insight on the merits of the UT. Finally, Europe has flirted and continues to flirt with
general implementation and application of the UT. The European Common Consolidated Tax
Base draws straight from the UT principle and will be presented below as a form of UT, which is
already contemplated by the European Union.
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A. Rebuttal of the Regular Arguments Levelled Against the UT
The first argument levelled against the UT is that it is incompatible with the international tax
treaty network.455 A more extensive debunking of this argument will be provided below in
Chapter 8. The treaty network compatibility is a pseudo argument. Transfer pricing is currently
governed by Article 9 of the treaties, which assumes the SA method because it addresses the
commercial or financial relations between associated enterprises.456 If UT were adopted, Article
9 would become irrelevant in those situations to which UT applies (i.e., where a unitary business
is found to exist) because UT ignores the transactions between related parties, and treats them
instead as part of a single enterprise. Traditionally, the term PE was meant to include separate
entities (subsidiaries). However, in 1933, the League of Nations introduced Article 5457 (ancestor
to the current Article 9 of the Model) where separate enterprises were no longer considered PE.
UT would revive the disregard for separate entities and would apply globally each time a unitary
business is found to exist. UT would be governed by Article 7 of the double tax treaties. Under
Article 5(7), “[t]he fact that a company that is a resident of a Contracting State controls or is
controlled by a company that is a resident of the other Contracting State … shall not of itself
constitute either company a permanent establishment of the other.” However, it is well
established that a dependent agent can be a PE (see Art. 5(5)), and whether an agent is dependent
is based on whether the principal exercises legal and economic control over the agent.458 “An
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agent that is subject to detailed instructions regarding the conduct of its operations or
comprehensive control by the enterprise is not legally independent.”459
In the case of a modern, integrated MNE that operates as a unitary business, a strong argument
can be made in most cases that the parent of the MNE exercises both legal and economic control
over the operations of the subsidiaries, especially where the subsidiaries bear no real risk of loss
and acquire goods and services exclusively or near exclusively from the parent or other related
corporations. The existence of Intranets in most MNEs has resulted in most important
operational decisions being centralized. In that case, the subsidiaries should be regarded as
dependent agents of the parent. Such a finding is in fact made with increasing frequency in both
developed and developing countries.460 If the subsidiary is an agent of the parent, Art. 7(2) of the
treaties requires the attribution of the same profits to the subsidiary “that it might be expected to
make if it were a distinct and independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities
under the same or similar conditions.” Arguably, the application of UT satisfies this arm’s
length condition because in the absence of precise comparables, which almost never exist, it is
not possible to determine exactly what profits would have been attributable to the subsidiary
under separate accounting.
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Another pseudo argument levelled against UT is that it is contrary to the ALS which has risen to
the level of a customary international law norm. The argument of customary international law
does not, either, impede the application of a UT approach. The argument is based on the
contention that because separate accounting and the ALS are embodied in all of the treaties they
should be considered binding. But embodiment in the treaties is not enough to create a customary
international law ban on UT, since article 7(4) is embodied as well. Most double tax treaties
currently applicable contain Article 7(4) which provides:
“Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to determine the profits to be attributed to
a permanent establishment on the basis of an apportionment of the total profits of the enterprise to
its various parts, nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining
the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be necessary; the method of
apportionment adopted shall, however, be such that the result shall be in accordance with the
principles contained in this Article.”

The Article allows for application of a formula, and the Article is well embodied in morst double
tax treaties as we will see in Chapter VIII below. If the ALS is an international customary law
norm due to its overwhelming presence in the current tax treaties, at least formulary
apportionment should also rise to the level of customary international law norm because it is just
as present in the current double tax treaties.
Furthermore, it should be noted that Model Tax Treaties do not, in any way or form, create a
‘right to tax’.461 The key issue is the actual practice of states, i.e. what countries actually do as
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domestic laws reign supreme in the area of taxation, and many of them follow UT approaches in
practice. In addition, countries should be free to follow the UN Model which does not adopt the
changes made by the OECD, and which is also widely followed.
Finally, it can be argued that even the OECD may be revising its approach. The authorized
OECD approach may have marked the high point of OECD commitment to SA. With the
beginning of the BEPS project, which is influenced by large developing countries like China and
India, it is likely that the OECD may be stepping back from its total commitment to SA.
Specifically, the potential adoption under BEPS of country by country reporting (which is
already required for extractive industries in the US) can be the basis for implementation of UT.
This development is very important for developing counties as many rely heavily on extractive
industries. The requirements of the country by country reporting, if implemented, will likely start
with the extractive industries as to draw from the US experiences with the system and thereby
allow a profound change in taxation of the major industry in the developing world: the extractive
industry.
Sovereignty is also an argument used to oppose any application of the UT. It is argued that
taxation is a very central topic of a country’s identity and that the determination of a tax policy
suitable to a specific country’s needs is the very basic of their sovereignty. We absolutely agree
with this premise. Taxation is a matter of a country’s sovereignty and every country should have
the right to tax income within its borders. The current system has betrayed the basic premise of
each country being able to tax income generated within its borders. The BEPS project analyzed
above as well as the many various other schemes that have led to many countries not being able
to exercise their power to tax income properly generated within their borders. For those who
repudiate UT on the basis of countries’ sovereignty, the answer is that the current system
241

diminishes countries’ ability to exercise their tax sovereignty more than the UT would ever be
able to achieve. In fact, the UT reestablishes countries sovereignty by ensuring that they are able
to excessive their taxing power appropriately and thoroughly. The debate though is what it
means for a country to exercise its fiscal sovereignty. Does fiscal sovereignty mean that each
country should have isolated and uncoordinated tax policies with other nations? Does fiscal
sovereignty mean that each country addresses global problems posed by MNEs taxation from a
local perspective exclusively? Does fiscal sovereignty mean that countries should not agree on a
common general policy manner to go about crafting their tax policies? The answer to these
questions, even from the avid critics of the UT, is no. Fiscal sovereignty does not mean fiscal
unilateralism or isolation. If fiscal sovereignty meant fiscal isolation, then no one would be able
to argue today that the current international tax system is anywhere close to affording countries
such sovereignty. In fact, countries are highly connected and coordinated whether through
double tax treaties or other bilateral or regional instruments of common application. Fiscal
sovereignty is therefore not to be found in the need of a country to be isolated and coordinated
with others.
Instead, we argue that UT provides greater fiscal sovereignty in the real sense of the word. On
the one hand, and as indicated above, UT would allow countries to tax all the income generated
within their borders. The unique ability of the UT to reduce the potential for MNEs to shift
income out of some jurisdiction where the income is economically earned and fiscally belongs is
an immediate testimony of putting the power back in the hands of each country’s tax authorities.
On the other hand, UT does not interfere with each country’s freedom to determine how much
tax revenues they would like to raise. The duty of determining tax rates is and shall always
remain a country specific duty and each country should be free to set its tax rates at a level it and
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only it decides appropriate.462 The UT does not, or at least our proposal does not advocate for a
global uniformity of tax rates. Far from that, our proposal underlines the need for each country to
determine its rates and the amounts of tax revenue they are willing to raise based solely on the
social consensus and agreement as to what the role of the government should be for that specific
country. Each country is free and shall always remain free to have and solve that debate and
adopt a tax policy that corroborates the specific country’s position through the levels of tax rates
retained. Sovereignty is therefore a pseudo argument against UT because from the perspective of
the current system, UT offers a far greater level of sovereignty to countries in dealing with their
fiscal affairs, chief of which is their ability to adequately tax income within earned within their
borders.
The very many arguments raised against adoption of UT are fundamentally lacking and do not
justify a legitimate rejection of the UT. As seen above, most the arguments are at best, pseudo
arguments, that actually apply in a more devastating manner to the current international tax
system. The debunking and repudiation of the arguments above is in no way an admission that
the UT is flawless. Any implementation of the UT, on a global scale, would have to contend with
major transitional issues, and the system incontestably would struggle to establish a unique
formula for global adoption just as it might at some point not reflect the real time economic
returns of various entities within the group. The effort is to minimize such potential negative
impact by providing an extensive analysis of the UT. Many criticisms clearly stem from the lack
of concrete knowledge of what the UT really. Many academic contributions have superficially
brushed off the idea of a UT without, unfortunately, a preliminary in depth explanation and
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understanding of what it is. A thorough understanding of the UT compels the conclusion that it
ought to be adopted in replacement of the current system under the ALS. The superiority of the
UT to the ALS is evident, whether it is regarding its fair results, its ease of operation, its
advantages to the developed and the developing world, or its advantages to the MNEs and the
private sector. In fact, the long standing experience of UT by the US States and the current
experiences of some form of UT in Europe under the European CCTB, and the final BEPS
Reports are very informative as to the merits of the UT as compared to the current and failed
international tax system based on the ALS.
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B. The US States Experience with UT
Each of the US States with an income tax system applies some form of formula of the UT.463
Application of the UT in the US, even though with specificities, can provide a picture and
helpful insight on any project of global application of the UT.464 The UT and the use of
formulary apportionment in the US States can be traced back to the state of New Hampshire in
1842 when the State enacted a law assigning the administration and assessment of railroad
property to a State board.465 In 1868, Pennsylvania enacted a statute applying the apportionment
formula concept to the tax base of an entire corporation.466 The Pennsylvania method resulted in
an inclusion of the company’s out of state income into the tax base of the apportionment.
Following the Pennsylvania experience, the UT principles and apportionment methods primarily
conceived for property taxation and instate income, became instruments applicable to interstate
commerce and out of state income.467 Interstate apportionment quickly gained popularity as
many States followed suit and adopted UT principles.468 Court challenges quickly ensued but
mostly unsuccessful.469 The Supreme Court of Kansa explicitly endorsed UT and formulary
apportionment in the Missouri River case when it indicated that “a railroad is an entire thing and
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should be assessed as a whole… a railroad is an entire thing, and cannot be valued or assessed
except as a whole…”470
Early in the twentieth century, many States expanded the reach of formulary taxation. What had
mostly been applied to property taxation was being expanded to other forms of income. The
State of Massachusetts adopted a three-factor formula based equally on assets, payroll and sales
on the basis that such factors revealed the true source of the taxpayer’s income.471 By years
1930s, the concept of UT was widely established and accepted. The formula retained; however,
remained subject to contestations and sometimes even chastised by courts.472 The courts
continuously posed the requirement that the formula retained neither be arbitrary, nor produce
unreasonable results.473 Some States, including New York and California, went as far as adopting
a UT that would apply to all income of the corporation, including that which is earned in other
countries. The courts continued their support by upholding the UT applied by US States, even at
a global level.474
Under the application of the early UT principles, companies still had to possibility to manipulate
their inter-company transactions so as to minimize the income. The State of California instituted,
in 1936, the concept of combined reporting to avoid inter-company gamesmanship. The
combined reporting, an informational return reduced the potential for tax avoidance through the
setting up of separate companies in different States. Various challenges to the combined
reporting instituted in California eventually survived and the system expanded to other States.475
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Taxpayers were not happy with the continued court endorsement of the UT approach. Congress
eventually passed measures limiting the scope of application of state UT principle.476 In addition,
Congress aimed to make uniform across the States, the acceptable principles under UT.477 In
1964 and 1965, Congress published reports recommending uniform standards, tax bases, and
rules and procedures of apportionment to be applied by States tax administrations. Predictably,
States resented the recommendations and were publicly opposed to any federal intervention in
what was considered a State tax matter. In response, many States vowed to improve interstate
taxation, and got together, formed what became known as the Multistate Tax Compact. The
Compact wanted to preempt the federal government, and provide for a more coordinated
application of UT principles amongst States.478
Until the 1980s, UT and formulary apportionment flourished across US States and its reach
seemed unlimited. Taxpayers used various forms or protest against the UT system usually to no
avail. Taxpayers who opposed the ever-expansive use of UT principles used judicial means to
curtail application of the UT. However, courts continued to upheld UT principles and their
expansive application within US States. Taxpayers opposed to the UT also tried political
pressures to eradicate UT, but again, to no decisive avail. Most State legislatures continued to
expand the reach of their UT principles. The most convincing tool used to curtail expansion of
the UT and the ever-increasing reach of its principles was the economic challenge.479 Many
States refrained from applying their UT principles to income earned overseas and to require
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global combined reporting for the fear of losing economic activity within their respective States
and ultimately loosing revenues. The expansion of the UT was therefore halted.
The UT in US States was however not abolished and today, all the States with income tax apply
a form of UT. Some States still tax their MNEs on their worldwide income, and require a global
combined reporting for state tax purposes.480 The common way in which US States currently
apply UT is either through a single factor based formula, or a differently weighted multiple
factors formula.
First, many US States apply the single factor sales formula for their income apportionment.
Business representatives are relentlessly lobbying for various changes to formulary
apportionment applied by States, and the major trend and change noted is the move for many
states to a single factor formula.481 In Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Oregon, or Nebraska, only sales are
included in the apportionment formula. Other States use the notion of receipts, close to sales, to
determine the apportionment formula. 482 The general move to a sales only factor formula is
presented as an economic necessity and economic booster. A sales only factor encourages
exports whereby goods are produced in one location with no tax concerns, and those goods are
sold everywhere, with the only incidence of taxation being the place of the sale of goods.
Additionally, the sales factor encourages investments in production facilities and plants because
the location of the facilities, plants and other assets would carry no tax consequences. It is
unsettled at the very least as to whether businesses actually prefer a single factor sales formula as
a general proposition. Several empirical research show that a single factor sales formula leads to
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lower taxes paid by business in the various states they operate in. In fact, a single factor sales
formula seem appealing to the brick and mortar industry, allowing them to install large amounts
of assets at a location of their choosing and only be subject to taxation at locations of their sales.
The situation sometimes leads to incongruences as to whether to support or not a single sales
factor formula at a specific location. It is not uncommon for a major US company to support the
adoption of a single factor formula in one State and oppose adoption of same in another State, all
at the very same time. For example, Ford Motor Company was widely in favor and advocated for
adoption of single factor sales formula in Michigan for the Michigan Single Business Tax.483
However, the same Ford Motor Company, a few years later, vigorously opposed adoption of the
same measure in Illinois, calling it unfair to out-of-state companies.484 The same attitude was
noticed with Kraft Foods which opposed single factor sales formula in Maryland and supported
adoption of same in Illinois,485 as well as AT&T which supported adoption of single factor sales
formula in New Jersey while opposing the same in Oregon within a matter of one month.486 The
ideal situation for most businesses seems therefore to have a single factor sales based formula in
the State in which they manufacture or the State in which they are headquartered, while other
States adopt a different formula that is not solely based on sales. The tendency though, is for
more and more States to adopt a single factor sales formula or at least double weight sales,
making it difficult for companies to manipulate the differences between the States’ adopted
formulas.
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Second, some States still use the basic Massachusetts formula. Under the Massachusetts’s basic
formula, all three factors: assets, payroll, and sales are given equal importance and weighted
equally. States such as Hawaii, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, or North Dakoda continue to give
equal weight to all three factors and apply a three-factor formula for apportionment of income of
their corporate residents.487 The equally weighted three factor test has the advantage of not
favoring one factor over another; it is advantageous because it grasps all aspects that contribute
to income and wealth creation and aims to tax it accordingly. The main criticism of the equally
weighted three factor test is that it is not adapted to the modern economy. The assets factor
included in such formula is inherently flawed when it comes to intangible assets and the
difficulty of valuing them nowadays.
Finally, various States still apply more than one factor in their formulas but grant them differing
weights. The most common use of this system is the double weighted sales factor. In Alabama,
Idaho, New Hampshire, Vermont, or Kentucky, the sales factor is given double weight in the
apportionment formula.488 The States that adopt this formula argue that all three factors are
important, but that the assets and payroll factors are highly subject to manipulation and have a
more negative impact on investments and job creation. The emphasis on sales, is not only liked
by businesses that are headquartered in those States, but also allows for an expanded tax reach of
the local consumption. The debate of the move from the equally weighted three factor test to the
double weighted sales factor and to the single factor test is reigniting the debate over a uniform
formula, ideally amongst the States.489 The original idea and initial efforts of having a uniformed
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and coordinated formula amongst the States490 has still not come to fruition half a century later,
but has gained more acclaim in recent debates over US States taxation, a debate that is highly
important and instructive in the international arena. The experience of the US States with UT has
inspired the European Union in their efforts to establish a common consolidated tax base across
Europe.
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C. The European CCTB
Europe has long struggled with tax competition and various countries assigning different goals to
their tax policies and tax rules.491 Unilateralism ruled the continent in the past on matters of
taxation. Tax policy was determined on a country by country basis and each country reserved the
sovereign right to determine its tax rules, with no coordination with other countries whatsoever.
With the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957,492 and the efforts to draw
Europe closer primarily for the sake of promoting economic progress and avoiding wars, issues
of taxation remain deeply territorial and country specific. Europe continued to grow closer and
continued to coordinate its economic, social and political policies in order to form a more perfect
union and draw countries closer in their economic, social and political ties. Still, taxation
remained out of the debate and tax policies remained largely uncoordinated and country specific.
In the last few decades however, Europe grew from the era of unilateralism to a belief in
bilateralism in tax policy. Many European countries negotiated and signed various bilateral tax
treaties with other European countries and non-European countries. Europe has the most
expansive bilateral tax treaty network as many European countries have concluded bilateral tax
treaties with other countries in Europe and globally.493 Nevertheless, and thus far, the unilateral
approach and the bilateral approach have been ineffective in preventing tax abuse and illicit tax
competition in Europe.494 To mitigate the tax abuses and respond to general outcry, Europe
endeavored to coordinate its tax laws and policy and provide for a common definition of tax base
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and coordinated tax enforcement through exchange of information. The Common Consolidated
Tax Base (“CCTB”) is currently the manifestation of the commitment for a multilateral
approach, at least across the European Union (“EU”), to tax policy and tax administration. The
CCTB amounts to a proposal to develop a tax code for the EU, while leaving to the discretion of
the individual member States, the ability to set tax rates. The goal of the CCTB project is to
replace the separate accounting and ALS by consolidation and formulary apportionment. Under
the CCCTB, a European company would only have to deal with one set of rules in order to
calculate its profit for tax purposes – instead of having to comply with up to 27 different sets of
rules as at current.495
The long-awaited proposal for a CCCTB was published by the European Commission in 2011.496
The proposal is presented as ‘a complete set of rules for company taxation. It details who can opt
[in], how to calculate the taxable base and what is the perimeter and functioning of the
consolidation. It also provides for anti-abuse rules, defines how the consolidated base is shared
and how the CCCTB should be administered by member States under a 'one-stop shop'
approach.’497 The discussion below only focuses on that part of the report that is relevant to the
proposed formula and how it advances UT at a regional level.
The CCTB requires a great degree of consolidation in determining the tax base. European
companies would be provided with an instrument for the cross-border consolidation of profits
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and losses. All intra-group transactions would be neutralized.498 A wide array of companies and
legal entities are eligible for consolidation. Permanent Establishments are ipso facto included in
the CCTB consolidation. Lower tiers subsidiaries; however, are included in the consolidation
only if and to the extent that a two prong test is satisfied. The conditions relate to control and
ownership. The parent company must hold more than 50% of the voting rights and must own
more than 75% of the subsidiary’s capital or – alternatively – must be entitled to more than 75%
of its profits.499 With regard to lower-tier subsidiaries, a holding of more than 50% of the voting
rights is deemed to be a holding of 100%.500 By attributing a 100% for all lower tiers subsidiaries
owned more than 50%, the calculation reflects the fact that a majority of the voting rights at each
tier confers to the parent company control over all subsidiaries in the chain of participation. With
regard to the ownership threshold, the interests held at each tier have to be multiplied.501
The CCTB also provides for a territorial scope of consolidation. Consolidation under the CCTB
is limited to companies operating in the EU. Only EU companies and Permanent Establishments
may be part of a CCCTB group. However, companies which are tax resident in third countries
may form a CCCTB group with regard to their qualifying subsidiaries and Permanent
Establishments located in the EU.502 The right to opt for the CCCTB lies with the ultimate parent
company of the group if it is tax resident in the EU, otherwise with one of its EU resident
subsidiaries or Permanent Establishments.503 If the group opts for the CCCTB, all qualifying
subsidiaries and Permanent Establishments are automatically included in the group;504 and the
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consolidation extends to the entire tax base of all group members irrespective of minority
shareholdings.505
Formulary apportionment is at the heart of the EU CCTB proposal. The CCCTB proposal adopts
a three-factor equally weighted formula comprising assets, payroll, and sales.506 The CCTB has
the specificity of providing guidance on the payroll factor. In fact, under the CCTB, the payroll
factor comprises both salaries and the number of employees, considered equally.507 The CCCTB
proposal also includes special apportionment rules for four industries: financial institutions;
insurance; oil and gas and shipping; inland waterway transport and air transport. The asset factor
is defined to consist of all fixed tangible assets.508 Intangibles and financial assets are excluded
from the formula due to their mobile nature and the risks of circumventing the system. However,
where the entity is a financial institution this is varied to include 10% of the value of financial
assets, except for participating interests and own shares. Financial assets are included in the asset
factor of the group member in the books of which they were recorded when it became a member
of the group.509 Such a modification is arguable seen as necessary because of the significance of
these assets to MNEs in the financial industry. The sales factor, normally defined to mean the
proceeds of all sales of goods and supplies of services after discounts and returns, excluding
value added tax, other taxes and duties and excluding exempt revenues, interest, dividends,
royalties and proceeds from the disposal of fixed assets is also varied for financial institutions.510
The sales factor is varied from the general definition to include 10% of its revenues in the form
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of interest, fees, commissions and revenues from securities. Financial services are deemed to be
carried out, in the case of a secured loan, in the member State in which the security is situated or,
if this member State cannot be identified, the member State in which the security is registered.
Other financial services are deemed to be carried out in the member State of the borrower or of
the person who pays fees, commissions or other revenue. If the borrower or the person who pays
fees, commissions or other revenue cannot be identified or if the member State in which the
security is situated or registered cannot be identified, the sales shall be attributed to all group
members in proportion to their labour and asset factors.511
In the Commissioner speech presenting the CCTB in 2011, the European commission
endeavoured to present the CCTB and a coordinated approach as a panacea to Europe’s tax
problems and obstacles. The Commissioner indicated in his speech that a common approach and
a uniform policy to taxation was necessary to strengthen the single market and was necessary for
Europe’s prosperity as a whole.512 Adoption of common and uniform principles for determining
the corporate tax base across the EU is seen as a beneficial policy for both the companies in the
EU, and the EU member States tax administrations. The European Commission has repeatedly
affirmed its conviction that the only way to address tax obstacles that currently exist for
companies in the EU operating in more than on EU member States is to provide for a
consolidated tax base for EU-wide activities. It is in fact of great value for a company to apply
the same set of rules across the EU instead of contending with 27 sets of differing and sometimes
antagonistic tax rules. The CCTB proposal does not negate each Member-State’s sovereignty. As

511

Id.
See Speech by Algirdas Semeta, Commissioner responsible for taxation, European Corporate Tax Base: making
Easier and Cheaper to do Business in the EU, March 16, 2011, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_SPEECH-11-185_en.htm?locale=en (last retrieved 4/13/2015).
512

256

proof that a UT is not necessarily an impediment to countries’ sovereignty, the CCTB stands on
the principle that there is a need to provide for a uniform way to determine the tax base, as well
as a consistent formula to apportion taxable profits amongst intervening jurisdictions. At the
same time, the CCTB leaves to the member States, the sovereign right in the way, the degree if at
all, to which it taxes the then apportioned income.513 Sovereignty is exercised, deservedly so,
through the setting and determination of the countries’ tax rates, if at all, that it ought to apply to
the income that is earned within its borders.514 The application of an equally weighted three
factors test for apportionment under the CCTB is an important factor that reiterates the
usefulness of UT principles in eliminating or at least mitigating illicit tax schemes. As seen
above and through the experience of US States, each of the three factors plays an important role
in establishing to true economic reality of business operations and income earnings aspects of
corporate organizations. Nevertheless, the EU’s preference for an equally weighted three factor
test comes as a surprise in the face of established empirical evidence of the shortcomings of such
formula. 515 The three factors equally weighted test affords an ease of application and
straightforwardness to each component of the apportionment formula. The question is whether
the EU decided that the advantages of the three factors equally weighted test outweighs the more
complicated and arguably more effective formulas that have been developed in the US since the
Massachusetts framework. The EU seems to have adopted a preference for rules that are
relatively subject to manipulation but easily applicable from a taxpayer and tax authorities’
perspective. Further, most US States started their formulary apportionment regimes with a three
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factor equally weighted test.516 It was only in light of reported abuses, or for the sake of
encouraging certain business policies that States started, in an isolated manner, to move beyond
the equally weighted three factors, and to implement formulas that were more adapted and
arguably were more aligned with the State’s policy it aims to advance.517 States started giving
more importance to the sales factor as to encourage assets investments as well as payroll and jobs
within their borders. The literature and empirical research on the matter is inconclusive as to the
effects of the importance of the sales factor in the States assets and payroll growth and
performance.518 As a regional conglomerate, the EU seems to start with the equally weighted
well understood and relatively easy to apply apportionment formula. Europe would undoubtedly
learn from the application of the equally weighted three factor test, and make changes if any, as
the experience with the system would require.
Still, application of the CCTB across Europe would offer a credible and fortunate departure from
the ALS, a net advantage to international taxation, and a model that can inspire global
international tax reform. An analysis of the benefits of such reform and departure from ALS to
the UT, from the perspective of all stakeholders, is necessary to provide more perspective in the
urgency and necessity of the reform.
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Chapter VII
The Case for Unitary Taxation as the Answer
to the Current International Tax Shortcomings
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The UT is a system based on the idea that any MNE is a global unique entity and all its
subsidiaries, wherever located, constitute mere parts of the same unitary and unique body,
provided that the conditions of the Unitary Business explored above are met.519 The current
system, as seen above, relies on a fiction that suggests that the different subsidiaries of a
common parent are in fact separate and independent entities and shall be seen and taxed as such.
The resulting separate accounting and ALS has led to various abuses for countries globally and a
largely unwelcomed level of complexity for MNEs operating globally. The needs of countries
around the world and of tax authorities specifically are not being met and governments in the
south or the west continue to denounce the fail system. Governments in the developed world are
dissatisfied with the current system of international taxation; governments in the developing
world are outraged by the current system of taxation of MNEs; and the private sector continues
to voice its call for a simpler system and adoption of more easily understandable and comply
with rules for the taxation of international income. 520 On the one hand, one can argue that the
time is ripe for reform due to the global dissatisfaction with the current system and a realization
that the status quo is not sustainable. As indicated by Professor James Hathaway in a different
context, there is no better moment for reform than when all parties involved are dissatisfied and
happy to express their dissatisfaction and understanding that the status quo is not sustainable.521
The dissatisfaction with the current international tax system is widely shared and for that reason,
reform is warranted. Further, reform is even more appropriate as there is a viable solution to
replace the current and failed system, a solution that would prove advantageous to developed
countries (A), MNEs (B), and developing countries (C) alike. This chapter demonstrates that
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reform is not only of the essence because of a global dissatisfaction, but reform is further
warranted because there is a viable, more credible and more advantageous alternative, able to
leave all the parties involved in a better position than they currently are.
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A. Unitary Taxation: The Better Alternative for Developed Countries
The current system of international taxation has failed developed countries in many ways already
and continues to pose a threat to the very continued existence and ability of the governments to
tax its people as the public perceptions of the fairness and effectiveness of taxation continues to
dwindle. The UT presents a viable alternative chiefly because it provides a greater access to
information thereby signing the death certificate of the tax heavens phenomenon, but also
because it contributes to restoring integrity into the tax system through its at least appearance of
fairness.
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1. Information Access
Once a determination is made that an entity, along with its sub entities constitutes a unitary
business as seen above, it become necessary that the taxation of such unitary business relies on
the performance of the unit as a whole. The implementation of the UT requires that information
be shared as to the performance of the unit as a whole. By providing the information on the
global operations, UT allows for developed countries to access information they need to
adequately apply their tax rules. Lack information and the non-sharing of information regarding
multinational global performance by tax authorities has let to inadequate taxation. In recent
years, many developed countries have made the sharing of information, the cornerstone of their
international tax policy and the condition at times for their collaboration with other countries.
The US, for example, has required a revision of most its outstanding tax treaties, and now
incorporate in all new tax treaties, mandatory sharing of information between the government
specifically as it relates to corporate performance of multinational companies within their
border.522
We have seen many experiences where lack of information, specifically in the developed world
can lead to inadequate taxation, and to a feeling of tax unfairness. The debate regarding the so
called ‘Panama Papers’ provided a case study of lack of information decimating tax policy and
providing an appearance of tax unfairness not only amongst big companies, but also for
individuals. The Panama Papers are a leaked of over 11 million documents that reveal how key
financial information is kept private thereby restricting taxation. Though the Panama Papers do
not necessary outline any illegality, they do reveal the art of hiding information for the purposes
of diminishing potential taxation. A tax authority may only tax the income it is aware of, income
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that is hidden duly escapes taxation and the revelation to the general public of such hidden
income, whether legally or not, highlights the distrust in the expected fairness of any tax system
and undermines the trust of the many in the system thereby reducing voluntary compliance on
which many western tax authorities rely upon to raise revenues. According to the EU estimates,
the revenue lost from Panama Papers exceeded a trillion Euros; and the EU vowed to end such
mechanisms of hiding financial assets and financial information.523
The UT presents a viable alternative and a beneficial solution for developed countries. Combined
reporting would prove to be very effective in developed countries being able to adequately apply
their arguably well intended tax provisions to all income. As seen above, combined reporting
would require for the multinational company to provide information as to its whole operations
and performance globally. The developed countries would have the information handy and
would more adequately apply their tax rules. UT prevents any possible Panama papers
phenomenon. An obligation to entities to report their global financial data would leave no place
to hide as the tax policy would follow economic activities and a unitary business would reveal its
financial data globally, from a unitary perspective, for all to see, specifically tax administrations,
in order to adequately tax all incomes, and eventually restore the credibility of the system as a
whole.
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2. Restoring Credibility on the Tax System: Disclosure and Fairness
One of the main existential threats to the survival of the taxation as we know it is the appearance
of unfairness that has the ability to diminish people’s trust into the system and may lead to a
general revolt and refusal to comply with tax law. If most people feel that the system is unfair,
that no one pays their fair share of taxes, that in fact taxes are only paid by the naïve and
uninitiated, all might recourse to ultimate goal of not paying taxes and as such governments
would lose tremendous revenues. In the developed world, the outrage as to the current
international tax system has been one of the major social and popular debates. The press, civil
society and politicians aspiring to power have well documented the failures of the system.
However, nothing is close to an agreement as to how to move forward, and as a consequence, the
broken status quo remains in place and many feel the unfairness is at its highest and the system is
designed to benefits some and not all. By not implementing a system that promotes disclosure,
that at least appears to put all in the same footing, policy makers continue to fail the basic test of
tax fairness and the people continue to express their anger and a prediction of major revolt
potentially leading to the end of the tax system as we know are not totally out of the realms of
possibilities.
Many feel the current system has developed losers and harbored winners. Most income that
multinational companies earn end up in places of their choice having a common characteristic of
low to no taxation. In 2012 alone, for example, multinational companies reported more than $80
billion of profits in Bermuda, a country with no corporate income tax, and an amount that
exceeded the combined benefits reported in Japan, France, and China. Similarly, the gross profits
reported in Bermuda was about 4% of the other profits around the world though sales in
Bermuda accounted for less than 0.3% of the overall sales, and share of employees was less than
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0.2% of the overall employees.524 The losers in this system seem to be the places where
economic activities really happen and the taxpayer not sophisticated enough as to manipulate the
system.
There is therefore a tension between the winners and losers in fact of the current failed system.
Unable to position themselves on the winners’ side, many taxpayers are arguing for a revolt and
disobedience in paying taxes. For developed countries, this can be a major issue because
developed tax systems are heavily reliant on voluntary compliance and self-declaration. The
burden to enforce tax rules outside of the self-compliance system could be overly burdensome
for developed countries tax authorities and the lost revenues would be colossal. For example, in a
country like the US with more than 300 million individual inhabitants and many ore corporate
entities, the IRS is not able to get the man power to enforce tax rules at the level of every
individual taxpayer. Voluntary compliance has been the bedrock of developed countries tax
systems and any departure from that would lead to major catastrophes. However, many taxpayers
continue to wonder, in the face of current failures of the tax systems, why they should continue
to comply, let alone voluntarily comply with a tax system that fails them over and over again,
and that allows other to not pay taxes. The thread of public disobedience is real and developed
countries face an urgent challenge to make their systems fairer.
The UT presents a way forward. Under the UT, all actors in the tax arena would have the
information they need and would appreciate the government efforts to apply fair rules to all.
Under the UT little to no income would avoid taxation and the application of the tax rules to real
economic realities and real incomes would reinstitute the integrity and fairness of the system and
would boost the belief in the system and solidify the tenets of voluntary compliance.
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B. Unitary Taxation: The Better Alternative for MNEs
It has become somewhat of a generally shared and agreed upon statement that MNEs do not like
to pay taxes. Most commentators seem to agree that MNEs manage to stay away from zones with
high taxation and are more lured into jurisdictions with low or no taxation.525 The current
experience with this empirical fact is that the congregation of MNEs in low to no tax
jurisdictions come with a reputational cost. Most MNEs who incorporate or locate their revenues
in low to no tax jurisdiction have to deal with the public perception and the reputational
inconvenient of existing and being motivated solely by the need to avoid taxes. Needless to say,
most MNEs would prefer to avoid such reputational repercussions, even if that meant paying a
little bit more in taxes if other advantages were provided.
Further, with the current debate around dealing with low to no tax jurisdictions and aiming to
combat what is now known as the ‘race to the bottom’526 phenomenon, the international tax
arena has created extremely complex rules that do not afford predictability to MNEs. The rules
are often so different in various jurisdictions and so complex that the costs for complying to said
rules are forever increasing.
This research believes therefore that the UT would be a better system and would prove more
beneficial to MNEs because it would afford them simplicity and predictability as well as reduce
the amount of compliance costs inherent to the current system.
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1. Predictability and Simplicity
As much as MNEs would prefer to pay as little a tax as possible, MNEs are even more resentful
of fiscal unpredictability and their inability to understand the tax environment in which they
operate. When a tax environment is unpredictable and cannot be read, and planned around in the
design of a business plan, many business enterprises are discouraged from engaging in business
in those areas. Tax uncertainty, and tax unpredictability are aspects that weight heavy on the
private sector and MNEs.
Current international tax systems are characterized with their uncertainty and unpredictability.
Tax systems in general and international tax systems for each country particularly are currently
so dissimilar that an understanding of one, does not necessarily show helpful to the
understanding of the other. Countries seem to have different interests and aim and promoting
different sectors whether in society or in the economy. As a consequence, tax law and tax policy
has been the tool readily available to incentivize those social, cultural, or economic priorities.
The result has been the creation, in each tax jurisdiction, of a conglomerate of tax rules, quasi
impossible to understand and generally unique to the specific jurisdiction. Tax law and tax policy
is local, aim at solving jurisdictional specific issues, and continues to grow in complexity. For
MNEs, the situation is difficult to understand and comply with. MNEs continue to plead for a
simple tax system, which would allow them to predict they fiscal environment and the fiscal
component in the planning of their business endeavors.
The institution of transfer pricing in almost all tax systems and the reliance on ALS have
introduced a new level of complexity in taxation. The conception and application of transfer
pricing principles has ushered an unprecedented level of unpredictability in the tax arena.527
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Several methods initially proposed to apply transfer pricing quickly showed lacking policy
makers around the globe have continued to designed new transfer pricing methods without ever
eliminating the previous ones, thereby consecrating a convoluted system, extremely complex and
at times internally contradictory. Time after time and survey after survey, investors and business
managers have pointed to transfer pricing as their main tax worry.528 The area has become so
complex that only a select few law firms and generally ‘big four’ accounting firms are able o
assist on transfer pricing matters. However, transfer pricing is just an example of an international
tax system that has grown unfit, and un-adapted to the new economies and the new needs of tax
policy.
UT, as seen above, provides a set of rules that include coherent definition of Unitary Business,
universal requirement of a global reporting, and an agreed upon formula on which to apply the
financial data in order to determine the tax liability. The UT therefore outlines a set of rules, and
its global adoption would allow for a predictable fiscal environment in each and every one of the
jurisdictions MNEs may operate in. If a country adopts the UT, any MNE venturing in business
in that country would know, in advance, that the basic tenets of UT would apply in the
determination of the tax liability and as such could adequately include the fiscal considerations in
the planning of its business venture. For example, if country X adopts a UT system outlining a
clear definition of a Unitary Business, a requirement of combined reporting, and a formula based
on equally weighted three factor average test, any MNE or any investor planning to engage into
business in country X would know how such country would determine tax liability from the
operations of the business and the company could plan accordingly. The MNE or investor would
not be left to guessing how the investment in the assets would impact its fiscal posture, or how
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much the workforce to carry its mission would help or hurt its fiscal outlook, or the occurrence
of the sales and their geographical location would impact the investment.
UT aligns fiscal policy with economic reality. If an investor is satisfied with the outlook of its
potential investment, taxation should not constitute a drawback to an otherwise promising
business endeavor.529 Taxation and the fiscal environment should be predictable, and tax policy
should align itself with economic reality so that each business actor understands that there would
be no unknown factors affecting the life, return, or sustainability of their business. Any factors
that would not be linked to their business reality and the economics of their operations.
UT offers fiscal simplicity and tax predictability to business investors and presents a better
alternative compared to the current system of taxing multinational where most business operators
barely understand if they will be tax, on what items, let alone how they would be taxed in each
and every single jurisdiction they intend to operate in. By providing simplicity, the UT will also
help MNEs cut down compliance cost that are related to navigating the current complex and very
unpredictable set of tax rules across various jurisdictions.
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2. Reducing the Cost for Tax Planning and Tax Compliance
MNEs would be the first ones to point to how much they spend, year after year, to make sure
they understand the various tax systems in the jurisdictions they operate in and to comply the
countless reporting and other requirement of the ever-growing complex tax systems. MNEs
nowadays can’t seem to exist without an army of lawyers and accountant just to help them
understand the tax systems, and later to help them comply with such systems.530 Yet, the high
cost does not come with a guarantee of accurateness and ease of a step taken care of. More often
than not, tax authorities come back to question the understanding of the laws that the experts
have provided to MNEs and what they had deemed proper compliance with the law.531 Tax
audits and tax controversy continue to expand the spectrum of ever growing costs MNEs have to
incur related to taxation.
The example of the transfer pricing area mentioned above shows how costly the process of
paying tax, not just the actual taxes paid, has become for MNEs. As mentioned above, transfer
pricing has become very complex and transfer pricing engagements require application of very
especially complex rules. The domain is now reserved to a select few lawyers and the ‘big four’
accounting firms mainly because of the man power necessary to conduct a transfer pricing
engagement but also because of the technical resources needed, resources that are generally not
accessible for ordinary tax compliance.
Ordinary investors, without the capacity to retain a select few number of law firms of the ‘big
four’ accounting firms to accompany them and guide them in the process of understanding,
planning and complying with international tax, are discourage from engaging in international
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business activities. Because of taxation today, many investors are priced out of international
markets and are obligated to conduct business locally where taxation may not pause a major
influence.532
UT reduces the planning and compliance costs and alleviates the process of paying one’s taxes.
By providing for clear rules of transnational application, the UT cuts through complexity and
provides business investors with easier ways to determine their tax liability without necessarily
using an overly burdensome army of human and technical resources. The UT proposed in this
research is marked by simplicity based on agreed upon tenets of taxation regardless of fiscal
jurisdictions.
The argument for simplicity of UT would be even stronger if all countries adopt the same or a
quasi-identical formula for apportionment of income for purposes of assessing taxing rights. For
example, if all taxing jurisdiction could adopt an equally weighted three factors test as their
apportionment formula, UT would provide total simplicity as the same formula would be known
as adopted in each jurisdiction, and its application would be predictable. Under such
circumstances, a change from one jurisdiction to another would not compel a study of a new
formula for assessing tax liability and investors would easily factor in the tax implication of their
investment before they carry the same. The presence of uniformity would significantly reduce
the cost of complying with tax law.
Nevertheless, and even in the event the same formula is not adopted globally, UT still presents a
simpler tax system and less costly to comply with for MNEs than the current international tax
system. By adopting UT, even under differing formulas, tax jurisdictions agree on a baseline for
approaching tax policy and designing tax rules, tax authorities agree on a number of common
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tenets in the conception and application of their tax rules. As a consequence, the planning and
compliance cost otherwise related to understanding the fiscal tenets for each taxing jurisdiction
and interpretation of their way of assessing tax liability and levying taxes, those costs are
immediately inexistent.
The argument generally leveled against UT to the effect that UT would lead to increased tax
liability for MNEs falls apart, we believe, when factored in, the amounts of saving MNEs would
realize in reducing the costs associated with their fiscal planning and compliance. One of the
major expenses for MNEs today is the cost of experts to help them navigate the various fiscal
environments where they operate.533 The various separate efforts in different jurisdictions to tax
as much of the income within their borders as possible within the realms of ALS of transfer
pricing has led to an increase of tax laws. Due to the growing divergence and the ever increasing
complexity, many large law firms and accounting firms are projecting an exponential growth in
their tax revenues in the near future. The argument is that whatever MNEs may save by
employing an army of experts to help them manage their tax exposure, is far more than whatever
that is MNEs may end up paying as additional taxes under the UT. When the dust settles then,
MNEs would find the UT more beneficial to them with regards to costs than the current system
of needlessly complex tax provisions.
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C. Unitary Tax is Best for Developing Countries
Developing countries may stand to benefit the most under a UT system. As analyzed above, no
one else seems to have been more harmed and stands to lose the most in the future if the current
international tax system stays in place. The current system is based on complex tax rules,
incoherent in their nature, and majoritarily designed by developed countries.534 The current rules
of international taxation require massive human resources and acute expertise for their
application and enforcement. In an effort to set broad policies, developed countries have acted
through the OECD to establish major guidelines for international tax rule making.535 The various
rules and general guidelines are designed with developed countries capacities and capabilities in
mind. Transfer pricing rules for example, with its OECD authorized methods require acute
expertise and ability to access a wide array of information that generally seem out of reach for
developing countries. Needless to say, therefore, the current international tax system and its
encouragement for a tax treaty network has mostly left the developing world in a bad situation.
Because developing countries endeavor to adopt tax system that align to some extent with the
fiscal environment in the developed world, developing countries tax system are widely not
understood by the tax professionals who are supposed to enforce them, and international taxation
in the developing world continues to be a disastrous scene.
UT, however, by aligning fiscal policy with economic reality, by aiming at convergence of tax
system by and for both the developed and the developing world, is a better system specifically
for developing countries because it would provide them the information they desperately need on
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the MNEs economic operations globally, and the administration of the UT would show more
feasible for developing countries as compares to the current system.

1. Availability of Information
Any adequate taxation of MNEs requires, as a pre-condition, a proper location of the income to
be taxed. In order to properly locate the income to be taxed, each tax authority should understand
how the income is made, the processes within each industry and the relationship of the income
with the assets of the business as necessary. Under the current system, MNEs possess the
information regarding their global operations and the revenues location within their network in
accordance with their economic realities. However, MNEs are not required, generally, to provide
that data to taxing authorities and many developing countries continue to struggle to figure out
that information.
Many developing countries’ tax authorities claim that access to information regarding their
transnational taxpayer is the number one impediment for the adequate taxation of those
taxpayers.536 MNEs sophisticated transactions planning have made it quasi- impossible for tax
authorities, specifically tax authorities of the developing world, to understand the scope of the
income earned within their borders and therefore adequately tax the same. For example, many
MNEs chose to operate in the developing world through traditional subsidiaries, while others,
use the legal construct of a PE to operate in the same jurisdictions. For a developing country’s
tax authority looking into taxing the presence of the MNEs within its borders, it quite difficult to
determine the income earned by the branch present in the country without an understanding,
however basic, of the operations of the MNE out of the country. The traditional setting of a
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subsidiary as well as the more fiscally innovative set of a PE cause concerns to a developing
country’s tax administration when trying to determine the income adequately earned within its
borders for taxation purposes.
Generally, local tax authorities do not have the information regarding the structure and
functioning of the MNEs outside of the country. Even, the taxation authorities in the developing
world seldom fully understand the operations of MNEs within the country. Tax authorities in the
developed world have designed ways to access the information or manners to compel MNEs to
provide them with such information. However, developing countries do not have what is
necessary to access the information and in any event, do not have the powers to compel MNEs to
provide to information to them. For example, the US realized an immense tax leakage from the
US tax net based on transactions being carried abroad. In order to solve the problem, the US
implemented the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”).537 FATCA is a way for the
US taxing authorities to obtain information they need to assure adequate taxation in this area. 538
This was a way the US designed in order to access the information it needed from taxpayers.
However, and upon adoption of FATCA, many MNEs claimed the US government’s overreach
and planned to not comply.539 The US therefore had to design a way to compel compliance with
the Act. The US adopted sanctions especially applicable to taxpayers with a presence in the
US.540 The US in this instance, because of its power and level of development, found a way to
access the information and otherwise find a way to compel MNEs to comply with its provisions.
This situation squarely contrasts with a developing country’s circumstances. On the one hand, a
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developing country’s tax administration does not have the reach the US government may have
and on the other hand, a developing country’s tax authority would not be able to design an
enforcement method similar to the US because the presence of MNEs in the development is not
consequential.
The UT solves most the developing countries tax authorities access to information problems.
Under the UT, MNEs are required to report, in all jurisdictions where the operate, information
regarding their global operations. The combined reporting is done at the level of both developed
and developing countries alike. The information the MNEs will possess internally regarding their
global operations and economic results will be the same information used by taxing authorities in
the developed world as well as, most importantly, the developing world, to assess taxation. The
MNEs information needed for adequate taxation in all localities they operate in will be available
to all taxing authorities and would be accessible especially to the taxing authorities in the
developing world. As a consequence, the UT is a better system for developing countries, as
compared to the current system.
With accessible and readily available information, developing countries’ tax authorities as well
as any other tax authorities would be able to design a tax system that is easier to administer and
comply with.
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2. Easier to Administer
The ease of administration of a tax system is arguably the utmost priority of any developing
country tax administration contemplating changes to its tax system. Improving tax administration
in the developing world has been and continues to be a high priority.541 Many commentators and
experts endeavoring to offer a better tax system to developing countries have sometimes
understated the importance of tax administration in the design of any tax policy by or for
developing countries.542 Good tax administration distinguishes successful tax authorities from
unsuccessful ones in terms of the amount of revenues they are able to raise for the wellfunctioning of their governments.543 Whatever the policy or tax system adopted, the results in the
developing world are usually summarized in terms of how effective the tax authorities are at
administering such tax policy or tax system.
An effective tax administration is generally evaluated by looking at the ease with which the
taxing authorities are able to access the information they need; the ease with which taxpayers are
able to apply the rules in complying with the tax system, and tax administrations are able to
apply the rules adopted to collect the revenues; and the volume of revenues collected as a result
of adequate taxation of all economic activity within the taxing authority’s fiscal borders. By all
these measures, developing countries continue to struggle and their tax administration, to say the
least, are not optimum.544 The current system of international taxation has let to difficult to
administer systems in the developing world and various attempts to adapt have not received
major political will. Any changes to a tax system, even a change to tax administration in order to
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optimize the revenues must be driven first and foremost by political will.545 However, the foreign
systems empirically ask too much of developing countries governments. Basically, developing
countries are asked to, as indicated earlier, deploy the resources they do not have to apply the
rules they seldom understand and the outcome of which is at the very least, very uncertain.
Complicated tax rules on transfer pricing, analyzed above, are a very current and telling example
of what developing countries tax administration deal with.
Adoption of a UT system would usher in an era of more easily administrable tax rules and tax
systems for the benefit of developing countries. Basically, a UT systems allows for a more
effective tax administration on each of the three measuring factors.
First, the UT would allow for an easy access to information. As indicated above, MNEs, under
the UT, are required to make available to all governments tax authorities, including developing
countries tax authorities, the information on their global operations and global economic
performance. Under the UT reporting obligation therefore, it is no longer the task of a taxing
authority, let alone a task of a developing country’s tax authority to look for and find the
information it needs to apply its tax rules. In fact, the burden is on the taxpayer to provide such
information and for the tax authorities, specifically the developing country’s tax authority, the
information is available and easily accessible under the UT. Therefore, based on the first prong
regarding the ease with which the tax authorities are able to access the information, the UT
establishes a more efficient tax administration system.
Second, the UT allows for clear rules of easier application. Under an ideal UT adopted globally,
as we will endeavor to design and propose below, all three tenets would be globally agreed upon.
There would be a common understanding of a Unitary Business, an agreement on a combined
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reporting of net income, and a single agreed upon formula. It such UT is adopted; it would lead
to easy tax administration based on the second prong in the measurement related to the ease with
which rules are compliable by both the tax payers and tax administrations. Under the UT, both
the taxpayers, including MNEs and the tax authorities would have a set of rules, agreed upon and
ready to be applied uniformly. For the taxpayer, there would be total predictability of what
would constitute a Unitary Business, how they would combine report globally, and what formula
would be applicable to them. Therefore, taxpayers would have rules they understand making it
easy for them to comply with the rules. For tax administrations, they would similarly know what
constitute a Unitary Business, would expect taxpayer to combine report globally, and would
know what formula to apply. Therefore, tax administrations, including developing countries tax
administrations, would have clear rules to they understand and can easily apply in their
collection of revenues mission. As a consequence, the UT would lead to more effective and
easier tax administration because it would provide easy to understand and apply rules for both
taxpayers and tax authorities.
Finally, the UT would lead to increased tax revenues and in any event, adequate taxation of all
economic activities in each taxing jurisdictions’ fiscal borders. The UT relies on actual economic
activity and taxation follows economic performance globally. Under the UT, gamesmanships of
relocating profits or choosing jurisdictions within which to be taxed would be reduced if not
eliminated. MNEs would not, with the relation to their actual economic mode of operation and
reality, book profits in a jurisdiction of their choosing while booking losses where they believe
would make the most tax sense. By requiring a global reporting, a disclosure of global economic
performance as well as of global economic footprint, and by requiring the application of an
apportionment formula, the UT endeavors to give tax power where taxing power is economically
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due. In practice, developing countries may end up with an increase in tax revenues, and most
likely, the countries currently known as tax heavens may see a sharp decrease to however much
income they currently are entitled to exercise taxing power over.546 If the UT is implemented, the
result would be a more equitable application of various countries taxing sovereignty and a better
empowerment of developing countries in their ability to raise revenues. As a consequence,
therefore, the UT would allow for an easier administrable tax system based on the prong of
overall revenues raised and equitable global distribution of revenues raising as relates to
economic activity and performance from taxpayers.
Notwithstanding the various advantages outlined above, notwithstanding the fact that a UT
would be beneficial for developed countries, MNEs, as well as developing countries, none of the
advantages could take place unless and until an actual UT is adopted. We offer a proposal below
to replace the current system of taxation of MNEs and to take put into practice, the many positive
provisions of the UT. The below proposal may not immediately receive unanimous approval
from the various stakeholders, but at least it can provide a creditable starting point where
fundamentals are agreed upon, a result that has been the objective of this entire dissertation:
creating a new baseline for the taxation of MNEs.
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Chapter VIII
The Design of an International Tax Reform Based on
Unitary Taxation, and the Case for Its Compatibility with
the Current International Tax Treaty Network
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The design of a tax system and the proposal of a UT alterative requires an adoption of the basic
tenets with overall explanation of their meanings. The hope is to assure that the fundamentals of
the UT system are outlined in a manner that is agreeable to most, even though the edges and
many details may still require some fine tuning in order for the system to be readily
implementable. This chapter will therefore outline the tenets of UT seen above, proposing a
definition to be adopted with regards to each key term, explore a proposed formula to be adopted
for purposes of apportionment of the MNE’s global income.
After proposing a system, we would analyze why we believe it is not incompatible with the
current tax treaty network. In fact, we will argue, the current tax treaty network could facilitate
the transition from the current system of taxing MNEs incomes internationally, to the UT system
proposed in this research. Unlike many concerns that the tax treaty network is so engrained in the
international tax system that UT would be contrary, we will argue that the tax treaty network
would in fact serve as a springboard in the transition and for the implementation of the UT
proposed in this research.
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A. A UT Proposal
This UT is based on and applicable to a common business, required to file combine reporting of
net income from all its activities globally, and be applied a formula for the apportionment of
such global income to all connected territories for purposes of determining taxing rights.

1. Unitary Business
A MNE would qualify as a Unitary Business if any one of the conditions below are satisfied.
However, for any of the conditions to be tested and applied, there must be a shares or interest
ownership relationship between the tested entities. The percentage of ownership, unless
otherwise indicated below, is irrelevant. Further, the character of such ownership, whether direct,
indirect, or constructive is also irrelevant. Nevertheless, such ownership relationship, however
insignificant, must always exist before any of the below tests may apply.

a. Common Ownership
A MNE chain will be considered a Unitary Business based on common ownership if either:



The entity is legally owned, directly or indirectly, by another entity at a percentage of
more than 50%. Under this condition, an entity will constitute a unitary business if one
entity owns more than 50% of the stock of the other entity. This condition strictly looks
at legal ownership of the stock, and if the entity is not incorporated, this condition looks
at the interests (whatever its form) being held. Or,
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The entity is economically controlled by another entity which does not meet the required
legal ownership threshold. This condition strictly looks at the economic relationship
between the two entities. One entity may not hold the legal threshold required but it could
entirely control another entity so that that other entity would not be able to exist but for
the economic relationship with the first entity, under these circumstances, both entities
should be considered as forming a unitary business.

Common ownership is therefore established with legal ownership or with economic control. The
legal ownership remains the principle and the economic control may intervene under exceptional
circumstances.

b. Unity of Operations and Centralized Functions

A MNE chain will be considered a unitary business based on unity of operations or centralized
functions in the below described circumstances:



Two or more entities constitute a unitary business if their operations are united. The
concept if unity of operation requires that the operations of one of the entities are
inseparable from those of the other company. As a factual matter, the entities are
inherently tied to one another in their operation and as such are eligible for a unitary
business treatment. Generally, the frequency of interaction between the entities
constitutes a helpful indicator of the community of operations. Further, the unity of
operations implies unity of use. The entities may use identical assets, sometimes
comingle assets in their operations. The results of their operations are intertwined and the
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outcomes are in a continuum of interdependency for their ultimate use or
commercialization. For example, a unity of operation will exist if two entities, related in
ownership, are the only ones that produce: one car tires, and the other the body of the car,
products that would not be useful but for the actions of the other. If, in our example, the
entity that produces the cars operates in a similar fashion as the entity that produces the
tires and in some regards, uses identical machinery indistinctively owned by one or the
other entity, and assuming that these are the only two entities in the business of producing
car tires and body of cars, then those entities would satisfy the unity of operations and
would meet the unitary business definition under that prong. The bottom line is the not
separate, legally or otherwise, two entities that are intricately connected and intertwined
and would not exist by themselves on a standalone basis. And when operations are
united, when the level of interdependency is established, the unitary business is satisfied
and UT should come into play



Two or more entities constitute a unitary business if their functions are centralized. When
there is a stock ownership link and there is coordination of activities generally through
centralization of functions, the entities would constitute a unitary business. Centralization
of functions can be evidenced by, for example, central purchasing, common advertising,
central administrative functions such as accounting or legal, and centralized management
through group management divisions. Many MNEs now adopt a system aimed at
centralizing the most of their common functions within the group. For example, many
global businesses domicile all their accounting functions in one jurisdiction, all their legal
functions in one jurisdiction or all their advertising functions in one jurisdiction. Under
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this system, regardless of where the several entities of the group reside, all their functions
as relate to accounting legal or advertising are centralized in the same jurisdiction. These
business structures, when underlined by a stock ownership, would qualify as a unitary
business subject to UT rules. Again, the aim here to make sure that all that is
economically linked and connected, no legal or fiscal rule or policy should divide.
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2. Combined Reporting
All MNE that qualify as a unitary business will be required report in a combined manner on their
global operations, their net income from all activities and entities around the globe that form part
of the unitary business. The net income to be reported on the combined basis globally should be
computed locally, using of tax base that have been adopted locally. The mechanics of the global
combined reporting of net income are outlined below, followed by a policy justification for the
adoption of the combined reporting of global net income.

a. Computation of all gross income should be done locally
Under a UT system, all gross income is computed locally. Local gross income should mean, for
all jurisdictions, all incomes. The computation of the entity’s income would take into account, all
the incomes the entity receives or otherwise is entitled to as per the rules and tax base definitions
adoption in the jurisdiction in which such entity operates.
As an illustration, for an entity incorporated in country X, gross income for year Y would be the
sum of all incomes received by company X. Such incomes would include for example, all
revenues from sales, all dividends, all interests, all royalties, all gifts, all cancelation of
indebtedness or any other items of income as specifically received by the entity.
This definition of gross income would be closer to the definition that the United States tax laws
give to income. An over encompassing notion that takes into account, all items of income from
whatever source derived. The source or nature of the income would matter less, and items
income of whatever nature and from whatever sources would be included in the local
computation of the entity’s gross income.
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b. Factoring of Local Deductions and Incentives
Under the combined reporting of net income, deductions and incentives would be taken into
account from a local perspective. The UT would encourage and allow for an alignment of
standard business deductions but all deductions would be taken locally within the jurisdiction of
the entity’s incorporation.
Similarly, various incentives adopted by different jurisdictions for different reasons should be
taken into account at the local level. Many government endeavor, in a legitimate and reasonable
manner to provide incentives in order to boost certain sectors of their economies and the UT, by
adopting a system of combined reporting of net income, endorses such practices.
For example, the UT would encourage general adoption of standard deductions related to
interests or other common business expenses, and such deductions would be taken into account
at the local level in arriving at the entity’s net income for that jurisdiction and that specific
segment of activities. Further, should the local jurisdiction adopt incentives that are legitimate
and reasonable and that do not promote tax evasion, such incentives would be taken into account
at the local level in arriving at the entity’s net income for the geographical area and for specific
segment of activity.
As a consequence, therefore, deductions should be taken into account locally and local incentives
should be factored in arriving at the local entity’s net income for that geographical area and for
that activity.
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c. Combined reporting of all local country net incomes at the global level
After all the incomes are taken into account and gross income is determined at the local level for
the local entities, the deductions and incentives should be taken into account in arriving at the
local country and local entities net income.
After the net incomes are computed in local countries and for local entities, the MNE should
centralize all that information for all entities that form a unitary business and at the level of the
global MNE, should report to each taxing authority in each of the countries where any of the
entities that form part of the unitary business conducts activities, the global combined reporting
of the group. Each taxing jurisdiction connected to the operation of the unitary business shall be
entitled to receive a combined reporting of all net income of the group globally.
For example, if company X operates in countries A, B, C, and D, and local computations
established that each of companies A, B, C, and D have $25 of net income for the year, and
company X is a unitary business made of operations in countries A, B, C, and D, then each of
countries A, B, C, and D shall be entitled to and shall receive a combined reporting of net
income totaling $100.
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d. Justification of the Reporting of Net Income
The adoption of the combined reporting of net income is motivated and justified by is many
advantages including the following:
On the one hand, the UT does not intend to impede with local countries plans and willingness to
use their taxing powers to legitimately encourage sectors of activities or boost their economies in
some shapes or form. Under the UT, countries sovereignty in the area of taxation is not
eliminated. Countries remain free to adopt legitimate and reasonable incentives from a fiscal
perspective without running afoul of the UT rules. The adoption of the combined reporting of net
income achieves that goal. Under the UT, MNEs would be required to account for their revenues
at the local level, and take into account all the legitimate incentives provided in that local
jurisdiction in the ultimate computations of the net income for the local jurisdictions. The taxing
power, and the sovereign right to determine a country’s tax policy remain therefore largely at the
local country level and the local country’s area of decision. For example, and as indicated above,
if a country X decides to adopt incentive A and B, subsidiaries or branches of the MNE operating
in country X would be entitled and in fact would be able to benefit from those local incentives
should they qualify, and the UT would not stand in the way of such local entities benefiting from
the local tax incentives. It is worth noting that none of the incentives under the UT would be
purely for purposes of encouraging non-economic based tax advantages. The acknowledgement
of local countries right to determine their specific tax policy and eventual adopt tax incentive
will not constitute a license for the promotion of measure aiming at unfair tax competition or the
so-called race to the bottom. The UT is primarily a response to current abusive tax situation,
current schemes of tax evasion and tax avoidance; therefore, any attempt to use the local power
reserved in forms of incentives to provision tax evasion or undue avoidance would not be
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sanctioned. Incentives deemed illegitimate and unreasonable, and that are not based on economic
reality would not be taken into account in the net income calculations.
On the other hand, one of the main advantages for the UT is its relative simplicity for all the
parties involved. As seen above, UT is a simpler system for tax authorities and a simpler system
for businesses. The adoption of the combined reporting of net income underscore the simplicity
concerns and goals of the UT. By allowing for the net income to be arrived at from a local level
perspective avoids overly complicated and complex computations at the global level for the
MNE. The simplicity results from the fact that deductions, is any, are taken into account at the
local level, making it unnecessary to compile deductions globally and in some instances to
endeavor to understand and reconcile deductions adopted by one jurisdiction to those of another.
Furthermore, many MNEs today already operate this way. It is not unusual for a MNE today to
know and keep record of net income from its operations in each and every jurisdiction. The
simplicity here would come from the fact that MNEs would only use the information that are
already used to compiling, recording and utilizing internally. The net income historically
computed by MNEs would be used, eliminating any unnecessary new step under the UT system.
In addition, adoption of a different approach, specifically the combined reporting of gross
income would engender many complexities and inconsistencies. For example, if the gross
income was reported on a combined basis and globally, all incomes received by each of the local
entity of a unitary business would be reported at the global level, and it would be incumbent on
the global organization to conduct to taxable income and net income computations. Under these
circumstances, one would wonder what definition of tax base would be adopted, what accounting
principles would be applied and what results would be achieved when the net income
computations are done globally and detached from the local provisions and local fiscal systems
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already in place. By avoiding such complexities, the requirement of a combined reporting of net
income consecrates and underscore the simplicity characteristics of the UT.
It is worth noting that one could argue that the requirement of combined reporting of net income,
notwithstanding is merits, would be an invitation to promote tax evasion and tax avoidance. In
fact, one could argue that by giving countries the liberty to adopt their tax incentives for
example, the UT basically endorses the fragmentation of the MNEs to all the jurisdiction it
operates in, one of the cardinal sins of the current international tax system. However, these
arguments would be true but for the requirement of formulary apportionment as discussed below.
In fact, deductions and incentives may lead to lower taxable income, but there are no guarantees
under the UT system that the jurisdiction in which the taxable income may have seemed reduce
would get to tax any of it. Deductions and incentives reduces taxable income, but the countries
would not be inclined to adopt more or less deductions and incentives because the number of
deductions and incentives or lack thereof, does not impact the share, if at all, of their tax
revenues from the MNE operations. The repartition of the tax revenue amongst the jurisdictions
remains dictated solely by formulary apportionment under the UT.
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3. Formulary Apportionment
One of the most debated issues regarding the adoption or not of a UT is the controversy around
formulary apportionment. While some do not seem to agree with idea of a formula at all, other
seem to take issue with a kind of formula that could be considered ideal, or the lack thereof. As
seen above, any idea of adopting a UT would require not only that there be an agreement on a
well-defined and generally agreed upon notion of unitary business, as well as agreement on the
combined reporting of net income, but also, there would need to be agreement on the
apportionment formula to be adopted. Ideally, all countries would agree on an identical
apportionment formula to be applied. Nevertheless, even without an agreement on an identical
formula, there are formulas that can be adopted that would satisfy the goals of UT while not
providing avenues for double taxation.
The risk, if an identical formula is not adopted is that the same income may be subjected to
double taxation of to no taxation at all, coming back to the original problem that the UT aims at
solving. For example, if a MNE operates in jurisdictions A & B, and jurisdictions A & B have
adopted a UT system but with different apportionment formulas, there will be a real risk of the
same income being taxed twice by virtue different apportionment factors being used. Or
similarly, there will be a real risk for some of the income not to be taxed at all because an
apportionment factor may not include them. In order, therefore to avoid falling in the trap of the
current system and avoid encouraging similar techniques of tax avoidance or over taxation, a
formula should be universally adopted or at least be of a kind that can be coordinated with a
different formula so as not to allow risks of double taxation or for that matter, double nontaxation.
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The formula under this research and this model UT tax proposal is the equally weighted three
factors test based on assets, wages, and sales. Though imperfect as detailed above, this formula
proposal has the merit of being able to be agreed upon by the various jurisdictions and its
advantages in taxing economic realities far outweighs its disadvantages.
Under the equally weighted three factors test, assets, wages, and sales each constitute a factor
and each has the same weight in determining the countries taxable portion of the overall net
income of the MNE. In practice, each jurisdiction would compute the number of assets the MNE
holds in their territory, the amount of wages paid to employees in their country, and the amounts
of sales concluded from their country, in order to determine the amount of the net income to
which they are entitled to impose their taxing rights.
Under this equally weighted test, each of the factors would need a clear and agreeable definition.
Under the current proposal, assets would mean all assets whether tangible or intangible. The
location of tangible assets is rather easy to determine and in this proposal would constitute the
place where the assets can be found. The physical location of the assets will determine in which
country they are to be used as a factor for determining the net income attributable to that
jurisdiction. However, the physical location of the assets is only applicable to tangible assets. For
intangible assets, their location has sparked much debate in the current system of taxing MNE
and similarly pose a concern under a UT. Nevertheless, under the UT location of use of the IP
would determine its location as an asset. Under this conception, the place of registration of the
intellectual property for example, is not the determining factor for location of the intangible. As
an illustration, if a MNE has an intellectual property address registered in the state of Israel,
however, the use of that intellectual property is solely related to sales of the products the MNE
makes into the Cameroonian market. Under these circumstances, the intellectual property would
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be considered located in Cameroon as an asset, therefore, the factor would be taken into account
in Cameroon. If the intangible property is used in several jurisdictions, the degree of use in each
jurisdiction will determine the asset value that would attributable to that jurisdiction and the
ultimate value from that intangible that would be included in the country’s assets factor in the
formula.
Under this proposal, wages would have the common meaning of salaries on the one hand, but
also include the various new forms of compensation in the market. Therefore, the wages factor
would include regular salaries, bonuses, incentive based compensation such as stock options, as
well as contingent forms of compensation. The issue with the wages factor at an international
context is the exchange rate and the cost of labor. Labor cost in the US are empirically more
onerous that they would in any developing country and blindly recognizing wages without
appropriate considerations would lead to undue attribution of excessive taxable income to
developed countries such as the US. Under this proposal, the wage factor is subject to
adjustments. To determine how much wages are attributable to a certain jurisdiction and in order
to compare said wages with those of another jurisdiction, the computation would not be and the
comparison would not limit itself simply to the amounts at stake, but consideration would be
taken to how much of the amount represent in overall income in the jurisdiction. For example,
country A could pay 100 units of currency X (representing $100) in year 1, and in the same year,
the operations in the US have $500 in wages. Under this approach, we would not limit ourselves
to comparing and attributing 100 to country A and 500 to the US. Instead, we would look at how
much the 100 represent in the overall income in Country A and how much the 500 represent in
the overall income in the US. Thereby, adjusting the wages factor so as to account for the real
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weight of the wages in each of the jurisdictions, measured as a relative to the overall income of
the jurisdiction.
The sales factor adopted in this proposal refers to the gross amount of sales. Under this proposal,
sales would be deemed located in the jurisdiction in which the buyer is located. Under this
approach the physical location of the buyer is paramount. Under this proposal, the notion of
physical address of the buyer is adopted to determine the location of the sale. For in person sales,
one would rely on the address provided by the buyer at the point of payment. For online sales,
the shipment address as well as address used at the point of payment are indicators of the
physical location of the buyer.
This method of determining the location of sale based on the physical location of the buyer is
important because it is generally unbiased. While the MNE may want a sale to be located in one
jurisdiction instead of another in order to benefit from some tax advantages, for buyers, the
location of the sale is irrelevant for their tax perspective, and they would not use gamesmanship
or even be aware of any tax gamesmanship related to the report of their physical location.
The above outlined international tax proposal based on principles of UT would be beneficial, as
discussed above, to developing, and developed countries while not alienating the private sector.
The proposal is based on a common understanding of the notion of a unitary business, an
agreement on the application of combined reporting of net income, and allocation of taxing
rights based on an apportionment formula composed of an equally weighted three factors test.
The proposal is intended as a basic outline of generally agreeable pronouncements that would be
subject to negotiation and adaptations as needed during the country specific adaption of the UT
system.
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Further, the proposal, and the UT system in general are not incompatible to most current
international tax rules, in fact, the current international tax set up can serve as a spring board and
accelerate the transition and the implementation a UT system.
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B. Compatibility of UT with Current International Tax Treaty Network
Transfer pricing is currently governed by Article 9 of the treaties, which assumes the Separate
Accounting (“SA”) method because it addresses the commercial or financial relations between
associated enterprises. Traditionally, the term Permanent Establishment (“PE”) was meant to
include separate entities (subsidiaries). However, in 1933, the League of Nations introduced
Article 5 (ancestor to the current Article 9 of the Model) where separate enterprises were no
longer considered PE. If UT were adopted, Article 9 would become irrelevant in those situations
to which UT applies (i.e., where a unitary business is found to exist) because UT ignores the
transactions between related parties, and treats them instead as part of a single enterprise.
Instead, UT would be governed by Article 7. Under Article 5(7), “[t]he fact that a company that
is a resident of a Contracting State controls or is controlled by a company that is a resident of the
other Contracting State … shall not of itself constitute either company a permanent
establishment of the other.” However, it is well established that a dependent agent can be a PE
(see Art. 5(5)), and whether an agent is dependent is based on whether the principal exercises
legal and economic control over the agent. “An agent that is subject to detailed instructions
regarding the conduct of its operations or comprehensive control by the enterprise is not legally
independent.”
In the case of a modern, integrated MNE that operates as a unitary business, a strong argument
can be made in most cases that the parent of the MNE exercises both legal and economic control
over the operations of the subsidiaries, especially where the subsidiaries bear no real risk of loss
and acquire goods and services exclusively or near exclusively from the parent or other related
corporations. The existence of Intranets in most MNEs has resulted in most important
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operational decisions being centralized. In that case, the subsidiaries should be regarded as
dependent agents of the parent. Such a finding is in fact made with increasing frequency in both
developed and developing countries.
If the subsidiary is an agent of the parent, Art. 7(2) of the treaties requires the attribution of the
same profits to the subsidiary “that it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and
independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar
conditions.” Arguably, the application of UT satisfies this arm’s length condition because in the
absence of precise comparables, which almost never exist, it is not possible to determine exactly
what profits would have been attributable to the subsidiary under SA.
When the US adopted the `comparable profit method’ (CPM) and profit split in the 1994 transfer
pricing regulations, some countries objected that it was violating the treaties because these
methods did not rely on exact comparables to find the arm’s length price. However, these
objections eventually subsided, and the OECD endorsed similar methods in its transfer pricing
guidelines and more recently granted them equivalent status to the traditional methods. The US
has always maintained that both CPM and profit split satisfy the arm’s length standard despite
the lack of precise comparables (and in the case of profit split, using no comparables at all to
allocate any residual profits). Similarly, the US has maintained that the “super-royalty rule” of
IRC sec. 482 (which requires royalties to be “commensurate with the income” from an
intangible, and therefore subject to periodic adjustment) is consistent with the arm’s length
standard, even though no comparables can be found to show that such adjustments are ever made
by unrelated parties.

300

Before the recent changes to the OECD MC, it was therefore quite plausible to argue that UT
was compatible with the treaties if the subsidiary were as a factual matter legally or
economically dependent on the parent so as to constitute a PE. In addition, a country that wished
to adopt UT could rely on the language of the OECD MC Art. 7(4):
“Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to determine the profits to be attributed
to a permanent establishment on the basis of an apportionment of the total profits of the
enterprise to its various parts, nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from
determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be necessary; the method of
apportionment adopted shall, however, be such that the result shall be in accordance with the
principles contained in this Article.”
Since it can be argued that in the absence of comparables the result reached under UT is
equivalent to what could be reached under SA, this language seems to permit the use of UT for
dependent agent PEs.
However, the OECD in 2010 adopted changes to article 7 of the MC that would make this
argument more difficult to sustain. Specifically, the OECD adopted the “authorized OECD
approach” to the attribution of profits to a PE that treats a PE as the equivalent to a subsidiary,
and has suggested that the transfer pricing guidelines that explicitly reject UT should be applied
to PEs. In addition, the OECD has followed the US lead and deleted article 7(4) from its MC.
However, not all OECD countries accepted these changes, which were also rejected by
developing countries, and the UN model which still contains article 7(4).
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In fact, the vast majority of existing actual treaties have not been revised to incorporate those
changes. In particular, Appendix A (below) shows that many developing country treaties contain
article 7(4), even when the treaties are with OECD members. The Appendix lists 174 such
treaties by developing countries that contain this language, including recent treaties such as
India-Lithuania (2011) India-Nepal (2011) Korea-Panama (2010) and treaties with OECD
members such as India-Sweden, India-UK, Mexico-UK, and Sri Lanka-US. In all of those cases,
or in the absence of a treaty, countries should be free to implement UT in accordance with the
analysis set out above.

The Customary International Law Argument
The argument of customary international law does not, either, impede the application of a UT
approach. The argument is based on the contention that because SA and the ALS are embodied
in all of the treaties they should be considered binding. But embodiment in the treaties is not
enough to create a customary international law ban on UT, since article 7(4) is embodied as well.
Furthermore, it should be noted that Model Tax Treaties do not, in any way or form, create a
‘right to tax’. The key issue is the actual practice of states, i.e. what countries actually do as
domestic laws reign supreme in the area of taxation, and many of them follow UT approaches in
practice. In addition, countries should be free to follow the UN Model which does not adopt the
changes made by the OECD, and which is also widely followed.
Finally, it can be argued that even the OECD may be revising its approach. The authorized
OECD approach may have marked the high point of OECD commitment to SA. With the
unfolding of the BEPS project, which is influenced by large developing countries like China and
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India, it is likely that the OECD may be stepping back from its total commitment to SA.
Specifically, the adoption under BEPS of country by country reporting (which was already
required for extractive industries in the US) can be the basis for implementation of UT. This
development is very important for developing counties as many rely heavily on extractive
industries. The requirements of the country by country reporting, will allow a profound change in
taxation of the major industry in the developing world: the extractive industry.

Does Article 7 Preclude Application of UT to Entire MNEs?
One important question raised by Durst is whether the requirement that profits be “attributable”
to a PE under Article 7 of the model treaties means that if UT is applied, it must be done on an
activity by activity basis. Otherwise, profits would be “attributed” to the PE that have nothing to
do with it, because the PE is not engaged in the activity that generates these profits. However,
one would rather not make this assumption, because allowing a MNE to split its activities among
different subsidiaries is notoriously hard to combat, and facilitates precisely the kind of profit
shifting that developing countries in particular have a hard time policing.
In our opinion, the phrase “attributable to a permanent establishment” does not preclude
attribution of global profits of a MNE to a PE under whatever formula is adopted for UT
purposes. The reason is that once a functional analysis is performed and whatever can be
attributed to the various functions by using either comparables or a proxy (such as a fixed
percentage of costs as suggested by Durst), the remaining residual can be allocated in any way
we wish, since it is attributable to the entire MNE.
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Profit splits frequently result in a residual that cannot be allocated under the traditional functional
analysis because it results from cost savings that inhere in the relationship of the group members
to each other. The classic example is the US case involving Bausch and Lomb (B and L). B and
L developed an unpatented technology that enabled it to manufacture contact lenses at a cost of
$2.50 per lens, when its competitors had costs of $7.50 per lens. B and L contributed the
knowhow to its Irish subsidiary. The question facing the US court was whether to accept B and
L’s view that the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method should apply to determine the price
charged by the Irish subsidiary to its parent based on a comparison with prices charged by
independent lens manufacturers despite the difference in production costs. The IRS argued that
the residual profit from the know-how belonged to the US parent that developed it, but the court
rejected that view because the residual profit inhered in the relationship between the parties. Had
B and L Ireland been unrelated to its parent, the know-how would have been disclosed, the
competitors would have used it, and the residual profit would have disappeared.
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not say what should be done with residuals under the
profit split method. The US regulations follow the White Paper in assuming that any residual
results from intangibles and allocating the residual to where the intangibles were developed. This
is a view that favors US revenue interests because more intangibles are developed in the US than
elsewhere, but not surprisingly it has not been accepted by other OECD members. Nor is it
congruent with the facts, since residuals can result from other reasons such as cost savings from
synergies or advantages of scale, and they usually inhere in the relationship among the group
members and cannot be allocated to any one of them.
The OECD’s preferred method of applying the profit split method is to analyze the functions,
assets and risk of each member of the affiliated group. However, in the context of residuals this
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method also proves to be illusory. A functional analysis can only be applied to those functions
that can be assigned to the group members, such as production or distribution, but it does not
help with residuals that result from the relationship among the group members. Assets can
include intangibles, which are usually the most valuable assets of a modern MNE, but intangibles
also get their value from the relationship among the group members, as illustrated by the B and L
case. This makes it very difficult for them to be allocated to either where they were developed or
where they are exploited. The Glaxo case in which the IRS and HMRC disagreed about whether
the profit from selling Zantac, a drug developed in the UK, into the US market resulted from the
intangibles embodied in the drug itself or those used in Glaxo’s marketing resulted in massive
double taxation.
Risk is the trickiest concept of all. Recent case studies by the US Joint Committee on Taxation
reveal a model in which the entrepreneurial risk for a product is assigned to an affiliate in a low
tax jurisdiction and the manufacturing and distribution of the product in high tax jurisdictions are
done on a contract manufacturing and commissionaire basis. But it is not clear what the
allocation of entrepreneurial risk means among related parties. If a product fails because of
technological change or defects in manufacturing or environmental hazards, the risk is
effectively borne by the entire MNE, or more accurately by its management who risk being fired
and by its shareholders who see the stock price plummet.
Under UT, these issues can be solved by using the formula to allocate the residual by the profit
split method. The specific formula used can be negotiated, and is the topic Michael Durst has
written about. But in our opinion it is clear that whatever formula is decided upon should be
applied under UT to the entire profit of the integrated MNE, and not divided into separate
activities, and that this would be perfectly congruent with Article 7.
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Appendix 1: Current tax Treaties with Article 7-4 Language15
DATE

ADOPTED VERSION OF ARTICLE 7:
7-4 LANGUAGE

March 7,
1989

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Oct. 17,
1986

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Jan. 24,
1994

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Jan. 26,
1996

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

June 15,
2006

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Lithuania

July 26,
2011

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Luxemburg

June 2,
2008

Art. 32
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

CONTRACTING STATES

TENTATIVE CONCLUSION

INDIA &

Japan

New Zealand

Singapore

Israel

Kuwait

15

Data compiled from the IBFD, June 2015.
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Sept. 10,
2007

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sept. 30,
2010

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

April 2,
2008

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Feb. 15,
1997

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Nepal

Nov. 27,
2011

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Norway

Dec. 31,
1986

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

April 2,
1997

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Philippines

Feb. 12,
1990

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Taiwan

July 12,
2011

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Mexico

Mozambique

Myanmar

Namibia

Oman
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Feb. 8,
2006

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sri Lanka

Jan. 27,
1982

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sweden

June 7,
1988

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

June 18,
2008

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Tajikistan

Nov. 20,
2008

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Tanzania

May 27,
2011

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Mar. 22,
1985

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

United Kingdom

Jan. 25,
1993

Art. 30
“…nothing in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this
Article shall preclude that Contracting State
from determining the profits to be taxed by
such an apportionment as may be necessary
…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Ukraine

April 7,
1999

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Serbia & Montenegro

Syria

Thailand
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Sept. 7,
1994

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Netherlands

Mar. 5,
1973

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Switzerland

Aug. 29,
1988

Art. 25
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

April 30,
2004

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Japan

Mar. 3,
1982

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Kuwait

April 23,
1997

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Dec. 10,
1996

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sept. 6,
2002

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Vietnam

INDONESIA &

Iran

Mauritius

Mexico
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July 11,
2002

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Mar. 25,
1987

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

June 18,
1981

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Oct. 6,
1992

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Portugal

July 9,
2003

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Slovakia

Oct. 12,
2000

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

June 7,
1997

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Thailand

Mar. 25,
1981

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Tunisia

May 13,
1992

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Korea

New Zealand

Philippines

Poland

Syria
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Nov. 30,
1995

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

United Kingdom

April 5,
1993

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Ukraine

April 11,
1996

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Feb. 27,
1997

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Vietnam

Dec. 22,
1997

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Zimbabwe

May 30,
2001

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Syria

Feb. 21,
2000

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Mexico

Oct. 16,
1994

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

United Arab Emirates

Venezuela

KOREA &
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Mar. 25,
1997

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Romania

Oct. 11,
1993

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sri Lanka

May 28,
1984

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Feb. 12,
1980

Art. 26
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Tunisia

Sept. 27,
1988

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Ukraine

Sept. 29,
1999

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sept. 26,
1997

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Myanmar

Feb. 22,
2002

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Oman

Sept. 23,
2005

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Malta

Switzerland

Russia
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Oct. 20,
2010

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Slovakia

Aug. 27,
2001

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Slovenia

April 25,
2005

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Nov. 16,
2006

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

United Arab Emirates

Sept. 23,
2003

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Venezuela

June 26,
2006

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sept. 27,
1993

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Nov. 9,
1994

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Panama

Thailand

MEXICO &

Netherlands

Singapore
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Aug. 3,
1993

Art. 26
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

United Kingdom

June 2,
1994

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Norway

Mar. 23,
1995

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Nov. 30,
1998

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Portugal

Nov. 11,
1999

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Romania

July 20,
2000

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

June 7,
2004

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Slovakia

May 13,
2006

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Spain

July 24,
1992

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Switzerland

Poland

Russia
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Sept. 21,
1992

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Ukraine

Jan. 23,
2012

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Venezuela

Feb. 6,
1997

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Pakistan

May 18,
2006

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Oct. 24,
1994

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Portugal

Sept. 29,
1997

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Romania

Sept. 11,
1981

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Singapore

Jan. 9,
2007

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sweden

MOROCCO &

Poland
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Mar. 31,
1993

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

July 13,
2007

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Norway

Nov. 13,
1989

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

New Zealand

Oct. 15,
1980

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Mar. 15,
1971

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Slovakia

Mar. 4,
1974

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Venezuela

May 29,
1991

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Oct. 5,
2009

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Switzerland

Ukraine

NETHERLANDS&

South Africa

Oman
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Mar. 24,
1982

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Panama

Oct. 6,
2010

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Poland

Sept. 20,
1979

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sept. 20,
1999

Art. 32
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Qatar

April 24,
2008

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Taiwan

Feb. 27,
2001

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Mar.5,
1998

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Saudi Arabia

Oct. 13,
2008

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Slovenia

June 30,
2004

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Pakistan

Portugal

Romania
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Nov. 17,
1982

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

United Arab Emirates

May 8,
2007

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Uganda

Aug. 31,
2004

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

May 29,
1991

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Vietnam

Jan. 24,
1995

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Zambia

Dec. 19,
1977

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

May 18,
1989

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sept. 9,
1992

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sri Lanka

Venezuela

Zimbabwe

PHILIPPINES&

Poland
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Dec. 14,
2008

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Romania

May 18,
1994

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Russia

April 26,
1995

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Aug.1,
1997

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

San Marino

May 23,
2007

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Switzerland

Oct. 25,
1993

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Qatar

Oct. 24,
1999

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

May 16,
1996

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Qatar

Singapore

ROMANIA&

Yugoslavia
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Sept. 27,
1993

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Nov. 15,
1995

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Yugoslavia

Oct. 12,
1995

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Slovenia

Nov. 29,
1995

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Mar. 2,
1999

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Syria

Sept. 17,
2000

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Thailand

Sept. 23,
1999

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sept. 22,
2003

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

May 27,
1993

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Russia

RUSSIA&

Switzerland

Sri Lanka

Venezuela

Vietnam
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SAUDI ARABIA&

Sept. 2,
2011

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

April 10,
2010

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Slovenia

June 11,
2003

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Spain

Mar. 9,
2009

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Turkey

Oct. 12,
2005

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

United Arab Emirates

Jan 13,
2013

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

July 3,
1967

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Aug. 28,
2003

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Ukraine

Vietnam

SERBIA &

SOUTH AFRICA&

Switzerland

Ukraine
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SRI LANKA &

United Kingdom

United States

June 21,
1979

Mar. 14,
1985
As
amended
by 2002
protocol

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Although this paragraph is not included in
the U.S. Model, this is not a substantive
difference because the result provided by
paragraph 4 is consistent with the rest of
Article 7.
The U.S. view is that paragraphs 2 and 3 of
Article 7 authorize the use of total profits
methods independently of paragraph 4 of
Article 7 of the OECD Model because total
profits methods are acceptable methods for
determining the arm’s length profits of
affiliated enterprises under Article 9.
Accordingly, it is understood that, under
paragraph 2 of the Convention, it is
permissible to use methods other than
separate accounting to estimate the arm’s
length profits of a permanent establishment
where it is necessary to do so for practical
reasons, such as when the affairs of the
permanent establishment are so closely
bound up with those of the head office that it
would be impossible to disentangle them on
any strict basis of accounts.

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Feb. 23,
1983

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Switzerland

Jan. 11,
1983

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Thailand

Dec. 14,
1988

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sept. 24,
2003

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sweden

United Arab Emirates
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United Kingdom

Vietnam

June 21,
1979

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Oct. 26,
2005

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Mar. 18,
2001

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

May 2,
1976

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Oct. 19,
1988

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Feb. 1984

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

May 7,
1981

Art. 26
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Aug. 14,
1995

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

SUDAN &

United Arab Emirates

SWEDEN &

Tanzania

Thailand

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Ukraine
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Sept. 8,
1993

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Vietnam

Mar. 24,
1994

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Zambia

Mar. 18,
1974

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Mar. 10,
1989

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

July 9,
1999

Art. 26
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Vietnam

April 13,
1998

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Poland

April 18,
1997

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Oct. 10,
2002

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Venezuela

Zimbabwe

TAIWAN &

Thailand

MONGOLIA &

Singapore
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Switzerland

Sept. 20,
1999

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Thailand

Aug. 17,
2006

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

United Arab Emirates

Feb. 21,
2001

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

April 23,
1996

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Ukraine

July 1,
2002

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Vietnam

May 9,
1996

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Mar. 30,
1998

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Aug. 19,
1995

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

United Kingdom

MAURITIUS &

Oman

Singapore
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April 23,
1992

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Zimbabwe

Mar. 6,
1992

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

United Kingdom

Dec. 10,
1996

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Aug. 23,
1992

Art. 26
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Syria

Feb. 26,
2007

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Turkmenistan

Nov. 19,
2008

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

United Arab Emirates

Nov. 28,
1995

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Yugoslavia

April 24,
1990

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Dec. 26,
2006

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Implementation of a formulary
apportionment method would be
valid under the treaty thus not
requiring treaty renegotiation.

Sweden

MALAYSIA &

Mauritius

KENYA &
Thailand
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